Ideas and Ideals

Modern philosophy of mind focuses on such aspects of consciousness as perception, information processing, and qualia (also occurring in perception). At the same time, insuffi cient attention is paid to such conscious actions of the subject as decision-making and action. However, action requires no less consciousness than perception. It is not so much the philosophy of mind that deals with action as the philosophy of subject. This article makes a connection between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of subject through the concepts of freedom and selfrelationship. The subject is essentially free because he makes decisions. Even if his decisions are determined by his biological arrangement or his history, he transforms past determinations into future ones, and still the decision-making occurs, so that some freedom is required. As for mind, it is also related to freedom because its light is lit in the same decision-making situations. There is a special group of decisions concerning subject’s relations. The subject’s relations to the world, to the Self, to the Others, to transcendence are considered. In relation to the world, the subject can manifest his freedom through self-restraint, renunciation of power, based on Heidegger’s maxim of “letting being be.” He can build his attitude towards Others in an ethical paradigm, for example, according to the teachings of Levinas. Transcendence can be given in the form of looking at oneself from the outside. A special group of actions of the subject is distinguished: self-attitude and self-action. In the fi eld of mind it is self-consciousness. The subject can modify his own attitudes based on the transcendent point that he himself posits. This also has implications for the choice of values. The religious relation to one’s own soul and Heidegger’s doctrine of transcendence are considered. Self-existence is a supremely free action of the subject through which he constructs himself.

The article examines the genesis of the Eurasian ideology of the 1920–1930s from the point of view of discourse analysis. Discourse is defi ned as a set of statements refl ecting different points of view on the same issue. In accordance with this defi nition, the author isolates the Eurasian discourse from two adjacent ones - the pre-revolutionary imperial and religious-philosophical. The problematics of pre-revolutionary imperial discourse were focused on justifying the right of Russian tsars to own lands and peoples within the existing borders of the empire, as well as the right to expand these borders. The religious and philosophical discourse about Russia was built around the question of its divine purpose in the history of mankind. In contrast, Eurasian discourse focuses on ethnocultural synthesis within the boundaries of a special geographical area, most of which is located within the Russian state. But before the revolution of 1917, this problem was not considered at all in this formulation. The predecessors of Eurasianism include only a few authors who recognized and positively assessed the Turkic-Mongol infl uence on the Russian mentality and statehood. However, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the prevailing tendency was to downplay or deny this infl uence altogether. The turn to the Eurasian issues is associated with the work of symbolist poets A. Blok and A. Bely. Being infl uenced by the religious and mystical prophecy of the philosopher V. Solovyov, they accepted the revolutionary upheavals of the early twentieth century, as the awakening of the “inner East” in the Russian people. Together with other representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, they were the creators of the Eurasian myth, born in the elements of revolution and civil war. The founders of the Eurasian movement rationalized this myth, reducing it to political ideology. This was a version of the new imperial ideology, which explained and justifi ed the preservation of a united and indivisible Russia within its former borders.

The ancient separation of the world into the domains of ideas and things created the ground for questioning about true existence. Thus, reality could be attributed to ideas, or it could be attributed to things. Given the tension between Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies, the problem of the status of general notions was embodied in medieval philosophical discussion, often clothed in theological form. The article reconstructs the controversy around the ontological status of universals within several scholastic doctrines. The essence of this dispute, from a perspective that is of ontological and gnoseological interest, comes down to clarifying the categorical grid, within which it is possible to make statements concerning reality. There are at least three main positions that refl ect the views of scholastic thinkers on the ontological nature of universals: realism, nominalism and conceptualism. The basic difference between them is determined by confl icting opinions regarding the issues of autonomy of the existence of universals, their dependence on the mind and things, and also about their materiality. This study reproduces the crucial moves of the scholastic thought of realists (A. Canterbury), nominalists (W. Occam), conceptualists (P. Abelard) and moderate realists (F. Aquinas), around which the conceptual background of the conversation about reality is formed. At the same time, it became obvious that the concept of realism (which was not yet in the philosophical vocabulary during the period of scholasticism) acquires its features in the intersections and contradictions between positions in the range from strong realism to extreme nominalism. Besides, it has been demonstrated in actual analysis that a set of alternative solutions to the problem of universals was refl ected in the broad philosophical problems of Modern (along the epistemological teachings of rationalism and empiricism) and contemporary thought (in projects of speculative realism, fl at ontologies, as well as in the fi eld of philosophy of mind). At the same time, it must be recognized, as a result, that the later development of the concept of realism and the problems of cognition associated with it had a retrospective impact on the correlation of scholastic positions with each other.

