Dynamics of the Demarcation Status of Theories
Ruslan Abzaltdinov
This article advances the discussion by S.Yu. Kolomiytsev and N.I. Martishina concerning the limitations of falsifi ability criteria within the scientifi c demarcation problem. The subject of the study is the dynamics of a theory’s scientifi c status during its development and the relationship between this dynamic and classical demarcation criteria. The methodology employs an evolutionary model that frames scientifi c status as a variable attribute of a theory’s life cycle. This model defi nes fi ve sequential stages in a theoretical construct’s evolution: metaphysical (speculative idea), protoscientifi c (testable hypothesis), scientifi c (verifi ed theory), aposcientifi c (outdated but utilized model), and exscientifi c (rejected concept). The terms protoscience, aposcience, and exscience serve as author defi nitions for stages 2, 4, and 5, respectively. The main result establishes the specifi c, context-dependent function of classical demarcation criteria as triggers for transitions between these stages: potential falsifi ability enables the shift from metaphysics to protoscience; empirical verifi cation drives the progression from protoscience to science; the accumulation of anomalies or emergence of a competing theory signals a move from science to aposcience; irrefutable falsifi cation underpins the transition from aposcience to exscience. The analysis demonstrates that these criteria operate not as universal indicators of scientifi city, but as mechanisms governing the evolution of demarcation status. Furthermore, the model reveals the potential for a theory to return from aposcience to science through modifi cation, highlighting the prevalence of evolutionary correction over radical paradigm shifts. The conclusions emphasize the practical value of this approach. It provides a systematic tool for assessing a theory’s epistemological status using stage-relevant criteria, classifying transitional knowledge states, optimizing scientifi c resource allocation, and integrating the frameworks of K. Popper, T. Kuhn, and I. Lakatos into a unifi ed dynamic scheme. Critically, the model offers a solution to the core theoretical diffi culties regarding the applicability and limitations of demarcation criteria raised in the Kolomiytsev-Martishina discussion.