Ideas and Ideals

The article attempts to determine the specifi cs of the semiotic hierarchy of neo-Protestantism and to identify its structure. The object of the research is the dogmatic and praxeological complexes of neo–Protestantism, and the subject is the structure of their semiotic hierarchy. Semiotic methodology is used as a basic methodology in the study. The terminology used in the hierarchy is defi ned and explained.  The concept of hierophany is studied as the basic one in religious semiosis. The author gives its confessional concepts (Orthodoxy, Catholicism). The historical biblical facts of hierophany are considered. Their semiotic structure is investigated. There is a genetic similarity between the facts of the biblical science of hierophany and the concept of hierophany in neo-Protestantism. The consistency and complementarity of all three semiotic concepts are emphasized. The work also lays the prerequisites for the study of semiotic transformation – semiotic drift. The result of the study was the identifi cation of specifi c features of the semiotics of neo-Protestantism, which allows it to go beyond value judgments from the standpoint of religious semiotics and overcome its theological and social marginalization.

Medieval thought in its philosophical, theological and poetic guise appeared to readers of Modern Times as the thought of the ‘highbrow’, which was facilitated by the scholastic method of research. The Renaissance era contrasted the ‘highbrow’ with a man rediscovering the world, who appeared as multidimensional, open to different traditions, and therefore unable to claim the completeness of knowledge. One of the main principles of thinking was the polylogicality of philosophical logic. And although this meant the coupling of various cognitive systems, taking place in the mainstream of communication (not generalization), the reliance on the Word and its expression of thought remained unchanged for everyone, which initially placed the philosopher in a religious atmosphere: the philosopher worked with something that expressed itself and was ready for its own renewal (philosophy was originally religious). This was realised by Nicholas of Cusa, who understood the original thought as having a willingness to think and the ability to think, which is why the text of the Bible seemed self-speaking. He was the herald of ‘scientifi c ignorance’. He was rather an ignoramus (a layman, a simpleton, a fool) relative to the ‘highbrow’ scholastics. But the introduction of the idea of the simpleton itself meant that the philosophical context included the whole of human life with its faith and hopes, education and upbringing of each person, which was expressed in S. Brant’s “Ship of Fools”, in the “Laudatory Word of Stupidity” by Erasmus of Rotterdam, in the “Letters of dark People” by W. Von Hutten and in the “Book about the Sage” by S. de Beauvel, an informative text, sometimes reminiscent of textbooks, which is the knowledge of a Simpleton.

The article is devoted to the traditional philosophical problem of the essence of man, but an approach to its solution through the reconstruction of the origin of the main distinctive features is chosen. The attention is focused not on the boundary, which somewhere and once hominins from the genus Homo (protosapiens) crossed in their evolution, becoming full-fl edged Homo sapiens. This boundary is called the “Rubicon of sapientation”, and sapientation here is understood as approaching the essential human features associated with “reasonableness”: conscious behavior, speech communication, special sociality, cultural accumulation and openness to subsequent evolution. The thesis that this “Rubicon” was crossed not in the known achievements of the Upper Paleolithic of western Eurasia (c. 50–40 thousand years BP), but several tens of thousands of years earlier in Africa is substantiated. On the basis of generalization of various indirect data the main processes and macroevents of this epoch are reconstructed. The reasons for the formation of intergroup alliances are shown, as well as the cardinal role of abilities necessary for such fundamentally new interactions and relations. The acquisition of essential human traits in this concept is understood as a consequence of the development of special “magic wands” – fl exible polyfunctional structures with high possibilities of modifi cation and synthesis. These include rituals, syntax and “withdrawal communication”, supersituational thinking, arbitrary normativity and institutionality. All of them, on the one hand, are connected in a special way with the ability to create intergroup alliances, and on the other hand, they constitute necessary and suffi cient ingredients for the essential qualities of “rationality”.

