Ideas and Ideals

The article presents the analysis of remembering process in the concept of time that was introduced by E. Husserl. Research is based on the following thesis: Husserl gets an opportunity to build a new concept of mind by the virtue of such properties as temporality and intentionality. Consequently, Husserl is able to show how the time is flowing in the mind. That kind of concept allots memory a particular mode of existence in the consciousness that is being intended towards temporal lasting objects. The mind finds itself in an unbroken lasting flow of temporality. The subject of the article lies in the mode of existence of the memory in the human mind, it is therefore necessary to answer the question of how the mind may get access to the memory. In order to get a multi-faceted view of the problem, the article considers works of the philosophers (M. Merleau-Ponty, P. Ricoeur) who were influenced by Husserl’s method and concept to a great extent. They both use the concept in their studies and raise their own questions, giving interpretation of his work. The work of remembering process is discussed as exemplified in the following Husserl’s works: ‘Ideas I’, ‘Lectures on the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness’, ‘Logical Investigations’. The article highlights the idea, that the specifics of the remembering process resides in distinguishing the content of the perceiving of the past and the reproduction of the consciousness of the past that was perceiving that content. Ultimately, considering remembering as a process of ceaselessly changing reproduction of the consciousness of the past makes us be positive about conceiving remembering as an incessant lasting process, but not  as a quiescent print that is receding with time. The remembering process is interworking with contstantly changing mind, that is herein addressed as a lasting act. Substantiation of the above listed points clarifies why constantly lasting interworking of mind and remembering is only possible in the absolute flow dimension.

The logical structure of the second part of Asanga’s “Compendium of Abhidharma” (Abhidharma-samuccaya) correspond with the organization of Buddhist practice leading to the attainment of the highest goal of Buddhism – enlightenment (nirvāṇa). The first chapter of this part expounds the essence of Four Noble Truths being the basis of the Buddha’s teaching that is to be comprehended by disciple. The first Noble Truth, or the truth of suffering (duḥkha-satya) proclaims essential improperness of any existence in the wheel of rebirth (saṃsāra) determined by universal changeability. The second Noble Truth, or the truth of the cause of suffering (duḥkha-samudāya-satya) demonstrates universal yearning for existence (tṛṣṇā) inherent in any sentient being and caused by afflictions (kleśa) that are contained in any saṃsāric consciousness. The third Noble Truth, or the truth of the destruction of suffering (duḥkha-nirodha-satya) shows the possibility to find way out of saṃsāra. The fourth Noble truth, or the truth of the way to destruction of suffering (duḥkha-nirodha-mārga-satya) explains methods of overcoming the saṃsāric existence; the essence of these methods is the uprooting of afflictions present in an unenlightened consciousness from beginningless times and causing saṃsāra. The topic of this part of the “Compendium of Abhidharma” is Buddhist religious anthropology including the conception of unenlightened person and of persons practicing the Buddhist religious ideals. The theme of the second chapter is the types of texts presenting the teaching of the Buddha. The third chapter presents the Buddhist theory of personality types and the results that are to be attained by disciple in the course of practice. The topic of this chapter is the aspects of disciplinary and meditative practices in association with Buddhist religious anthropology. The fourth chapter explains the principles of argumentation and methods of propagation of the Buddhist teaching. The logic of the structure of the second part of “Compendium of Abhidharma” is based on the following principle: from the truths that are to be comprehended by a disciple to the analysis of his personality and persons of those whom he addresses his sermons and to the contents of the results that they will attain in the Buddhist practices and from this – to the principles of argumentation.

The focus of the following essay is one of the most known ancient myths about Daedalus and Icarus. This myth will be considered through a prism of the universal metaphysical problem of a boundary in correlation with the problem of human essence. The aim of this article is to present dialectical unity of two models of relationship of the world and a human, and two models of achievement of human self-identity in the process of establishment of actual borders and attempts of their surpassing. A person equally needs to establish and label his/her limits and overcome them for being him/herself. Moreover, he/she is able to discover his/her own borders only during the moment of their intersection. Thus, existence is always connected with transcendental acts, with the process of establishment and deconstruction of the borders. Both the establishment of boundaries and their destruction correspond to the nature of a human and his/her basic existential needs. The death of Icarus establishes (finds out) actual boundaries of a man, which he ignored before. The inventions of Daedalus establish (pave) new boundaries, overcoming the former ones.