The article presents a brief essay on the analysis of three key concepts in the philosophy of Georges Bataille – heterology as the logic of exclusion, (a-)theology as an atheistic understanding of the death of God and the concept of ‘negative’ or ‘sacrificial’ Sovereignty. It seems that the key to understanding the various and heterogeneous philosophical, literary-poetic, cultural-anthropo­logical and socio-economic concepts of the French thinker is the prism of the heterological logic of exclusion, which opposes the internalization of the domi­nant ontological discourse. The heterology or ‘logic of exclusion’ used by Georg­es Bataille, is not so much a negative version of the traditional logic of ‘inclu­sion’, but is a logic of alternative extremes. It is precisely by striving to overcome the dominant metaphysical universalism of the general order of being (embod­ied, according to Bataille, in the concept of ‘being’ / ‘die Existenz’ in the philos­ophy of Martin Heidegger). In an effort to overcome the dominant metaphysical universalism of the general order of being, Bataille turns to various kinds of ‘de­nials’ and extremes – the left sacred or the sanctity of ‘foulness’, the metaphori­cal of the disgusting, erotic and violent forms of transgression, the cultivation ofthe experience of inner abandonment and ultimate despair, and, also, to his own concept of ‘sacrifice’, serving as a guide to the world of sovereign domination.

Thus, developing his concept of metaphysical ‘sovereignty’, Bataille turns not only to the existential, but also to the political sphere, largely contrasting his ‘metaphysics of sacrifice’ with the concept of ‘metaphysical domination’ ofthe German political and legal theorist Carl Schmitt. The nihilistic energy drawn from Friedrich Nietzsche and the ‘metaphysical negation’ taken from Hegel’s dia­lectic through the interpretation of Alexander Kozhev is used by Bataille for the purposes of his own ‘heterological’ logic of exclusion, desubjectivization and dissolution. However, negation for Bataille is not a target for itself, but a meth­odological tool on the way to the ‘Other’ excluded from any ontosemantic order.

With the prevailing ideas of humanism in the public consciousness, many boundaries were created that divide people into categories. At the same time, on one side of the border there are those who are more deserving of the title ‘hu­man’ in comparison with those who are on the other side. Over the course ofhistory, these borders have been actively rebuilt, and the pace of their changes has become increasingly rapid in recent years.

The article examines changes at five such boundaries: between men and women, according to belonging to different religious denominations, to differ­ent nationalities and races, between healthy people and disabled people (includ­ing between the mentally healthy and the crazy), as well as changes in attitudes over time to the homeless and tramps. The author considers the consequenc­es of changes that have already occurred or are planned at each of these five boundaries.

The author believes that a mandatory factor in global economic development has always been the “friendly-alien” division. With the help of such division in economic activity, trust is generated, which is the most important institution nec­essary for the existence and development of the economy and social organiza­tion. Trust facilitates the interaction of economic agents and facilitates the func­tioning of monetary mechanisms.

Large-scale attempts to erase boundaries between people are being made through coups and revolutions, but they lead to the replacement of previous­ly existing boundaries between people with new ones. An attempt to eliminate classes leads to the creation of a new system of boundaries - property inequality. An attempt to eliminate property inequality and the exploitation of man by man leads to the creation of a new system of boundaries – by the place in the vertical of power, by membership in the ruling party, and others.

For this reason, with any reforms and radical transformations, it is advisable to anticipate the formation of new borders, and also to evaluate if they are muchbetter than the previous ones in terms of social justice and economic efficiency.