The author of the article identifi es the initial context for the assumption of the connection between the ideal and the real, which is the basis of classical epistemology of the XVII century. The author shows that initially such a connection presupposed deep ontological transformations of the real through unity with the ideal. The tradition of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation was formed in archaic times and continued until Modern Times. Classical epistemology arose in the XVII century as a titanic attempt to translate the theurgic act of transformation into the sphere of the possibilities of cognition, to replace the ideal principle (or higher reality) with the possibilities of the human mind. So, on the one hand, classical epistemology retains its connection with the universal tradition of the search for truth as a transformation, and therefore it is highly appreciated by many modern epistemologists. But on the other hand, due to the unjustifi ability of its claims to transformation, it (classical epistemology) breaks with the entire history of the search for truth as a transformation that preceded it. From the need to expose the unjustifi ed assumptions of classical epistemology, the inevitability of non-classics arises. The identifi cation of such a ‘genealogy’ of modern epistemology allows us to conclude, fi rstly, that all the ‘diseases’ of the classical theory of knowledge, which have worsened to date, are ‘genetically’ conditioned and, beyond the idea of transformation, all attempts by defenders of the classics to somehow neutralize them will, by and large, miss the mark. Secondly, the aspirations of non-classics to expose the abuses of the classics, which lead the modern theory of knowledge to dead ends, can, on the contrary, become guidelines for further searches as references to the context of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation, which is original for classical epistemology, where the initial motives of unjustifi ed abuses of the classics become clear.

The article is devoted to the problem of fundamentalism arising within the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, as if contrary to his main position. This approach proclaims the freedom of the method, plurality, the purpose of which is the liberation of research activities, the rejection of the dictate of the method. However, these principles, reduced to the slogan “everything will do”, lead to a serious contradiction: if everything will work, then the dictate of the method will do. Epistemological anarchism is quite capable of pandering to the fundamentalism with which it is called to fi ght. This problem is the subject of the study of this work. In this regard, the method of critical analysis was applied to this research principle, designed to identify its internal contradictions and limitations. With the help of the method of hermeneutics, epistemological anarchism is associated with the broader context of the deontologization of European philosophy, and the corresponding issues. This makes it possible to interpret some ways of understanding P. Feyerabend’s theory as a transition of science from a claim to objectivity to ‘social constructivism’. But such a transition is just a reversal of the classical subject-object opposition. Using the theories of B. Latour, a different interpretation is given to the works of P. Feyerabend, an interpretation that indicates the hybridization of the research strategy, the constant interweaving of things, researchers and forms of expression of research programs and subjects of research. The consequence of such an interpretation of epistemological anarchism is an indication that scientifi c methods are not eliminated in their aspect of the regulation of research activity, but acquire a new property – they are understood aesthetically. Thus, as an addition to the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, there is the concept of aesthetic experience, where the method of science is a “guide”, freely chosen for the purposes of clarity of presentation, the way of expressing scientifi c ideas. An important feature of this approach is a specifi c relationship to empiricism, namely the concept of aesthetic experience. The latter presupposes not the verifi cation of the truth of theories by empiricism, but the use of empirical data as an array of expressions, as a condition for the problematization of any theory. In this regard, aesthetic experience and the corresponding empiricism inverts the principle ‘everything will do’ to ‘nothing will do’.

The paper offers an understanding of the trends and prospects for the development of modern fl at ontology on the example of object-oriented philosophy. The main attention is paid to the concepts developed within the framework of the object-oriented ontology project in the works of G. Harman, L. R. Bryant and T. Morton. The phrase ‘weird realism’, proposed by object-oriented ontology, claims to describe both the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world and current trends in modern philosophy. The work reconstructs the key provisions of object-oriented ontology, fi xes the contradictory consequences of ontological egalitarianism, object-centrism, and criticism of correlationism. The philosophy of object-oriented ontology offers an immaterialistic model of reality, defi ned by an irreducible variety of a multitude of equivalent, but ‘withdrawn’ objects from direct human access. Object-oriented ontology denies the ideas of holism, proclaims ontological egalitarianism, and fi xes the identity of human and ‘non-human’ beings.  The paper notes that the philosophy of objectoriented ontology balances between schematism (through the ‘fl attening’ of being) and metaphorization, objectivity and subjectivism, holism and mereology, the statics of identical and incoherent objects and the dynamism of their internal activity. The criticism of correlationism in the works of representatives of object-oriented ontology takes the form of a rethinking of anthropocentrism. The incorporation of non-human beings as full-fl edged actors expands the possibilities for the co-evolution of man and nature, the fi eld of human moral responsibility. The author discovers that the object-centricity of object-oriented ontology contains signs of ecocentrism and panpsychism, and the ‘democracy of objects’ takes the form of conceptual animism. The recognition of the selfworth of ‘non-human collectives’, the statement of their intertwining with humans expand the possibilities for mapping natural and socio-cultural objects, but raise issues that require comprehensive discussion. The author comes to the conclusion that despite the contradictions, the philosophy of object-oriented ontology encourages a rethinking of classical philosophical issues, contributes to understanding the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

