Ideas and Ideals

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

This article is devoted to the study of the history of translations of Aristotle’s heritage into Russian. For a complete picture, the article examines in general terms the degree of familiarity of the Old Russian reader with the corpus of his texts (in particular, with treatises on animals, “Categories”, “Politics”, “Physics”, “Topics”, etc.). However, key attention is paid to supplementing the general “List” of pre-Soviet translations of Aristotle with texts, a signifi cant part of which had not previously appeared in the scientifi c literature. The most valuable among the discovered works are the translations of the “Hymn to Virtue”, the inscription to the statue of Hermias in Delphi and Aristotle’s “Testament”, as well as the lost translations of “Poetics” made by A. F. Merzlyakov. Conclusions are made that the described translations for the most part do not have scientifi c value, since they are unprofessional and are often made using secondary literature. However, this does not exclude their historical signifi cance. Bibliographic information about the translations themselves, their volume and translators, as well as the texts of the translations of the “Hymn” and the inscription on the statue of Hermias, for convenience, are presented in the form of appendices and are given at the end of the article.

Medieval thought in its philosophical, theological and poetic guise appeared to readers of Modern Times as the thought of the ‘highbrow’, which was facilitated by the scholastic method of research. The Renaissance era contrasted the ‘highbrow’ with a man rediscovering the world, who appeared as multidimensional, open to different traditions, and therefore unable to claim the completeness of knowledge. One of the main principles of thinking was the polylogicality of philosophical logic. And although this meant the coupling of various cognitive systems, taking place in the mainstream of communication (not generalization), the reliance on the Word and its expression of thought remained unchanged for everyone, which initially placed the philosopher in a religious atmosphere: the philosopher worked with something that expressed itself and was ready for its own renewal (philosophy was originally religious). This was realised by Nicholas of Cusa, who understood the original thought as having a willingness to think and the ability to think, which is why the text of the Bible seemed self-speaking. He was the herald of ‘scientifi c ignorance’. He was rather an ignoramus (a layman, a simpleton, a fool) relative to the ‘highbrow’ scholastics. But the introduction of the idea of the simpleton itself meant that the philosophical context included the whole of human life with its faith and hopes, education and upbringing of each person, which was expressed in S. Brant’s “Ship of Fools”, in the “Laudatory Word of Stupidity” by Erasmus of Rotterdam, in the “Letters of dark People” by W. Von Hutten and in the “Book about the Sage” by S. de Beauvel, an informative text, sometimes reminiscent of textbooks, which is the knowledge of a Simpleton.

The article is devoted to the traditional philosophical problem of the essence of man, but an approach to its solution through the reconstruction of the origin of the main distinctive features is chosen. The attention is focused not on the boundary, which somewhere and once hominins from the genus Homo (protosapiens) crossed in their evolution, becoming full-fl edged Homo sapiens. This boundary is called the “Rubicon of sapientation”, and sapientation here is understood as approaching the essential human features associated with “reasonableness”: conscious behavior, speech communication, special sociality, cultural accumulation and openness to subsequent evolution. The thesis that this “Rubicon” was crossed not in the known achievements of the Upper Paleolithic of western Eurasia (c. 50–40 thousand years BP), but several tens of thousands of years earlier in Africa is substantiated. On the basis of generalization of various indirect data the main processes and macroevents of this epoch are reconstructed. The reasons for the formation of intergroup alliances are shown, as well as the cardinal role of abilities necessary for such fundamentally new interactions and relations. The acquisition of essential human traits in this concept is understood as a consequence of the development of special “magic wands” – fl exible polyfunctional structures with high possibilities of modifi cation and synthesis. These include rituals, syntax and “withdrawal communication”, supersituational thinking, arbitrary normativity and institutionality. All of them, on the one hand, are connected in a special way with the ability to create intergroup alliances, and on the other hand, they constitute necessary and suffi cient ingredients for the essential qualities of “rationality”.