In the current article the author considers the problem of the subject’s per­sonal identity. The analysis of this concept seems to be very relevant, since in today’s public space the concept of identity is used, firstly, as non-problematic, and, secondly, as completely politicized. The analysis of the concept of identity is important because philosophy can look at the subject’s identity without preju­dice and thereby depoliticize its concept. And ontology as a branch of philoso­phy is able to carry out a truly fundamental and comprehensive research of the concept of the subject’s identity. Personal identity turns out to be an ontological concept because the subject exists as identical to itself, and consistent reflection on the modes of existence of the subject inevitably leads us to discover the con­cept of its identity.

The subject of the article is the subject’s personal identity. On the basis ofphilosophical methodology and on the method of historical analysis, the author of the study considers personal identity as something non-self-evident, placing it in the conceptual framework of subjectivity proposed by Levinas. The personal identity of the subject is endowed with the status of a mediator, smoothing out the collision of the same and the other. In this research, human identity appears as both a space and the result of a collision of familiar experience and new im­pressions – in the terminology of Levinas – identical and different. The tempo­ral structure of the subject’s identity is revealed. The concept of an ontological criterion of personal identity is put forward and four historical concepts that of­fer such a criterion are considered: Locke, Hume, Kant and Parfit. Thus, four ontological criteria are found – consciousness, memory, transcendental criterion and psychological continuity. Each criterion is analyzed, integrated into the on­tology of the subject’s personal identity and the role of each criterion is traced in the organization of its temporal structure. The results of the research are the reconstruction of the discovered concepts in the status of ontological criteria ofpersonal identity, their comparative analysis is carried out. It is concluded that Parfit’s psychological continuity is the most consistent of all the analyzed criteria because it simultaneously affirms the possibility of the subject’s personal iden­tity and outlines the boundaries of the application of this concept. Though psy­chological continuity doesn’t fit in Levinas’ conceptual frame because it doesn’tsolve existential and ontological problems, that exist around concept of personal identity.

The article analyses both the book of American philosopher ChristophCox “Sonic Flux: Sound, Art and Metaphysics” and a wide range of criti­cal publications dedicated to this book. The project “Sonic Flux” belongs tosonic materialism (a branch of “New Materialism’) also known as “Deleuziansound studies”. For Cox this means a development of “immanent metaphys­ics” launched by G. Deleuze. But while continuing the project of Deleuze,Cox inherits his predicaments. Their range is as broad as the specter of Cox’ssources covering philosophy, arts, theory of perception. Debates around theproject “Sonic Flux” highlighted such problems as the way Cox understandsmaterialism and how he understands access to reality. Cox’s correlation of fi­nite and infinite; particularity and universality, and anti-historicism are highlyproblematic for critics. Since Cox claims to develop a theory of sound art weassess his ideas from this perspective. This allows us to focus on modernism,anonymity and anti-humanism, central to Cox’s project but not to its criti­cism. A less important aspect – resentiment in Cox’s style – turned out to behelpful in drawing conclusions that the whole project “Sonic Flux” is builtupon a range of assumptions. Cox himself names some of them while weindicated some others.

The main conclusion of the article is the idea that the project “Sonic Flux” cannot provide an adequate theory of sound art nor contribute to sound stud­ies because it is too embedded in the worst kind of modernism and structural­ism. Such important notions of sonic materialism as autonomy and anonymity of sounds perfectly fit the tradition of Modernism while being completely alien to the sound studies.