This article is devoted to the study of the history of translations of Aristotle’s heritage into Russian. For a complete picture, the article examines in general terms the degree of familiarity of the Old Russian reader with the corpus of his texts (in particular, with treatises on animals, “Categories”, “Politics”, “Physics”, “Topics”, etc.). However, key attention is paid to supplementing the general “List” of pre-Soviet translations of Aristotle with texts, a signifi cant part of which had not previously appeared in the scientifi c literature. The most valuable among the discovered works are the translations of the “Hymn to Virtue”, the inscription to the statue of Hermias in Delphi and Aristotle’s “Testament”, as well as the lost translations of “Poetics” made by A. F. Merzlyakov. Conclusions are made that the described translations for the most part do not have scientifi c value, since they are unprofessional and are often made using secondary literature. However, this does not exclude their historical signifi cance. Bibliographic information about the translations themselves, their volume and translators, as well as the texts of the translations of the “Hymn” and the inscription on the statue of Hermias, for convenience, are presented in the form of appendices and are given at the end of the article.

The felicitous turn of European civilization forms a critical industry – a set of ideas about what happiness should be and how to feel it correctly. In these conceptual ideas, the concepts of “success” and “happiness” are mixed or replaced, and the value experience of experiencing failure is not considered. Experiences of happiness are replaced by ambiguous emotional states associated with the practices of achievement and demonstrative strategies. The doctrine of social success is modal and deprives a person of the freedom to choose alternative lifestyles. The felicitous doctrine is based on the mechanism of social pressure, forcing a person to choose “happy objects”. Happiness in its social sense is imposed, a person is deprived of his free individual happiness.

We consider the concept of “happiness” in relation to its oppositions: success, failure. Success requires constant confirmation and carries risks of failure. Failure is seen as a form of happiness, filled with valuable experience necessary for building a future trajectory in life. This allows us to come to the definition of happiness, its socio-philosophical and sociocultural content, and to form a scientific understanding of the culture of happiness. The conclusions are based on the methods of systemic, sociocultural approaches.

The culture of happiness characterizes the felicitous experience of humanity. Happiness is a subsystem of the cultural system; it embraces eternal values with a single semantic content, dictates the norms of virtue, performs stabilizing and regulating functions, and manifests itself in symbolic design. The semantic content of happiness connects the terminal (noological) and instrumental (everyday) aspects of a person’s spiritual life and his social practices. Behavioral patterns and symbolism are distributed in accordance with the dual content of the concept of “happiness”.

When the orderly and ordered systemic character of classical scientifi c theories or philosophical concepts reproduces the supposed order of nature, the obvious and unproblematic nature of such correspondence does not require further refl ection. On the way to solving actual problems of conceptualisation of chaos, paradoxes arise: the stronger the ordering means and the more developed concepts, the less chaos remains in it, and vice versa, the more chaos, the less conceptual said concept will be. This paradox turns out to be a specifi c version of a bigger paradox – how do we conceptualise what ultimately escapes conceptualisation? How do we grasp something intangible by defi nition? This is ultimately maintained by the rigidity of classical binary oppositions, the removal of which allows one to avoid its most radical forms. Typical examples would be the problem of the Other or the attempts at consistent thinking of contradictions. The same thing happens with the conceptualisation of the non-systemic and the unstable. We need to systematise the non-systemic one way or another just to incorporate knowledge about it into the broader body of knowledge about complex systems. As for the unstable, it has to be stabilised to end up forming a concept. Even though ontology of the unstable has to correspond to what is being conceptualised, it cannot afford to be too unstable, or else it risks failing to be recognised by the academic community altogether. The paradox can be overcome if we use the means provided to us by post-non-classical approaches in philosophy, which reject classical interpretations of chaos, in turn allowing us to construct concepts fl exible and mouldable enough to actually approach chaos on a level that matches state-of-the-art epistemologies. This outlines a way to think about chaos chaotically, but also to avoid the self-destructive catastrophe of chaotic thinking. Some of the aforementioned concepts are: chaosmos, hyperchaos, magma, plasma and plasmagma. In the light of above considered ways and methods of overcoming the paradox of conceptualization of chaos or perhaps the possibility of avoiding the paradox entirely, it is clear that it is necessary to transform the very mode of our thinking, it is therefore necessary to rethink thinking itself in order to build suffi ciently fl exible and plastic post-non-classical concepts which stand a chance of making the comprehension of chaos accessible to begin with.