Ideas and Ideals

The article offers an analysis of the basic principles and history of the development of the philosophy of machinism. In the fi rst paragraph, the socio-cultural and communicative-discursive conditions for the maximum expansion of the scope of the ‘machine’ concept are considered. The fi rst task is related to the differentiation of the worldview position in relation to the specifi cs, development and problems of the relationship between a man and a machine with the philosophical trend of machinism. The semantic spectrum of the word ‘μηχανή’ and the functional of the conceptual metaphor machina mundi, as well as their role in the formation of machinism, are analyzed. The second paragraph is devoted to the principles of formation of modern mechanicism and modern machinism. The author analyzes the specifi cs of machinism, its connection, similarities and differences with the philosophy of mechanicism. It is shown that the conceptual metaphor of machina mundi can represent opposite ontological constructions depending on the image of the machine. It is shown that this image depends not so much on the characteristics of exemplary technical devices as on the expectations of philosophy regarding human activity. The author considers the infl uence of psychoanalytic discourse and schizoanalysis on the formation of a new image of the machine; the contribution of Z. Freud, J. Lacan, F. Guattari and J. Deleuze. It is shown that machinism can be an integral characteristic even of those concepts that oppose each other in their basic ideas. The thesis that machinism is primarily an ontological construct is substantiated. Machinism offers such conditions for the clarity of experience, which, on the one hand, radically break with the Modern philosophy, but, on the other, act as a variant of an ancient ontological construct – the myth of a “sick reality”. In the third paragraph, a brief analysis of the futurological positions of machinism is given. It is shown that as a projection of the future, the role of machinism is associated with various options for human surrender. The positions of L. Bryant, N. Land and others are briefl y analyzed.

In this article, the author considers the issues that the generations “Z” and “Alpha” face in the context of rapidly developing digitalization and the growing role of artifi cial intelligence in human life. This paper considers the ways of comprehension of being, which were once developed and presented by the famous German philosopher Martin Heidegger. The author analyzes the classical comprehension of being taking into account the changes that have occurred due to the widespread digitalization of society. The author considers the impact of digitalization on the state of development of modern society, namely, on the fundamental issues of ethics: free will, the meaning of life and the purpose of man. New technologies offer unprecedented opportunities for people, such as universal access to information, entertainment services, but the author emphasizes that these opportunities have a downside, which is expressed fi rst of all in the limitation of personal autonomy, and secondly by the negative impact on the cognitive functions of a person.

In conclusion of the article the author comes to the opinion that at the present moment of time there are two categories by means of which in the modern world one can be included in the real world while trying to preserve freedom and striving for independence from the system, namely, creativity and cognition.

The author shows that humanism as an ideological direction has reached a dead end and has turned into a set of slogans that are far from life. Against the backdrop of these slogans, massive crimes against people are being committed, and the destruction of the surrounding nature continues. Posthumanism began with evidence that man is not the pinnacle of the universe.  These evidences, according to the author, fi rst appeared in the 19th century in the works of A. Schopenhauer and F. Nietzsche. For a long time, posthumanism was developing as a direction in literary criticism, as an analysis of individual features of changes in social consciousness using the example of characters in works of art. At the next stage, posthumanism moved into the sphere of philosophy and the formation of its own special theory of posthumanism. In parallel, the direction of posthumanism began to develop, as close as possible to the practice and achievements of scientifi c and technological progress, called transhumanism. The world of the future in the concept of transhumanism is seen as evolution, the consistent generation of new generations of cyborgs. The article also examines examples of descriptions of the future by the followers of literary and philosophical posthumanism.

Many modern researchers reject Weber’s hypothesis about the connection between the Reformation and the formation of rational capitalism. It is worth agreeing with critics that Weber did not present a complete theory of the origin of capitalism. Nevertheless, the Weber hypothesis provides indications of a necessary (but not suffi cient) condition for the formation of modern capitalism. At the same time, it explains not so much the formation of the capitalist spirit in principle – as something unchangeable and uniform for all countries and centuries – as one, but historically a key episode in the development of capitalism. For the fi rst time, Protestantism successfully fulfi lled the task of forming the spirit of capitalism, since it is a manifestation of anti-traditionalism and individualism. It is also more open to social innovations and contributes to the destruction of community ties. The Reformation created the ideological and psychological prerequisites for the initial accumulation of capital and contributed to the formation of capitalistically motivated classes of entrepreneurs and the proletariat.

