The Issue of War in F. Bacon’s Political Philosophy
Vasily Markhinin
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.2.1-21-43
Abstract:

The article brings the analysis of Bacons’ ideas on war and political violence in general. Military activities of a state and military foundations of statecraft were of a particular interest for Bacon both from legal & bureaucratic and philosophical perspective. Both perspectives merged in his writings on colonization of Virginia and Ireland, military affairs with Spain, legal issues of union of England and Scotland and on the principles of policy-making. Bacon believed violence – organized, well-armed and successful – was a mighty factor uniting communities into a state. No one state in the world had been able to emerge without an oppression of the ruled by those who rule. The later stages of a state-building required something except mere force – a set of common habits and laws and a consent to be governed as well. The pursuit of common interest requires nowadays the use of an armed force. The reason for it is the contest between the rival states. The balance of powers, the colonial policy, the control of lands and populations are never available for a state lacking military power. Although a successful colonization, a proper use of lands and an effective government could never be achieved by such a means. These goals require a legitimate rule based upon a common consent, a respect for the law and a peaceful labor. A conquered population should be naturalized rather than forced to recognize a new government. A wise ruler will use armed force moderately even for such purposes like suppression of seditions and wrong religions. Analyzing war from a pragmatic, Machiavellian perspective, Bacon had escaped the aestheticisation of martial virtue and art of waging wars typical for Machiavelli.

Tradition with a Small Letter
Alexey Timoshhuk
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.2.1-44-55
Abstract:

May 7th, 2020, the wonderful philosopher Tatyana Borisovna Lyubimova died. Her final monograph “Philosophy and Countertradition” is a multifaceted study of the correlations between traditional culture and the current state of philosophy. This is also the last publication on the life path of Tatyana Borisovna, in her philosophical adventure, where Western sociology and categorical aesthetics, ancient Russian philosophy and metaphysics of a unified tradition became landmarks. Tatiana Borisovna always lacked topos and chronos, she wrote about Peter I and the sociology of Adorno’s music, the ontology of tragedy and the ecology of culture, about the dialogue of civilizations and the philosophy of life of Rozanov; she translated Böhme and Berleant, Sartre and Ricoeur. Particularly noteworthy is the participation of T.B. Lyubimova in grant research on the interaction of cultural models, the modernization of ideology and the globalization of cultures, where she expressed her non-standard opinion outside the ordinary field of consciousness. In short, Lyubimova’s system can be called a ‘strange philosophy’. This is a philosophy where self-discovery of the paradoxes of one’s own world takes place. This is a portrait of culture without its essence, made according to aesthetic guidelines. This is a worldview where a metaphysical thread stretched between unusual reference points: Kepler’s hexagonal snowflakes and the calendar rites of the farmers of Central Asia.

Tatyana Borisovna published the largest anthology of the works of René Guénon in Russian in her own translation. The French traditionalist remained for Tatyana Borisovna a transcendental magnet of her late work, he set the course of her inner time, bestowed metaphysical freedom, and clarified the increasingly complex world of quantitative relations.

From the Being of Culture to the Culture of Being: About Perspective Possibility of Constructing Positive Ontologies
Baizhol Karipbayev,  Alibek Sharipov
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.2.1-56-67
Abstract:

The article presents a historical and philosophical retrospective aimed at establishing strict conceptual boundaries that prevent uncontrolled extrapolation of modern terms and concepts to realities that are not included in the meanings of modern humanitarian discourse. The philosophical definition of the “culture” concept is substantiated, which includes specific characteristics that have a chronologically factual origin. The authors give a general conceptual overview of current intellectual trends dealing with the theming of the phenomenon of culture; and highlight their pluralistic character. The article analyzes the polysemicity of the postmodern situation as an intersubjective disposition within cultural communication and as a special way of understanding the current state of affairs that exist under the sign of fundamental complexity. Criticism of destructive attitudes in understanding and predicting possible outcomes and solutions of pressing culturological problems is carried out. In particular, it points to the moment of subjective psychologizing in some pessimistic expert assessments, when personal disorder in new circumstances is presented as an objectively negative state of affairs. The principles of constructivism ontology are introduced and defended, which constitute an alternative to the traditional understanding of philosophy as delayed evidence (the owl of Minerva flying out into the twilight). A fundamental replacement of the descriptive (passive-contemplative) approach is proposed with a projective (active-creative) one. The authors present a substantial version of constructing a positive ontology based on a historical precedent in the form of the ideology of classical humanism. The philosophy of postmodernism is interpreted as hyperreflection of Modernity, that is, not as a negation, but as overcoming the traditional structures of rationality to form more complex (sophisticated) types of reflective thinking. The authors substantiate the need to connect a volitional resource, intentionalized in the direction of creating semantic configurations of social reality. This eliminates the reductionist possibility of interpreting such a call by appealing to complex contexts that require the development of complimentary discourses and narratives.

The authors adhere to the position according to which any extreme is false, and the truth is found in the zone of balance between the extremes, considering the completeness of the experience knowledge of both extremes. Classical history passed under the sign of speculation, the 20th century - under the sign of thoughtless activism. In the 21st century, it is necessary to learn how to combine these extremes.

