Ideas and Ideals

The article suggests a critical overview of the most prominent discussion among the European and American researchers about the dogma problem in Sextus Empiricus teaching: whether the Pyrrhonian sceptic can have a dogma. Due to his philosophy’s features labelled by Sextus as a non-dogmatic one, scholars have divided into two groups. On the one hand there are supporters of an «urban» interpretation (M. Frede, G. Fine, C. Perin) who argue that the sceptic can have some beliefs – namely impressions passively acquired by the sceptic during his life. On the other hand there are the supporters of a «rustic» interpretation (J. Burnyeat, J. Barnes) who refute the former view and take the opposite one: sceptics can have no belief, for belief is defined as a proposition about the world taken to be true by an agent who expresses it. In that case the sceptic’s ataraxia, based on suspension of judgement, wouldn’t come to life. After the analysis of arguments a critical rethinking of the grounds of the discussion is presented. G. Striker argued that the results of a discussion would depend on belief’s notion. K. Vogt suggested to apply the ancient notion of belief as an assent to an impression and came to the conclusion, that the sceptic cannot have beliefs. His beliefs would be pathos, which just push him to act. In addition an idea of K. Vogt is presented that one should distinguish doxa and dogma, for the latter notion was thought as a body of teaching, not as a singular statement. The conclusion contains the main results of the discussion to this moment.

In this paper the author tries to look at Leibniz from the topos of Indian philosophy. François Jullien called such a strategy “dépayser la pensée” – to withdraw a thought from its habitat and to see it through the lens of different culture. She refers to Indian philosophy, especially to some Buddhists systems, and highlights – in a more general intercultural perspective – continualistic and atomistic approaches in Leibniz’s thought. The author argues that despite Leibniz’ consistent criticism, predominantly from the continualistic position, of the ancient and the contemporary atomism, Leibniz in his own metaphysics remained a convinced atomist - his monads are the only final causes of things, substances, or "true atoms of nature". In this paper, Leibniz’ mereological arguments are examined with the help of some principles and conceptualizations developed in Indian philosophy. In particular, the author compares the whole-parts models in monadology and in Nyāya, as well as the Buddhist schools of Abhidharma and Yogācāra. The article also shows that because of their atomistic approach both Leibniz and Buddhists confronted a problem of how to give an account for a complex substance, and proposed different strategies of dealing with its continuity. If we evaluate the position of Leibniz, for example, from a Buddhist point of view, its main drawback consists in theism, in an attempt to shift responsibility for the universe from human beings to God, and instead of investigating causal relations between things to recourse to the theistic principle of pre-established harmony.

The article deals with the mathematization of thinking program proposed by Leibnitz, and the program of Mathematics foundations by Hilbert. The author argues that modern symbolic and mathematical logics were created on the basis of these programs. The article examines which aspects and meanings of thinking and reasoning had to be sacrificed, why modern symbolic logics are continuously reproducing, and what is the relationship of symbolic logics to the traditional Aristotelian one. Defending the pointed out statements, the author refers to the works of Aristotle and Schopenhauer, Ya. Lukasevich, A. Vasilyev, A. Karpenko, A. Anisov, S. Pavlov. The article states that the formation of symbolic logic required philosophical reflection of the conditions of conceivable solutions of symbolic logic creators and the need to distinguish between the two types of historical logics, to resolve the contradictions between the sense of autonomy of symbolic logic and the sense of its dependence on the traditional logic. According to the author’s opinion, Ludwig Wittgenstein, then Lukasevich, and the other Russian philosophers tried to respond to the mentioned above challenges in their works.

The author analyzes five aspects of ontological teachings of Leibniz and Spinoza and identifies commonalities and differences in the positions of these two philosophers. The first aspect is adherence to rationalism. The god is an essentially rational being, and so is the world. However for Leibniz the god is outside of the rational world he created, but for Spinoza the rational god is the world itself. The second aspect is acceptance by both philosophers of predeterminism of everything in the world. For Leibniz this is the result of the god’s choice to create the best out of the many possible worlds, but for Spinoza the world is not the result of the god’s choice. The third aspect is the answer to the question about the freedom of the god. They both accept this freedom, but for Leibniz this is freedom of the god as a subject making a conscious choice out of many possible choices, while for Spinoza freedom is self-determination of activity of impersonal substance. The fourth aspect is acceptance by both philosophers of objective necessity. For Spinoza the god and necessity is the same thing. For Leibniz absolute necessity is mightier than the god. The fifth aspect is acceptance by both philosophers of multiple components of the universe and their mutual isolation and consistency of elements at the same time. The god is the source and reason of this consistency for both philosophers, but for Leibniz the god is outside of the world of multiple monads, while for Spinoza it is the unity of multiple attributes of the god itself.

The author analyzes the Leibniz’s idea of “uniqueness of objects”, i.e. his conclusion that every possible object is present in one and only one possible world. The article reveals the role of the principle of indistinguishability of identity in this conclusion, referring to the discussions in modern philosophy, which are generated by similar conclusions. Leibniz treats any possible world as a holistic system. This places his reasoning in the context of disputes about the validity of various holistic approaches. Leibniz accepts the “Holistic Assumption”, according to which all objects of one possible world are determined through each other. The article also shows how Leibniz’s “uniqueness of objects” logically connects his teaching with certain statement of the problem of intentional identity, as well as with ongoing discussions about mental holism. The author demonstrates that Leibniz did something more than the developing of the theory of metaphysical possible worlds – which, thanks to the works of S. Kripke, became the “canonical” semantics for modal logic. In addition, Leibniz stood at the beginning of understanding the possible worlds as corresponding to the subject of cognition’s perceptions. Thus, Leibniz also made a step towards the development of the semantics of epistemic logic that was proposed by J. Hintikka. The interpretation of the problem of intentional identity in E. Saarinen’s works is based on the accepting of the “uniqueness of objects” for many worlds, which are open to certain subject, and not for one and only one possible world, as in Leibniz’s works. The author concludes that the ways of generating the problem of intentional identity for Leibniz’s semantics and the ones for Saarinen’s semantics are similar. All this shows that the problems stated by Leibniz’s possible worlds semantics have been still discussed.

