Ideas and Ideals

The relationship between the unconscious and narrative identity remains unresolved within Russian philosophy. This study seeks to rectify this situation. The work’s scientifi c novelty is also determined by its interdisciplinary approach,
which integrates the traditions of phenomenology (E. Husserl), psychoanalysis (S. Freud), and philosophical hermeneutics (P. Ricoeur). This article conceptualizes
the unconscious as a noumenal source of subjectivity, inaccessible to direct signifi cation but manifesting itself through symptoms and affects. As a noumenon, the unconscious is inaccessible to direct reference, precedes symbolization, and serves as a space for the accumulation of “pre-refl ective” experience A hypothesis is advanced and substantiated regarding the dual function of the
unconscious in the structure of narrative identity: on the one hand, it serves as a “reservoir” for the formation of counternarratives that challenge established
self-narratives, while on the other, it constitutes the foundation of pre-reflective experience, ensuring the continuity of the pre-refl ective and the affective content
of implicit memory. It is demonstrated that the process of constructing narrative identity is linked not only to the symbolic horizon but also to affective experience
rooted in pre-refl ective experience, opening new perspectives for understanding the dynamics of personal identity construction.

The paper examines Aristotle’s place in one of the most signifi cant public education projects in late 19th to early 20th century Russia – the “Home Reading Programs” (1894–1914), published by the Moscow Commission for Self-Education.
The University Extension movement emerged as an attempt to overcome the class, geographic, and fi nancial barriers that prevented broad segments of the population from accessing systematic university knowledge. The “Programs”
offered readers structured courses in core academic disciplines, accompanied by recommended literature, methodological materials, and a system for assessing comprehension. Contrary to the widespread view that Aristotelian philosophy had weak reception in Russia, within the “Programs,” Aristotle’s philosophy occupies a central position in logic, psychology, political theory, law, history, literature, and aesthetics. Logic essentially in its Aristotelian version is treated as
the foundation of philosophical and scientifi c thinking. His political treatises are
used in the study of history and law, providing criteria for analyzing contemporary
political developments, patterns of political evolution, causes of coup-d’etat,
and actual governmental mechanisms. The Poetics serves as a basis for analyzing
literary forms and aesthetic theories. In the context of the “Programs,” Aristotle
appears not merely as an ancient author but as a relevant source of theoretical
models used to analyze both classical and modern sociocultural experience.
The “Programs” shaped an image of Aristotle as a universal thinker, a systematizer
of knowledge, the founder of scientifi c rationality, and the creator of
a scholarly tradition that retains methodological signifi cance for modernity.
Plato’s role is far more modest – he is portrayed as a mere philosopher of the past,
a dreamy author of idealistic doctrines that align philosophy with religion, and
of utopian political models. His philosophy is inferior to Aristotle’s in terms of
maturity and analytical rigor. The paper’s results demonstrate the signifi cance
of Aristotle’s philosophy in promoting models of intellectual culture through
the popularization and democratization of university education. They also offer
a new perspective on the scale and nature of the reception of Aristotelianism in
Russian culture within the context of educational initiatives of the time, and contribute
to a deeper understanding of the history of national education.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the problem of the relationship
between M. Heidegger’s ‘anti-metaphysical’ project and the so-called ‘indictment’,
which, with the assistance of a signifi cant part of representatives of
modern Western philosophy, seeks to present his philosophy as a metapolitical
project of affi rming the priority signifi cance of German’s ideas ‘soil’, ‘blood’,
‘destiny’, ‘spirit’ for world history. The author of the article presents the thesis
that the ‘anti-metaphysical’ project is a marker of the fact that accusations of the
national-socialist character of M. Heidegger’s philosophical thinking are groundless
and may relate only to his personal views, which had a more or less long-term
nature. The development of this thesis is based on the consideration of the criticism
of the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger by the French phenomenologists
J. -L. Marion and M. Henry.
In the fi rst part of the article the author presents a historical-philosophical
view of M. Heidegger’s ontology of intentionality as an ecstatic sphere of the being
of the beings, or ‘Logos’, which acts as the main element in the structure of
the fundamental ontology and metaphysics of fi nitude “Being-Logos-Beings”.
The second part of the article proposes to examine M. Heidegger’s Dasein
in the context of his doctrine of the ‘human-guardian’ of beings in its being.
This doctrine serves as a basis for radically questioning the assertions regarding
the metaphysical content implicitly present in the philosophy of M. Heidegger.
This allows us to remove accusations from fundamental ontology, the metaphysics
of fi nitude and the philosophy of the event in the presence of “national-socialist”
contents in them and to point out the inaccuracies contained in the criticism
of M. Heidegger by J. -L. Marion and M. Henry..