The article discusses the views of the ‘Tsargrad’ website participants and some methodologists on the revival of Russia and the salvation of the world. The peculiarities of their thinking and discourses are noted: a refl ection of the aspirations and values of these participants themselves, utopianism and lack of evidence. A history of ideological infl uences on these views is outlined, which stretches from the works of P. Ya. Chaadaev, F. M. Dostoevsky, Konstantin Leontiev. V. Zenkovsky shows that, for example, Chaadaev’s thoughts on world history went through two stages. At the fi rst, he comes to the idea that it was in Europe that the ideas and plans of Christianity were embodied, and Russia remained on the sidelines, dropped out of the world historical process. But such a conclusion about Russia contradicted the very idea of the providence of the Creator. Therefore, at the second stage, Chaadaev comes up with ideas that form the essence of the tradition under consideration. Namely, Russia has its own purpose, it will come into play later, Russia will determine the historical development of Europe and the whole world, the main content of this future stage of history will be the revelation in the form of the ideas and practice of Orthodoxy. The central methodological fi gures of the reconstruction are Georgy Shchedrovitsky and Yuri Gromyko. It is suggested that the infl uence of methodologists is partly explained by the peculiarities of the consciousness of their followers. Here is a simplifi ed understanding of reality, a circumstance that still appeals to many today, because it becomes clear what is happening and where to go. This understanding was inspired by the Marxist worldview (partly scientifi c, partly utopian, extremely social engineering), as well as a simplifi ed understanding of history and sociality. If models and ideal constructions of methodology (activity and mental activity) are understood as heuristics and schemes that guide the methodologists’ own work of thinking, then everything is fi ne, there are no objections, but if – as an adequate description of the world and reality, then these models and ideal constructions are currently can be assessed either as a very poor and simplifi ed representation of a complex reality, or as generally incorrect knowledge. The last part of the article discusses the civilizational transition from modernity to “future culture”, showing the impossibility of simple solutions and a simplifi ed understanding of reality.

At the turn of the 20^th-21^st centuries there was a rapid growth of popularity of the concept of diaspora and the term itself in scientifi c and socio-political sphere. It was accompanied by increasing criticism and even denial of its usage as a tool of scientifi c analysis. This is a sign of the crisis, which may lead either to drastic transformation of the concept or to rejection of it. Within the global science, including Russia as a part of it, the concept is being criticized from two sides. Some scientists refer the word ‘diaspora’ only to the Jewish history and deny its extensive usage. On the other hand, key provisions of traditional interpretation of the concept are being under constructivist criticism. Among these key points are: the idea of diaspora as a primordial group affi liation by birth; grouping as a mandatory interaction between migrants and their descendants in the host country; diaspora-forming role of the source countries and host countries and political boundaries in the context of transnationalism. Apparently, the radically changing nature of the object under study requires concept transformation or rejection of it.

In the post-Soviet space, especially in Russia, the term diaspora as the ideology of compatriots became the instrument of interstate relations. It was widely spread in socio-political practice to justify state regulation of public relations. In full accordance with R. Kozellek’s scheme, in addition to temporalization of the term (fi lling old words with new meanings), its democratization took place (going beyond the scope of academic fi eld, usage by the lowest and wide stratums of society), ideologization and politicization. In this case diaspora appears as an organized community with joint responsibility of its members, offi cially registered organization with mutual obligations and set membership. The use of the word diaspora to name completely different understandings in scientifi c discourse and in socio-political rhetoric makes it diffi cult to apply it as a scientifi c term and calls the possibility of instrumental usage of the concept into question.

At the turn of the 20^th-21^st centuries there was a rapid growth of popularity of the concept of diaspora and the term itself in scientifi c and socio-political sphere. It was accompanied by increasing criticism and even denial of its usage as a tool of scientifi c analysis. This is a sign of the crisis, which may lead either to drastic transformation of the concept or to rejection of it. Within the global science, including Russia as a part of it, the concept is being criticized from two sides. Some scientists refer the word ‘diaspora’ only to the Jewish history and deny its extensive usage. On the other hand, key provisions of traditional interpretation of the concept are being under constructivist criticism. Among these key points are: the idea of diaspora as a primordial group affi liation by birth; grouping as a mandatory interaction between migrants and their descendants in the host country; diaspora-forming role of the source countries and host countries and political boundaries in the context of transnationalism. Apparently, the radically changing nature of the object under study requires concept transformation or rejection of it.

