Ideas and Ideals

May 7th, 2020, the wonderful philosopher Tatyana Borisovna Lyubimova died. Her final monograph “Philosophy and Countertradition” is a multifaceted study of the correlations between traditional culture and the current state of philosophy. This is also the last publication on the life path of Tatyana Borisovna, in her philosophical adventure, where Western sociology and categorical aesthetics, ancient Russian philosophy and metaphysics of a unified tradition became landmarks. Tatiana Borisovna always lacked topos and chronos, she wrote about Peter I and the sociology of Adorno’s music, the ontology of tragedy and the ecology of culture, about the dialogue of civilizations and the philosophy of life of Rozanov; she translated Böhme and Berleant, Sartre and Ricoeur. Particularly noteworthy is the participation of T.B. Lyubimova in grant research on the interaction of cultural models, the modernization of ideology and the globalization of cultures, where she expressed her non-standard opinion outside the ordinary field of consciousness. In short, Lyubimova’s system can be called a ‘strange philosophy’. This is a philosophy where self-discovery of the paradoxes of one’s own world takes place. This is a portrait of culture without its essence, made according to aesthetic guidelines. This is a worldview where a metaphysical thread stretched between unusual reference points: Kepler’s hexagonal snowflakes and the calendar rites of the farmers of Central Asia.

Tatyana Borisovna published the largest anthology of the works of René Guénon in Russian in her own translation. The French traditionalist remained for Tatyana Borisovna a transcendental magnet of her late work, he set the course of her inner time, bestowed metaphysical freedom, and clarified the increasingly complex world of quantitative relations.

The article presents a historical and philosophical retrospective aimed at establishing strict conceptual boundaries that prevent uncontrolled extrapolation of modern terms and concepts to realities that are not included in the meanings of modern humanitarian discourse. The philosophical definition of the “culture” concept is substantiated, which includes specific characteristics that have a chronologically factual origin. The authors give a general conceptual overview of current intellectual trends dealing with the theming of the phenomenon of culture; and highlight their pluralistic character. The article analyzes the polysemicity of the postmodern situation as an intersubjective disposition within cultural communication and as a special way of understanding the current state of affairs that exist under the sign of fundamental complexity. Criticism of destructive attitudes in understanding and predicting possible outcomes and solutions of pressing culturological problems is carried out. In particular, it points to the moment of subjective psychologizing in some pessimistic expert assessments, when personal disorder in new circumstances is presented as an objectively negative state of affairs. The principles of constructivism ontology are introduced and defended, which constitute an alternative to the traditional understanding of philosophy as delayed evidence (the owl of Minerva flying out into the twilight). A fundamental replacement of the descriptive (passive-contemplative) approach is proposed with a projective (active-creative) one. The authors present a substantial version of constructing a positive ontology based on a historical precedent in the form of the ideology of classical humanism. The philosophy of postmodernism is interpreted as hyperreflection of Modernity, that is, not as a negation, but as overcoming the traditional structures of rationality to form more complex (sophisticated) types of reflective thinking. The authors substantiate the need to connect a volitional resource, intentionalized in the direction of creating semantic configurations of social reality. This eliminates the reductionist possibility of interpreting such a call by appealing to complex contexts that require the development of complimentary discourses and narratives.

The authors adhere to the position according to which any extreme is false, and the truth is found in the zone of balance between the extremes, considering the completeness of the experience knowledge of both extremes. Classical history passed under the sign of speculation, the 20th century - under the sign of thoughtless activism. In the 21st century, it is necessary to learn how to combine these extremes.

The article deals with the theme of mysticism in the works of Plato. The study begins with the concept of magic and comes to the conclusion that modern scientists do not know what the word μαγεία/magic really meant for the ancient Greeks.

However, Plato is considered to be the philosopher who laid down all the basic concepts of mysticism. The original ancient Greek definition of the word ‘mysticism’, derived from the Greek μυστικός, differs from the modern understanding of this concept and is directly related to the ancient Greek mysteries and the cult of the goddesses of fertility Demeter and Persephone. Very little is known about the mysteries, but it is obvious that for the ancient Greeks it was a way to gain immortality, a kind of action during which the soul descended to the underground world of the dead and returned from there. Many researchers note that such journeys of the soul among the Greeks are extremely similar to shamanic ones. But we are talking here about archaic views, and not about the shamanism that modern ethnography describes.

The most important part of the mysteries was contemplation. What exactly the participants of the mysteries contemplated, what the high priest showed them, remains a mystery. However, Plato in the dialogue “Republic” gives a lesson on how to reveal the ability to such contemplation with the help of mimesis, or imitation. This is not just an external theatrical imitation, namely, it is getting used to what is being contemplated.