The subject of this research is various ideas about happiness in the history of philosophy. Happiness is a concept of a special kind, the importance of which in motivating human activity is extremely great. The subject arouses a constantly renewed interest among philosophers, psychologists, educators, sociologists and other specialists throughout the foreseeable intellectual history of mankind from Antiquity to the present day. All people strive for happiness, understanding it as a guarantee of a prosperous existence, but they put the most diverse meaning into this concept. Happiness has always been the most important motive of human actions, therefore it is necessary to clarify the actual content of this phenomenon in the conditions of the modern spiritual situation of the time of the confrontation of cultures and civilizations. The purpose of the work is an attempt to analyze from the historical and philosophical positions the intellectual and emotional-spiritual state of a person in which he feels happy. Each historical epoch put forward its own ideals, so intellectuals offered new formulas of happiness. The philosophical origins of the concept of happiness investigated in the article allow us to consider and substantiate its substantive aspect from various positions (theological, social, psychological). The methodological basis is the general scientifi c methods of cognition (historical, system-structural and dialectical, due to the complexity and internal inconsistency of the subject) in combination with the philosophical and anthropological approach. The main method of research is the historical-deductive method, a method of comparative analysis of philosophical approaches to solving the problem of happiness in various historical epochs. In conclusion, the authors assert that happiness is a deeply experienced complex integral physical, mental, intellectual, social and spiritual state that depends on the person himself. A person’s happiness is himself, his life created by him, in which all the acquired values of culture fi nd their true place and meaning. The results of the study can be used in the process of educating young people and teaching philosophy and humanities in various educational institutions.

In the history of philosophical thought the past twentieth century was marked by a great turning point caused by the collapse of the previous intellectual, cultural, and attitudinal paradigm characteristic of the classical modern era. Acting as the destroyer of this paradigm, postmodernism prioritized the “effectiveness of language”, freeing it from morality and truth, and reducing it to the transmission of information regardless of the degree of honesty or dishonesty of the position taken by the interested party. It is in the philosophy of postmodernism that language in its functional and especially in its axiological relation has undergone a violent degradation. Unlike postmodernism, the philosophy of the modern era has never ceased to live the history and heritage of world philosophical thought, the importance of which in the history of cultures and civilizations has always been recognized as the beginning of all subsequent intellectual and technical achievements of mankind. The key place in the article is occupied by the analysis of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, which creates a “theology without God” and rejects divine reality, without the realization of which the only possibility remains despairing pessimism. In postmodernism, language ceases to be an instrument of cognition of reality, remaining an instrument of the strategy of persuasion. Thus, philosophy should not abandon its own purpose in the search for teleological meaning in the evaluation and interpretation of human being in the world. The new conceptualization of the existence of the world and man was formalized in the philosophy of existentialism and postmodern. These approaches to the interpretation of man, his language, thinking, consciousness and faith inherent in the philosophy of J.-P. Sartre, N.A. Berdyaev, K. Jaspers, M. Heidegger, J. Derrida, M. Foucault and R. Rorty form the subject of this article. The author shows that it is the philosophy of classical modernity, based on Christian doctrine with its orientation to the life of the future century, is an alternative to postmodernism.

The a rticle discusses three versions of the question of the structure of Epicurus’ philosophy. According to the fi rst version, Epicurus’ philosophical teaching consists of three parts: physics, ethics and canonics. An established tradition in the history of philosophy speaks in favor of this version. An important role in the formation of this tradition was played by such authors as Cicero, Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius. According to the second version, Epicurus’ philosophical teaching is limited to two parts: physics and ethics. The Canonics is not considered as a separate section. It is part of physics. The basis for this version is the emphasis in the texts of Epicurus on two teachings: about nature and lifestyle. The two-part structure of epicureanism is also reported by some late Antique authors. According to the third version, the philosophical teaching of Epicurus does not have a strict division into separate parts. First of all, this is evidenced by the lack of clear statements of Epicurus about the structure of his teaching. It also follows from the texts of Epicurus that he adheres to a holistic view of philosophy, in which there is no special need to divide it into separate parts. In addition, works are attributed to Epicurus, the classifi cation of which is not reported. This may indicate a weak elaboration by Epicurus of the question of the structure of philosophical teaching. It was found that Epicurus does not share Plato’s and Aristotle’s representations about the classifi cation of sciences. Epicurus contrasts the representation of the division of sciences into theoretical, practical and productive with the opinion of the division of sciences into useful – contributing to the acquisition of serenity and useless – not contributing to the achievement of this goal. Epicurus’ disagreement with academics and peripatetics on this issue contributes to the assumption that Epicurus does not share other representations of his opponents, including the three-part structure of philosophy.