The problem of moral principles in the life of an individual and society has become rather acute in the context of the global spread of consumerism as the installation of modern civilized behavior of the individual. Traditionally, moral foundations are investigated as moral principles of individual behavior. The article draws attention to the problem of moral foundations of social life, which was first identified by the Russian philosopher V. Solovyov. The author considers two issues. The first one is the problem of moral foundations: whether morality has a religious origin or its roots are hidden in sociogenesis, in establishing principles of behavior in cultural communities. The second problem concerns the existence of issues of morality in public life and its impact on social relations. The article shows that the moral principles express solidarity relations among people. They arise in the course of new programs formation of symbolic behavior in communities following the way of active sociogenesis. New behavior, which is programmed by culture, requires establishing solidarity relations among members of the society, because deprived of such relationships, socio genetic development becomes impossible. Cooperation, based on the feeling of inner unity, is essential to the society. For this reason, moral foundations turn out to be the system principles of social organization, including economic life and economic relations in the society. Moral progress in the history of society is manifested in the development of solidarity principles up to the level of universal human morality, which defines the principles of behavior for societies and individuals.

What is Marxist philosophy? About thirty or forty years ago the answer could be found in any textbook of philosophy. Philosophy is "the science of universal laws of motion and evolution in nature, human society and thought." The inseparable connection between philosophy and "various branches of positive science" was postulated as well as its status as a universal method of all sciences, and so on. But here is the casus – there are no works of Marx himself, where his philosophy of Marxism as such would be stated. Kant has three of his "Critiques", Hegel has "The Science of Logic." So N. Mikhailovsky once asked: "In what work did Marx expound his materialistic understanding of history? ... Where is such work of Marx? – There isn’t any." Lenin, at the beginning of his revolutionary career, sarcastically giggling, replied to Mikhailovsky that the philosophy of Marx is "dissolved" in his numerous works on economics, politics, history, etc., and it is, so to say, their "dry residue". Indeed there is little reason to fully trust the quality of the analysis of the leader of the world proletariat and his conclusions.

The article is devoted to the anniversary of the birth (370 years ago) and the date of death (300 years ago) of the outstanding German philosopher, mathematician, physicist, jurist, historian, linguist, and diplomat Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz undertake a creative synthesis of science, philosophy and theology, producing a unique philosophical system. The foundation of this system is constituted by the doctrine of preestablished harmony. In all areas in which he worked, Leibniz made great discoveries. It inherited the gift of synthesizing the disparate views of different thinkers on the basis of the original methodological principle based on the universality and rigor of philosophical arguments in their logical sequence. Leibnitz is also a great theologian and originator of the profound ethical system. Ethical optimism of Leibniz's teleology has Christian religious worldview as its basis.

The starting point for writing this article was a wide circulation of ideas about the identity of such notions as sobornost and collectivism not only at the level of mass consciousness, but also in the research literature. The purpose of the article is to show the fallacy of such beliefs. The original author's position is that sobornost and collectivism constitute two different traditions - if sobornost, being of a religious origin, is related to the Orthodox spiritual experience, collectivism originated from social and political experience. The author draws attention to the fact that this erroneous assertion is based on misunderstanding that sobornost refers to the metaphysical reality, not the social one. The article outlines the key points of the concept ‘sobornost’ in the interpretation of A. Khomyakov, and the development of this idea in the writings of S. L. Frank. If collectivism, absolutizing unity, makes a personality ‘smaller’, thereby destroying it, sobornost, on the contrary, makes a personality “bigger’, allowing him/her to fully develop. It is sobornost that helps self-actualizing of a person. It is emphasized that moving towards sobornost as the highest stage of human development is performed through strengthening of individuality. The author draws a conclusion that such a radical convergence of two concepts: sobornost and collectivism entails various scenarios for Russia's future.

The development of society is presented as a type of its complicacy. The complicacy is shown to have two major quality parameters – the direction and nature – unified by the concept of cognature. The direction of development is determined by the hierarchy of the problems society chooses and gradates, and the nature of development is given by the methods of problem solving typical for the society. The problems, in turn, are created by the needs of a subject (an actor) and the typical methods of problem solving by its dispositions. This theory is shown to be related to classical theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber and synergetic paradigms as well. The relevance of the theory is stipulated by the growing complexity of the global situation and the multiplicity of factors influencing it. The basic problematic level of the social cognitive science is identified. It consists of relations between cognitive constructs and social phenomena. The main task of clarifying how the interaction of made decisions created by cognature of a society assembles the social reality is worded. Practical application of social cognitive science is the methodology elaboration of appraisals of the decisions to be made, the projects to be implemented at all levels, starting with the individual level up to the global one taking into account the complicacy change. The fundamental principal underlying such appraisals is not diminishing the complicacy; every decision should be both adequate to reality and not diminish its complicacy because there are reasons to suppose that simplifying reality decisions work only till the definite point, after which entropy starts growing and it ends in catastrophe.