Plato believed that actors and temples are not needed for a real mystery, it should unfold in contemplation, and therefore only you are needed for it. The author of the article finds confirmation of this idea in the dialogue between Socrates and Cephalus, which ends with the myth of Er’s travels to the world of the dead. Plato describes these journeys in such a way that his disciples, if desired, can enter the state of Er and, with the help of contemplative imitation, live everything that happened to him. These journeys are similar to the shamanic journeys of the soul to the underground world.

The author concludes the article with the assumption that Plato tried to create a kind of mysteries within his school for a philosopher who wants to master contemplation.

The article deals with one of the particular applications of the concept of “simulacrum”. The article also shows under which circumstances there was a need to use the concept of “simulacrum”. In this case, the simulacrum is presented as a form of simplified and distorted perception of system objects. The main form of a system organization is a hierarchy. Hierarchical systems have the property of forming inverse relationships. Inversion occurs when a subordinate element of the hierarchy acquires dominant properties in it, but does not move to a higher position. This relationship is possible because there are several organizational principles in the system, and these principles collide with each other. A distorted perception of hierarchical systems occurs when inverse relationships are ignored. As a result, an image of the system is formed that is distant from reality (simulacrum). Over time, this image becomes less realistic, as changes occur in the real system caused by the development of inversions. Inversions are the cause of intra-system dynamics; they can lead a system object to decay and destruction. They also, under certain circumstances, contribute to the self-development of the system. However, if we consider only the simulacrum of this system, this ability to self-destruct remains unnoticed. The system’s ability to develop itself remains unrecognized. This concept has become relevant as a result of inversion in the hierarchical system of human activity. The subordinate level of activity that is responsible for subject actions comes to the fore because of the increasingly technical aspects of human activity. The highest, symbolic level of activity moves to a subordinate position. The activity level responsible for subject actions also operates with signs and is responsible for using language as a sign system. Hence, there comes the need for the concept of “simulacrum”, which is “the signifier without the signified”.

Speculative realism is often associated with a group of thinkers who have consciously united around the idea of fighting a common enemy – correlationism. The article substantiates the thesis that there is no agreement among speculative realists both about correlationism and the ways to overcome it. Based on the works of Meillassoux, Harman and Brassier, the author demonstrates that their interpretations of correlationism and programs for its refutation are incompatible. It is suggested that the result of such incongruence of the concept of correlationism is the conviction of the philosophers of this direction in correlationism of each other.

The author considers Meillassoux’s concept of the “Era of Correlation”. From the point of view of Brassier, Meillassoux fails to substantiate the anti-correlationist thesis that human thinking is capable of cognizing non-subjective being. Rather, on the contrary, Meillassoux once again subordinates this being to thinking, and therefore remains a correlationist. Harman also accuses Meillassoux of correlationism for anthropocentrism.

The author also clarifies Harman’s concept of the “philosophy of access”. It is established that the concepts of correlationism in the interpretation of Harman and Meillassoux cannot be completely compatible. It is revealed that Harman remains a philosopher of the era of correlation for Meillassoux, because, firstly, he illegitimately attributes human characteristics to non-human beings. Secondly, it does not accept the correlationist argument of the circle and preserves the Kantian metaphysical dichotomy of the noumenal/phenomenal. Brassier also considers Harman a correlationist, since he ontologically equates natural science knowledge and scientific rationality with other types of knowledge.

The paper reveals the main features of correlationism in the interpretation of Brassier. It is established that for Meillassoux, the Brassier approach is correlationist on the same basis as the Harman approach. Harman, in turn, considers Brassier as a correlationist, since the latter postulates various ontological taxonomies, the most obvious among which are the priority of scientific rationality and anthropocentrism. According to the results of the work done, it is once again emphasized that speculative realists are by no means united in their understanding of correlationism and ways to overthrow this philosophical program.

The article analyzes the development of the ideas of Ludwig Binswanger in the early works of Michel Foucault. The transformation of the basic concepts of Dasein-analysis by M. Foucault leads him to the idea of ​​a human as a dreamer being, and a dream as a way of understanding the ontological foundations of human existence. The article reveals M. Foucault’s idea of ​​the predominance of dreaming activity over conscious, rational and reasonable human activity. The article analyzes ​​M. Foucault’s idea about the essence of madness, presented in his early phenomenological works. He notes the inadequacy of interpreting the meaning of dream images, as psychoanalysis does, it is necessary to consider a dream as a pure potentiality of being, which is constructed into normal or pathological worlds. The article considers the influence of the works of L. Binswanger and S. Freud on the ideas of M. Foucault. Z. Freud was one of the first to open a dialogue with madness. He drew attention to the fact that dreams have meaning and reflect an unconscious part of a person’s mental life. Following him, the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger proposed the Dasein-analysis method for understanding the pathological world of the mentally ill, based on the ideas of M. Heidegger’s ontology, E. Husserl’s phenomenology and Z. Freud’s psychoanalysis. From this moment, madness becomes the subject of research in existential psychology, phenomenological psychiatry and philosophical anthropology. In modern philosophy, madness is often viewed as a trait that distinguishes humans from animals, the problem of madness is compared with the problem of reality. The article notes the inadequacy of a positivist psychiatric approach for understanding madness. The article also highlights the importance of studying the problem of madness for a more holistic understanding of the human phenomenon, socio-cultural processes, where it often becomes difficult to draw a line of demarcation between norm and pathology. The article shows how L. Binswanger’s ideas about dreams developed by M. Foucault are continued in the works of modern Russian philosophers who study the phenomenon of madness.