The article discusses the position expressed by Peter Engelmeyer, the fi rst Russian philosopher of technology, that signs, language and thinking can be subsumed under the concept of technology. The author shows that there is indeed a problem here, to solve the problem it is necessary to understand and distinguish between the concept of technology and non-technology, represented by signs, language and thinking. Based on his studies of the nature and genesis of technology, he characterizes the latter as a cultural and historical formation, a solution to unsolvable problems and tasks, as an artifact that allows solving such problems and creating new natural processes that were previously unobservable and even non-existent, and fi nally, as a conceptualization of technology. Characterizing signs, the author shows that the meaning and the sign as a whole, as a concept, in contrast to the artifact, as a product of activity, relate to the inner, to the life world of a man. For a better understanding of this thesis, a case is considered – a story told by K. Jung in his last book, on the material of which the concept of the life world and the scheme explaining Jung’s act are introduced. Regarding language and thinking, two cases are distinguished: in one they are not technology, in the other, if rules and methodology are used, they can be considered as intellectual technology. The last part of the article discusses hybrid types of technology, specifi cally neural computers. The author shows that in a neurocomputer, due to technical imitation of the neural network and training, a model is created that allows, at the request of a person, to take information from the Internet, construct written speech according to the rules of language and reason according to the rules of logic. At the same time, this model does not replace natural intelligence, which lives and unfolds in people and in social communications. Since people are constantly improving computer technology and trying to replace natural intelligence with artifi cial intelligence, the neurocomputer as a model becomes more and more perfect in terms of the product (the results of linguistic communication and thinking).

In the 20th century, philosophy saw a number of rediscoveries of the idea of culture and, accordingly, the formation of approaches to its study. Given the extremely “confused and ambiguous social history” (T. Eagleton) of this idea, the article reveals its presence in the thoughts of different generations of Russian philosophers. The article is based on the materials of the book “Philosophical Generations” (Moscow, 2022), which contains a collection of autobiographical narratives of Russian philosophers of the mid-20th – early 21st centuries. Based on the memoirs and thoughts of philosophers about their time, the development of the concept of “culture”, its semantic emphases and fl uctuations in the second half of the 20th century are studied. The rich material presented in this “chronicle of the Moscow philosophical community” allows us to trace the specifi cs of philosophical solutions to the “problem of culture” and the reverse impact of structural transformations of culture, art, and aesthetics on philosophy. The search for a relevant philosophical language to describe cultural dynamics in an era of constant and multiple crises deserves special attention. The author of the article suggests looking for ways to place the problem of culture in a philosophical context associated with tradition, modernity and new methodologies in the humanities.

In search of the specifi cs of the domestic approach to the phenomenon of culture, the author turns to the analysis of discussions around the ‘philosophy of culture’, ‘cultural studies’, ‘cultural research’, ‘dialogue of cultures’. Particular attention is paid to the humanitarian discussions of the 1980-1990s, in particular, the discussion around the relevance of the Silver Age, the ‘cult’ of which fell precisely on these years, is reconstructed. The conducted research made it possible to identify, on the one hand, the generational specifi city of the theoretical positions and formulations of the issue of culture presented in the book (fi xing points of misunderstanding and breaks), and on the other, to catch traces of their interactions.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the problem of the relationship between M. Heidegger’s ‘anti-metaphysical’ project and the so-called ‘indictment’, which, with the assistance of a signifi cant part of representatives of modern Western philosophy, seeks to present his philosophy as a metapolitical project of affi rming the priority signifi cance of German ‘soil’, ‘blood’, ‘destiny’, ‘spirit’ for the world history. Appeals to the meaning of M. Heidegger’s philosophy of the event as a refl ection on the historicity of the accomplishment of the truth of Being itself, which has nothing in common with the will to power, which is the apogee of the metaphysical style of thinking, are rejected by these representatives as false and bewitching concepts designed to obscure and hide the ‘true’ intentions of the philosopher. The author of the article presents the thesis that the ‘anti-metaphysical’ project is a marker of the fact that accusations of the national-socialist character of M. Heidegger’s philosophical thinking are groundless and may relate only to his personal views, which had a more or less longterm nature. The development of this thesis is based on the consideration of the criticism of the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger by the French phenomenologists J. -L. Marion and M. Henry. In analyzing the views of the abovementioned authors, the fi rst part of the article presents a historical-philosophical view of M. Heidegger’s ontology of intentionality as an ecstatic sphere of the being of the beings, or ‘Logos’, which acts as a main element in the structure of the fundamental ontology and metaphysics of fi nitude “Being-Logos-Beings”.

The article attempts to determine the specifi cs of the semiotic hierarchy of neo-Protestantism and to identify its structure. The object of the research is the dogmatic and praxeological complexes of neo–Protestantism, and the subject is the structure of their semiotic hierarchy. Semiotic methodology is used as a basic methodology in the study. The terminology used in the hierarchy is defi ned and explained.  The concept of hierophany is studied as the basic one in religious semiosis. The author gives its confessional concepts (Orthodoxy, Catholicism). The historical biblical facts of hierophany are considered. Their semiotic structure is investigated. There is a genetic similarity between the facts of the biblical science of hierophany and the concept of hierophany in neo-Protestantism. The consistency and complementarity of all three semiotic concepts are emphasized. The work also lays the prerequisites for the study of semiotic transformation – semiotic drift. The result of the study was the identifi cation of specifi c features of the semiotics of neo-Protestantism, which allows it to go beyond value judgments from the standpoint of religious semiotics and overcome its theological and social marginalization.