The article distinguishes and analyzes two planes of discourses about death, as well as understanding of the cosmos: natural, independent of man, on the contrary, determining his life, and private, so to speak artificial, oriented towards man. Already in the works of Plato and further throughout history, these planes can be reconstructed. For example, they are demonstrated in the novel by Alexander Bogdanov “Engineer Manny”. The author shows that the private plane was initially independent; it was formed in the Ancient World on the basis of semiotic schemes that were invented as means of resolving problematic situations. The understanding of death and space is no exception. The corresponding schemes were understandable to man, as if they were created for his benefit, which is easy to explain, because it was man who invented the schemes that allowed him to understand what was happening and act effectively. Another matter is modern scientific explanations of the Universe and human death. They often describe (model) natural processes independent of man, which with iron necessity force him to follow these processes, but which man cannot understand. The isolation of the private plan, the author argues, did not benefit man. When the latter ignored the natural plan, realizing only his desires in the cognition of reality, the resulting reality became similar to the content of his consciousness without any correction from experience. The author illustrates this position by analyzing one of Carl Jung’s youthful memories. Based on the difference between these two plans, a brief understanding of the natural, humanitarian and social sciences, as well as death and the Universe, is offered. Although the Universe is a physical object, it is also an object of the humanities and social sciences. The latter can be understood in the sense that the Universe is a highly complex text and message that we have yet to understand, as well as a certain form of life, naturally, not biological, the nature of which, again, needs to be understood and explored. In conclusion, the article discusses the crisis of our civilization and a possible scenario for its resolution.

The felicitous turn of European civilization forms a critical industry – a set of ideas about what happiness should be and how to feel it correctly. In these conceptual ideas, the concepts of “success” and “happiness” are mixed or replaced, and the value experience of experiencing failure is not considered. Experiences of happiness are replaced by ambiguous emotional states associated with the practices of achievement and demonstrative strategies. The doctrine of social success is modal and deprives a person of the freedom to choose alternative lifestyles. The felicitous doctrine is based on the mechanism of social pressure, forcing a person to choose “happy objects”. Happiness in its social sense is imposed, a person is deprived of his free individual happiness.

We consider the concept of “happiness” in relation to its oppositions: success, failure. Success requires constant confirmation and carries risks of failure. Failure is seen as a form of happiness, filled with valuable experience necessary for building a future trajectory in life. This allows us to come to the definition of happiness, its socio-philosophical and sociocultural content, and to form a scientific understanding of the culture of happiness. The conclusions are based on the methods of systemic, sociocultural approaches.

The culture of happiness characterizes the felicitous experience of humanity. Happiness is a subsystem of the cultural system; it embraces eternal values with a single semantic content, dictates the norms of virtue, performs stabilizing and regulating functions, and manifests itself in symbolic design. The semantic content of happiness connects the terminal (noological) and instrumental (everyday) aspects of a person’s spiritual life and his social practices. Behavioral patterns and symbolism are distributed in accordance with the dual content of the concept of “happiness”.

When the orderly and ordered systemic character of classical scientifi c theories or philosophical concepts reproduces the supposed order of nature, the obvious and unproblematic nature of such correspondence does not require further refl ection. On the way to solving actual problems of conceptualisation of chaos, paradoxes arise: the stronger the ordering means and the more developed concepts, the less chaos remains in it, and vice versa, the more chaos, the less conceptual said concept will be. This paradox turns out to be a specifi c version of a bigger paradox – how do we conceptualise what ultimately escapes conceptualisation? How do we grasp something intangible by defi nition? This is ultimately maintained by the rigidity of classical binary oppositions, the removal of which allows one to avoid its most radical forms. Typical examples would be the problem of the Other or the attempts at consistent thinking of contradictions. The same thing happens with the conceptualisation of the non-systemic and the unstable. We need to systematise the non-systemic one way or another just to incorporate knowledge about it into the broader body of knowledge about complex systems. As for the unstable, it has to be stabilised to end up forming a concept. Even though ontology of the unstable has to correspond to what is being conceptualised, it cannot afford to be too unstable, or else it risks failing to be recognised by the academic community altogether. The paradox can be overcome if we use the means provided to us by post-non-classical approaches in philosophy, which reject classical interpretations of chaos, in turn allowing us to construct concepts fl exible and mouldable enough to actually approach chaos on a level that matches state-of-the-art epistemologies. This outlines a way to think about chaos chaotically, but also to avoid the self-destructive catastrophe of chaotic thinking. Some of the aforementioned concepts are: chaosmos, hyperchaos, magma, plasma and plasmagma. In the light of above considered ways and methods of overcoming the paradox of conceptualization of chaos or perhaps the possibility of avoiding the paradox entirely, it is clear that it is necessary to transform the very mode of our thinking, it is therefore necessary to rethink thinking itself in order to build suffi ciently fl exible and plastic post-non-classical concepts which stand a chance of making the comprehension of chaos accessible to begin with.