 Rationality is one of the key and most controversial topics of modern philosophy that gave rise to many different approaches. In this article I explore two original approaches to rationality, which are based on the connection between rationality and openness. I analyze key differences and similarities between two theories. The approach taken by Vladimir Shvyrev in his work “Rationality as a Cultural Value” differentiates between open and closed rationality. Open rationality is able to reconsider and to creatively develop its own presuppositions, while closed rationality always works within a fixed predefined scheme. But only in the case of openness rationality is exercised to its full extent, while closedness in its absolute form leads to the destruction of rationality. This approach is contrasted to Adin Steinsaltz’s theory of open and closed knowledge, presented in his work “Sociology of Ignorance”. According to this approach, rational or open knowledge is also based upon continuous examination of its own criteria. Both authors understand ‘open’ and ‘closed’ as ideal types that do not exist in reality in their pure form. They both agree that rationality or openness was first developed in ancient Greek culture, but blossomed only in the Enlightenment; openness is also connected to the development of trade. However Steinsaltz argues that the ideal of open knowledge was also developed in the ancient Hebrew culture in parallel to ancient Greek. The key difference between the two approaches is that they conceive openness very differently: according to Shvyrev, openness is a continuous change and development of knowledge, while Steinsaltz understands openness as open access to knowledge for every person. Despite such a stark difference, the two approaches are very similar in other respects. Theories of open rationality today are especially relevant because of the development of open science.

The author of the article reveals the theological context of the origin of the concept of actual infinity and clarifies the problem of actual infinity. The author shows that this problem is not a paradoxical category of thinking, but a problem of the unity of two realities (eternal, unchanging and infinite, and temporary, changeable and finite), which has been misunderstood. The author raises the question of the relevance of the problem of actual infinity brought by Christianity for modern secularized science and philosophy. The author shows that the problem of the unity of the two realities was declared much earlier than Christianity. This problem was already dealt with by the ancient Eleans. They initiated the one-sided view and incorrect understanding of this problem, which opened the main path of development of the entire Western European philosophy. With the advent of Christianity, all the dangers identified by the Eleans (and above all by Zeno) and then still unclear on this path received a new sharpness and now real force. The author of the article shows that the regularity of the relation of the finite, the actually infinite, and the potentially infinite, revealed by Zeno, was the basis for changing the classical rationality to the non-classical one. In turn, the fact of the collapse of the classics has become evidence of modernity that the problem of actual infinity is not a mental paradox, but contains the real possibility of changing the finite nature. But this change is not carried out in the direction suggested by the recognition of actual infinity itself, but in another direction, opposite to it, but closely connected with it. The disclosure of the essence of this connection will be the disclosure of the problem of actual infinity.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.

This article considers the genesis and development of Buddhism in Japan from the age of Nara to the Tokugawa period. Revealing the problems of the first six philosophical and religious schools of academic Buddhism, namely Kusha, Sanron, Jōjitsu, Hosso, Risshu and Kegon, the authors of the article sought to fully explore the basic foundations of the philosophy of each of them, delve into the linguistic nuances of Japanese and Sanskrit terms, touching on such aspects like dharma, dukha, anatmavada, shunyata or emptiness, the "two truths" of the Buddha's teachings, etc.

The text focuses on the role of Buddhism in the Nara period, it explores the main purpose of monks and the system of "local" temples which was not only an intellectual support of that era, but also played the role of an important military force. Drawing an analogy with the philosophy of the Rinzai-shu and Soto-shu schools, the authors analyze the expansion of the line of succession in Zen by monitoring the formation of groups of thinkers, their development and emergence of cultural capital through long-term discussions and continuous reflection over several generations. The work pays special attention to significant figures in Japanese Buddhism, it outlines the role of philosophical creativity, examines the social and religious transformations that occur over different eras and periods. The question of redistribution of power and basic economic resources, suppression of Buddhism, emergence of anti-Buddhist positions and formation of new doctrines are touched upon. As a result of the study, the genesis of Buddhism was described through the prism of Japanese culture, the trajectory of its development from inception to transformation processes in new trends as well as social phenomena that sometimes gave rise to a creative or destructive tendency and influenced the course of history. The authors note that Japanese society that tends to a greater extent towards abstraction and aesthetic pleasure managed to assimilate to the new realities of life and new teachings with pinpoint accuracy, transforming Buddhism into its culture and polishing and refining it in the Japanese style.