System’s Simulacrum and System Inversions
Dmitry Sevostyanov
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.1.1-68-81
Abstract:

The article deals with one of the particular applications of the concept of simulacrum. The article also shows under which circumstances there was a need to use the concept of simulacrum. In this case, the simulacrum is presented as a form of simplified and distorted perception of system objects. The main form of a system organization is a hierarchy. Hierarchical systems have the property of forming inverse relationships. Inversion occurs when a subordinate element of the hierarchy acquires dominant properties in it, but does not move to a higher position. This relationship is possible because there are several organizational principles in the system, and these principles collide with each other. A distorted perception of hierarchical systems occurs when inverse relationships are ignored. As a result, an image of the system is formed that is distant from reality (simulacrum). Over time, this image becomes less realistic, as changes occur in the real system caused by the development of inversions. Inversions are the cause of intra-system dynamics; they can lead a system object to decay and destruction. They also, under certain circumstances, contribute to the self-development of the system. However, if we consider only the simulacrum of this system, this ability to self-destruct remains unnoticed. The system’s ability to develop itself remains unrecognized. This concept has become relevant as a result of inversion in the hierarchical system of human activity. The subordinate level of activity that is responsible for subject actions comes to the fore because of the increasingly technical aspects of human activity. The highest, symbolic level of activity moves to a subordinate position. The activity level responsible for subject actions also operates with signs and is responsible for using language as a sign system. Hence, there comes the need for the concept of simulacrum, which is the signifier without the signified.

On the Concept of Correlationism: Meillassoux Q., Harman G., Brassier R.
Igor Devaykin
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.1.1-82-99
Abstract:

Speculative realism is often associated with a group of thinkers who have consciously united around the idea of fighting a common enemy – correlationism. The article substantiates the thesis that there is no agreement among speculative realists both about correlationism and the ways to overcome it. Based on the works of Meillassoux, Harman and Brassier, the author demonstrates that their interpretations of correlationism and programs for its refutation are incompatible. It is suggested that the result of such incongruence of the concept of correlationism is the conviction of the philosophers of this direction in correlationism of each other.

The author considers Meillassoux’s concept of the “Era of Correlation”. From the point of view of Brassier, Meillassoux fails to substantiate the anti-correlationist thesis that human thinking is capable of cognizing non-subjective being. Rather, on the contrary, Meillassoux once again subordinates this being to thinking, and therefore remains a correlationist. Harman also accuses Meillassoux of correlationism for anthropocentrism.

The author also clarifies Harman’s concept of the “philosophy of access”. It is established that the concepts of correlationism in the interpretation of Harman and Meillassoux cannot be completely compatible. It is revealed that Harman remains a philosopher of the era of correlation for Meillassoux, because, firstly, he illegitimately attributes human characteristics to non-human beings. Secondly, it does not accept the correlationist argument of the circle and preserves the Kantian metaphysical dichotomy of the noumenal/phenomenal. Brassier also considers Harman a correlationist, since he ontologically equates natural science knowledge and scientific rationality with other types of knowledge.

The paper reveals the main features of correlationism in the interpretation of Brassier. It is established that for Meillassoux, the Brassier approach is correlationist on the same basis as the Harman approach. Harman, in turn, considers Brassier as a correlationist, since the latter postulates various ontological taxonomies, the most obvious among which are the priority of scientific rationality and anthropocentrism. According to the results of the work done, it is once again emphasized that speculative realists are by no means united in their understanding of correlationism and ways to overthrow this philosophical program.

Dreaming Man in the Phenomenology of Madness by Michel Foucault
Olga Tsvetkova
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.1.1-100-116
Abstract:

The article analyzes the development of the ideas of Ludwig Binswanger in the early works of Michel Foucault. The transformation of the basic concepts of Dasein-analysis by M. Foucault leads him to the idea of ​​a human as a dreamer being, and a dream as a way of understanding the ontological foundations of human existence. The article reveals M. Foucault’s idea of ​​the predominance of dreaming activity over conscious, rational and reasonable human activity. The article analyzes ​​M. Foucaults idea about the essence of madness, presented in his early phenomenological works. He notes the inadequacy of interpreting the meaning of dream images, as psychoanalysis does, it is necessary to consider a dream as a pure potentiality of being, which is constructed into normal or pathological worlds. The article considers the influence of the works of L. Binswanger and S. Freud on the ideas of M. Foucault. Z. Freud was one of the first to open a dialogue with madness. He drew attention to the fact that dreams have meaning and reflect an unconscious part of a person’s mental life. Following him, the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger proposed the Dasein-analysis method for understanding the pathological world of the mentally ill, based on the ideas of M. Heidegger’s ontology, E. Husserl’s phenomenology and Z. Freud’s psychoanalysis. From this moment, madness becomes the subject of research in existential psychology, phenomenological psychiatry and philosophical anthropology. In modern philosophy, madness is often viewed as a trait that distinguishes humans from animals, the problem of madness is compared with the problem of reality. The article notes the inadequacy of a positivist psychiatric approach for understanding madness. The article also highlights the importance of studying the problem of madness for a more holistic understanding of the human phenomenon, socio-cultural processes, where it often becomes difficult to draw a line of demarcation between norm and pathology. The article shows how L. Binswanger’s ideas about dreams developed by M. Foucault are continued in the works of modern Russian philosophers who study the phenomenon of madness.