The article is devoted to the study of the position of R. Rorty in relation to two different methods of philosophical discourse - argumentation and “conversation”. The first of these correlates with the epistemological tradition, the heir of which is declared analytical philosophy, while the second - with continental philosophy. The research method consists in the analysis of Rorty’s neo-pragmatist rhetoric, which claims to find a balance between the argumentative style in philosophy and the understanding of philosophy as a “conversation of humanity”. Rorty’s motivation for this understanding is that philosophers-as-poets do not follow the standards of philosophical argumentation and offer new types of conversations. The author traces the origins of the concept of Rorty’s philosophy as a “conversation”, going back to the appeal of M. Heidegger and G. Gadamer to the poetry of F. Hölderlin. The article shows, that despite the slogan “philosophy as a conversation of humanity” in the spirit of hermeneutics, Rorty does not in any way reject argumentative practice. Moreover, he is trying with analytical precision to make the “conversations” believable, presenting them in the framework of an argumentative reasoning. On the other hand, Rorty cannot afford the full approval of the argumentative practice of analytic philosophers to the detriment of the evasive linguistic practice of continental philosophers. In this regard, Rorty was forced to keep a certain kind of neutrality. Such a neutrality of Rorty is analyzed in his evaluation of the work of J. Derrida, in which he calls many of Derrida’s arguments (in controversy with his opponent J. Searle) awful, and yet Derrida remains one of his heroes. Rorty shows a scornful attitude towards Serl to prevent analytical philosophy from winning too much. The article concludes that Rorty’s interpretation of opposing argumentation and “conversation” in philosophical discourse is a reflection of his philosophical “ecumenism”. Rorty was between two opposing trends in characterizing the essence of philosophy, not daring to choose between argumentation and conversation. The famous slogan of Rorty - philosophy is the conversation of mankind - is supported by his considerable argument. Such a mixture of genres speaks of the instability of the concept of neopragmatist rhetoric, which among its followers takes the form of a new style of philosophizing.

Kutyrev Vladimir Aleksandrovich is known as a social philosopher, a leftist conservative, a supporter of controlled progress. His papers and books are an event for the Russian intellectual life. The subject of the study is the monograph by Kutyrev, “The Owl of Minerva Starts Flying at Dusk” published in 2018. I offer an extenstive phenomenological analysis of what was said and unsaid by Kutyrev in the same manner as the author himself analyzes the soap bubble of modern anthropoactivity (homo bullo) by removing the casing behind the shell of the civilization bulb of innovationism. Removing and discarding layer by layer, we advance towards the system of human stability. Kutyrev's philosophy is presented as the reactivization of a narrow path between agnosticism and technocracy, reism and structuralism. The target of his book is, as always, the salvation of Man. The difference in this monograph is in the details. In his previous works he saved us from technology, emptiness, progress. Yet here he saves us from self-apocalypse, an eschatological man-made tragedy. The article provides an overview of the main subjects of the author's work: the struggle between the natural and the artificial, the open vs. the sustainable society, self-development of technology, the threat of hypermodernism and transhumanism, the problems of biotechnical design of a Post-Man, the prospects for conservative philosophizing, and justification of life. The basis of the monograph consists of the following deep ideas: being is a blessing; self-assertion is the essence of every living being; eternal regression is a solid platform instead of progressivism. The author of the book uses a hermeneutic analysis as a research method and he analyses the apologetics of slow life, thoughtful reading and aesthetics of Ecce homo. The book reflects Heidegger’s primordial understanding as a primer in relation to which Husserl is contrasted as speculative and scholastic. Grassroots of traditional poetry resist abstract logo-centrism, where factuality competes with contingency. Kutyrev takes revenge for  Jean Jaurès Jean and Karl Marx, Dostoevsky and Christ, trying to resist the Holocaust of traditional objective reality and the corresponding metaphysical philosophy. Humanity sculpts the image of chaos, not paying attention to the fact that the way of thinking magnetizes the course of action and the fatalism of the body-subject matter becomes closer as more and more papers on speculative-body nigitology come out. Conclusions: 1) if you want to understand Heidegger, read Kutyrev; 2) being is good, 3) eternal regression is a more solid platform instead of reckless progressivism.