The purpose of the article is to reflect on the concept of Intelligent Design, the connection between the development of this theory and the development of scientific ideas about the world, as well as about free will and predestination.

As a basis in the methodological aspect, the authors applied the five Proofs of the Being of God, which were developed by Thomas Aquinas, namely, the proofs: 1) from motion, 2) from the producing cause, 3) from necessity, 4) from the degree of perfection, 5) from the purposeful cause.  After characterizing each proof, the authors of the paper refute or prove each of the proofs in terms of the concept of predestination and the Being of God. We believe that Thomas Aquinas’ proofs are based in part on Aristotle’s logic and hence on commonplace conceptions of the world. Aristotle, indeed, is the founder of a number of modern sciences that are key today. In addition, the authors refer to one of the greatest philosophers of the enlightenment era in relation to his views in the doctrines of expediency and aesthetics as a category of the beautiful and reasonable.

The relationship between ontological randomness, quantum physics, and issues of freedom of choice and predestination is analyzed. The authors then draw on the aforementioned philosopher’s writings on free will and Genesis to reflect on the theses of causality, and conclude that freedom is God, and God is where there is choice.

The subject of the research in this article is epistemic paternalism, considered from the perspective of social epistemology. The research methodology uses methods of socio-philosophical cognition (systemic, functional, informational, etc.). The article substantiates the idea that, despite the variable assessments of epistemic paternalism, it has an objective basis for existence and in one form or another is reproduced in the processes of cognition, meaning the intervention of actors in the processes of cognition of individuals without their consent, but with the aim of bringing them benefi t. However, in many cases epistemic paternalism is diffi cult to distinguish from paternalism in general. A number of conditions must be fulfi lled to distinguish epistemic paternalism from general paternalism. But even in this case it is important: who implements such an intrusion, for what purpose and to what results it leads. The variant of epistemic libertarian paternalism seems preferable, although it could not avoid drawbacks. The question is: can the choice made by an individual in the process of cognition, based on given epistemic conditions, be considered truly free, and can he himself be considered an autonomous subject of cognition? This variant of paternalism largely corresponds to the concept of ‘nudging’, in which the creation of appropriate conditions ‘pushes’ the individual to a certain choice. At the same time, the following problems remain unresolved: who has the right to carry out this ‘nudge’, how to determine the true goals of such an intrusion and prevent malicious actions on the part of interventionists, etc.

The subject of this article is the phenomenon of the boundary between the private and public spheres. The research is based on a systematic approach that allows analyzing and combining individual aspects of the phenomenon under study, as well as methods of logical and historical analysis, hermeneutical and logical methods. The ratio of public and private spheres has now become the subject of consideration of a number of social sciences and humanities. If the public sphere is fundamentally transparent and open to everyone, then privacy, on the contrary, is connoted with darkness, opacity, mystery. A person as a social being is characterized by the need for both public and private space. The boundaries between public and private space can be both material (doors, walls) and immaterial (laws, traditions, social norms). It is noted that these boundaries are not static, they change in space and time, depend on culture, generation and social stratum. Socially constructed boundaries of privacy are formed on the basis of existing ideas in this society about the degree of personal inviolability. What a person is allowed to demonstrate and see is subject to public expectations. Different ideas about personal boundaries can lead to cross-cultural confl ict. It is argued that borders protect the right to privacy associated with tact, voluntary refusal to interfere in the personal affairs of another person. The observance of social distance constitutes personal freedom in both public and private space. Deprivation of privacy humiliates human dignity. Therefore, the right to private space, the ability to defend and protect personal boundaries is a necessary prerequisite for personal freedom and autonomy.