The author of the article identifi es the initial context for the assumption of the connection between the ideal and the real, which is the basis of classical epistemology of the XVII century. The author shows that initially such a connection presupposed deep ontological transformations of the real through unity with the ideal. The tradition of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation was formed in archaic times and continued until Modern Times. Classical epistemology arose in the XVII century as a titanic attempt to translate the theurgic act of transformation into the sphere of the possibilities of cognition, to replace the ideal principle (or higher reality) with the possibilities of the human mind. So, on the one hand, classical epistemology retains its connection with the universal tradition of the search for truth as a transformation, and therefore it is highly appreciated by many modern epistemologists. But on the other hand, due to the unjustifi ability of its claims to transformation, it (classical epistemology) breaks with the entire history of the search for truth as a transformation that preceded it. From the need to expose the unjustifi ed assumptions of classical epistemology, the inevitability of non-classics arises. The identifi cation of such a ‘genealogy’ of modern epistemology allows us to conclude, fi rstly, that all the ‘diseases’ of the classical theory of knowledge, which have worsened to date, are ‘genetically’ conditioned and, beyond the idea of transformation, all attempts by defenders of the classics to somehow neutralize them will, by and large, miss the mark. Secondly, the aspirations of non-classics to expose the abuses of the classics, which lead the modern theory of knowledge to dead ends, can, on the contrary, become guidelines for further searches as references to the context of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation, which is original for classical epistemology, where the initial motives of unjustifi ed abuses of the classics become clear.

The article is devoted to the problem of fundamentalism arising within the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, as if contrary to his main position. This approach proclaims the freedom of the method, plurality, the purpose of which is the liberation of research activities, the rejection of the dictate of the method. However, these principles, reduced to the slogan “everything will do”, lead to a serious contradiction: if everything will work, then the dictate of the method will do. Epistemological anarchism is quite capable of pandering to the fundamentalism with which it is called to fi ght. This problem is the subject of the study of this work. In this regard, the method of critical analysis was applied to this research principle, designed to identify its internal contradictions and limitations. With the help of the method of hermeneutics, epistemological anarchism is associated with the broader context of the deontologization of European philosophy, and the corresponding issues. This makes it possible to interpret some ways of understanding P. Feyerabend’s theory as a transition of science from a claim to objectivity to ‘social constructivism’. But such a transition is just a reversal of the classical subject-object opposition. Using the theories of B. Latour, a different interpretation is given to the works of P. Feyerabend, an interpretation that indicates the hybridization of the research strategy, the constant interweaving of things, researchers and forms of expression of research programs and subjects of research. The consequence of such an interpretation of epistemological anarchism is an indication that scientifi c methods are not eliminated in their aspect of the regulation of research activity, but acquire a new property – they are understood aesthetically. Thus, as an addition to the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, there is the concept of aesthetic experience, where the method of science is a “guide”, freely chosen for the purposes of clarity of presentation, the way of expressing scientifi c ideas. An important feature of this approach is a specifi c relationship to empiricism, namely the concept of aesthetic experience. The latter presupposes not the verifi cation of the truth of theories by empiricism, but the use of empirical data as an array of expressions, as a condition for the problematization of any theory. In this regard, aesthetic experience and the corresponding empiricism inverts the principle ‘everything will do’ to ‘nothing will do’.

The paper offers an understanding of the trends and prospects for the development of modern fl at ontology on the example of object-oriented philosophy. The main attention is paid to the concepts developed within the framework of the object-oriented ontology project in the works of G. Harman, L. R. Bryant and T. Morton. The phrase ‘weird realism’, proposed by object-oriented ontology, claims to describe both the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world and current trends in modern philosophy. The work reconstructs the key provisions of object-oriented ontology, fi xes the contradictory consequences of ontological egalitarianism, object-centrism, and criticism of correlationism. The philosophy of object-oriented ontology offers an immaterialistic model of reality, defi ned by an irreducible variety of a multitude of equivalent, but ‘withdrawn’ objects from direct human access. Object-oriented ontology denies the ideas of holism, proclaims ontological egalitarianism, and fi xes the identity of human and ‘non-human’ beings.  The paper notes that the philosophy of objectoriented ontology balances between schematism (through the ‘fl attening’ of being) and metaphorization, objectivity and subjectivism, holism and mereology, the statics of identical and incoherent objects and the dynamism of their internal activity. The criticism of correlationism in the works of representatives of object-oriented ontology takes the form of a rethinking of anthropocentrism. The incorporation of non-human beings as full-fl edged actors expands the possibilities for the co-evolution of man and nature, the fi eld of human moral responsibility. The author discovers that the object-centricity of object-oriented ontology contains signs of ecocentrism and panpsychism, and the ‘democracy of objects’ takes the form of conceptual animism. The recognition of the selfworth of ‘non-human collectives’, the statement of their intertwining with humans expand the possibilities for mapping natural and socio-cultural objects, but raise issues that require comprehensive discussion. The author comes to the conclusion that despite the contradictions, the philosophy of object-oriented ontology encourages a rethinking of classical philosophical issues, contributes to understanding the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world.