The theme of abilities was constantly in Nietzsche’s focus of attention, the meaning transformations of which in many respects define the depth of his mythopoetic discourse. The opposition of aesthetic ability, which is realized in a Dionysian Dithyramb and an Appollonian dream - and abilities to argue logically - is the basis of Nietzsche’s analysis of the basic tendencies of cultural development in Ancient Greece. The German thinker understood harmonization of life as the process of tightening all abilities into one center, the main ability. However, harmonization of human life demands not only its deepening, but also the life’s expansion beyond the sphere of individual existence. This deepening and life expansion should be connected with a current state of affairs which is achievable here and now. Hence, Nietzsche’s interest in the problem of historical experience comes from, as well as the problem of differentiation between the historical and unhistorical. Free Spirit is, first of all, the ability for versatility and integrity, width and completeness. The thinker constantly points to the superindividual character of abilities, in its historical digressions the subject of abilities is mankind. Nietzsche’s thematization of abilities shows incompatibility of its creativity with the individualistic outlook. In a certain sense the "philosophy" of Nietzsche is a conceptually verified strategy of application the metaphor of ability to designate the limiting bases of creative life.

Plato considers the nature of a man in three different aspects: as a retrospective description of the achieved in the past and the lost state of a man; as the goal of his improvement, the acquisition by the empirical person of the completeness of his eidos, i.e. the merging of a real and eidetic person; as mass, stereotypical, wrong variants of soul and body connection. For the Plato’s philosophical anthropology, the thesis of a person’s existential insufficiency is essential. Plato considers this problem alongside with the problem of human integrity and includes constitutive as well as regulative judgments. Relationships of the sacred and profane, mental and somatic were the main themes in the anthropology of Plato. It has characteristics of radical pneumatology. Man is his soul. The soul determines the hierarchy of anthropological composition; the soul changes the state of the body, and the state of the body is an indicator of the state of the soul. Within this tradition, the somatic is devoid of subjectivity.

The philosopher develops pneumatology within the framework of essentialist and voluntaristic traditions. The first assumes that the correct hierarchy of the soul and body is predetermined by the very order of the universe. The "beginnings" of the soul, i.e. psychophysiological potentials, are created to realize a chain, which is responsible for control and submission of intellect-will-feelings. This chain will be completed if the potentials reach the limit of their perfection - the state of virtue. The hierarchy of the "beginnings" of the soul is established together with the attainment of virtue, and virtue is certified by recognition of the priority of thinking.

In the voluntaristic tradition, the essence of man is also represented by the soul, but the soul is not determined by the intellect, but by the will. In this line of Platonic reasoning, intellect is an optional factor of action. Knowing good does not mean choosing it as a guide to behavior. This means that there is not only an erring, but also a vicious (evil) will. The thinker substantiated evil: it is not a lack of good, but something that exists independently. Evil is connected with the soul. Evil in the human soul is like a cosmic situation. For the philosopher it is obvious that egoism can be combined with the rational organization of consciousness.

The recognition of good and evil creates the effect of pseudorational behavior. The instruments of consciousness are used to imitate virtue while preserving the intemperance of desires, and good is not associated with a highly developed intellect. To identify the good, neither intellect nor virtue are needed, there is enough to have intuition and life experience

The article investigates the ontological foundations of negativity. It shows dialectical relationship of nothingness and negativity. Negativity is understood as the being of nothingness, as a special process, unfolding in the deepest substrate of destruction and changing. The article considers a problematic and ambiguous interpretation of the category of nothingness in the history of philosophy. The article substantiates the thesis that various philosophical directions giving different definitions of nothingness, nevertheless, allow us to describe the negativity through the set of manifested characteristics of nothingness. The author reveals the natural-philosophical and anthropological approaches to the interpretation of negativity. As a result, the author criticizes the natural-philosophical concept of negativity and justifies the anthropological concept of negativity. Negativity is not able to come into existence without reflection. And reflection is carried out only by a man. The main bearer of negativity as such is a person who is aware of his mortality and finiteness