Two Theories оf Open Rationality
Alexandra Elbakyan
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.1.1-117-129
Abstract:

 Rationality is one of the key and most controversial topics of modern philosophy that gave rise to many different approaches. In this article I explore two original approaches to rationality, which are based on the connection between rationality and openness. I analyze key differences and similarities between two theories. The approach taken by Vladimir Shvyrev in his work “Rationality as a Cultural Value” differentiates between open and closed rationality. Open rationality is able to reconsider and to creatively develop its own presuppositions, while closed rationality always works within a fixed predefined scheme. But only in the case of openness rationality is exercised to its full extent, while closedness in its absolute form leads to the destruction of rationality. This approach is contrasted to Adin Steinsaltz’s theory of open and closed knowledge, presented in his work “Sociology of Ignorance”. According to this approach, rational or open knowledge is also based upon continuous examination of its own criteria. Both authors understand ‘open’ and ‘closed’ as ideal types that do not exist in reality in their pure form. They both agree that rationality or openness was first developed in ancient Greek culture, but blossomed only in the Enlightenment; openness is also connected to the development of trade. However Steinsaltz argues that the ideal of open knowledge was also developed in the ancient Hebrew culture in parallel to ancient Greek. The key difference between the two approaches is that they conceive openness very differently: according to Shvyrev, openness is a continuous change and development of knowledge, while Steinsaltz understands openness as open access to knowledge for every person. Despite such a stark difference, the two approaches are very similar in other respects. Theories of open rationality today are especially relevant because of the development of open science.

Robert Merton and Ibn Sina: A Roll Call of Moral Imperatives
Vyacheslav Vasechko
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.4.1-75-87
Abstract:

The paper attempts to expand the authentic understanding of the imperatives of the scientific ethos given by R.K. Merton in 1942. In the original interpretation, Merton’s Code referred only to the European science of the New Age and subsequent centuries. As Merton himself and his followers have seen, the applicability of this code to other societies is not relevant. However, the author of the paper believes that the original four maxims of Merton in one way or another work effectively outside the specified space-time frame and, in particular, work in medieval Arab-Muslim science. The philosophical allegorical parable "The Message of Birds" written by Ibn Sina in the XI century is used as a text in which the imperatives that semantically coincide with Merton's maxims are found. The analysis shows that the text of the medieval scientist is transparently articulated: 1) Mertonian "communism" which assumes the collective ownership of epistemological discourse participants of the products received in its process (new empirical facts, theoretical and methodological innovations); 2) "universalism" that excludes any discrimination of discourse subjects on external, non-scientific criteria; 3) "disinterestedness", according to which the scientist builds his activities as if he had no other interests but to understand the truth; 4) "organized skepticism" according to which there is no presumption of innocence in science, and whoever comes forward with epistemological innovation must calmly and patiently prove his rightness to those who are standing in defence of the existing body of knowledge. Since the author of "The Message of Birds", despite his chosen artistic and mystical form for this work, is one of the largest figures of medieval Arab-Muslim science, his parable should be interpreted, first of all, as a text, which reflects the very process of cognitive search in pre-classical science. A closer familiarity with the nature and content of epistemological discourse in ancient and medieval traditional societies provides a good reason here to see one of the attempts to systematize the ethical rules that have actually been in force among scientists for many centuries.

Actual Infinity: A Pseudo-Problem or a Meta-Foundation of Western European Philosophy and Science?
Maria Filatova
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.4.1-11-27
Abstract:

The author of the article reveals the theological context of the origin of the concept of actual infinity and clarifies the problem of actual infinity. The author shows that this problem is not a paradoxical category of thinking, but a problem of the unity of two realities (eternal, unchanging and infinite, and temporary, changeable and finite), which has been misunderstood. The author raises the question of the relevance of the problem of actual infinity brought by Christianity for modern secularized science and philosophy. The author shows that the problem of the unity of the two realities was declared much earlier than Christianity. This problem was already dealt with by the ancient Eleans. They initiated the one-sided view and incorrect understanding of this problem, which opened the main path of development of the entire Western European philosophy. With the advent of Christianity, all the dangers identified by the Eleans (and above all by Zeno) and then still unclear on this path received a new sharpness and now real force. The author of the article shows that the regularity of the relation of the finite, the actually infinite, and the potentially infinite, revealed by Zeno, was the basis for changing the classical rationality to the non-classical one. In turn, the fact of the collapse of the classics has become evidence of modernity that the problem of actual infinity is not a mental paradox, but contains the real possibility of changing the finite nature. But this change is not carried out in the direction suggested by the recognition of actual infinity itself, but in another direction, opposite to it, but closely connected with it. The disclosure of the essence of this connection will be the disclosure of the problem of actual infinity.

Action without Intention: Some Remarks of Analytical Philosophy Applied to the Theory of Social Action
Aleksander Sanzhenakov
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.4.1-28-41
Abstract:

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.