In the post-Soviet space, especially in Russia, the term diaspora as the ideology of compatriots became the instrument of interstate relations. It was widely spread in socio-political practice to justify state regulation of public relations. In full accordance with R. Kozellek’s scheme, in addition to temporalization of the term (fi lling old words with new meanings), its democratization took place (going beyond the scope of academic fi eld, usage by the lowest and wide stratums of society), ideologization and politicization. In this case diaspora appears as an organized community with joint responsibility of its members, offi cially registered organization with mutual obligations and set membership. The use of the word diaspora to name completely different understandings in scientifi c discourse and in socio-political rhetoric makes it diffi cult to apply it as a scientifi c term and calls the possibility of instrumental usage of the concept into question.

The article examines the phenomenon of social practices and their signifi cance in the context of modern social development and substantiates the importance of their research at different levels of scientifi c knowledge. Through a theoretical and methodological analysis of the concept of ‘social practices’ and the mechanism of their formation and impact on social development in the concepts of social constructivism and structuralist constructivism, as well as in the theory of structuration, their importance in maintaining the structure of society, historical continuity and the formation of habitus is revealed. The dual nature of social practices is revealed, which consists in the fact that, on the one hand, they underlie the emergence of social processes, and on the other, individual social processes determine new social practices. Through the theoretical refl ection of the most important social processes of our time – globalization, migration, urbanization, and rurbanization (rural area), their interdependence with social practices is revealed.

The mechanism of determination of new social practices in the translocal living space is considered and their infl uence on the formation of trends in the development of social interaction and lifestyle is revealed. The pendulum migration has led to the emergence of both translocal living space and corresponding social practices. The localization of pendulum migration in the agglomeration determined the emergence of the process of urbanization based on translocal practices, which results in the transformation of both the lifestyle of the villagers and the habitus.

The interregional pendulum migration that has gone beyond the region has identifi ed new social challenges that have led to the formation of appropriate social practices in the context of the deterritorialization of family groups. Social practices are historically determined, refl ect the accumulated generational experience in each culture, and are a tool for maintaining intergenerational communication. The high rates of social dynamics have objectively led to the transformation of social practices and the formation of new ones in modern society. This process has manifestations at the level of their reproduction and at the same time affects the deep mechanisms of functioning of society, of which habitus and its transformation are a part.

The article examines the phenomenon of social practices and their signifi cance in the context of modern social development and substantiates the importance of their research at different levels of scientifi c knowledge. Through a theoretical and methodological analysis of the concept of ‘social practices’ and the mechanism of their formation and impact on social development in the concepts of social constructivism and structuralist constructivism, as well as in the theory of structuration, their importance in maintaining the structure of society, historical continuity and the formation of habitus is revealed. The dual nature of social practices is revealed, which consists in the fact that, on the one hand, they underlie the emergence of social processes, and on the other, individual social processes determine new social practices. Through the theoretical refl ection of the most important social processes of our time – globalization, migration, urbanization, and rurbanization (rural area), their interdependence with social practices is revealed.

The mechanism of determination of new social practices in the translocal living space is considered and their infl uence on the formation of trends in the development of social interaction and lifestyle is revealed. The pendulum migration has led to the emergence of both translocal living space and corresponding social practices. The localization of pendulum migration in the agglomeration determined the emergence of the process of urbanization based on translocal practices, which results in the transformation of both the lifestyle of the villagers and the habitus.

The interregional pendulum migration that has gone beyond the region has identifi ed new social challenges that have led to the formation of appropriate social practices in the context of the deterritorialization of family groups. Social practices are historically determined, refl ect the accumulated generational experience in each culture, and are a tool for maintaining intergenerational communication. The high rates of social dynamics have objectively led to the transformation of social practices and the formation of new ones in modern society. This process has manifestations at the level of their reproduction and at the same time affects the deep mechanisms of functioning of society, of which habitus and its transformation are a part.

The article is devoted to an attempt at a philosophical analysis of the genesis of the transhumanist worldview in the context of the explosive development of science and technology and the active use of convergent technologies that change the nature of interaction not only between humans and the environment, but also humans and the environment themselves.  The purpose of the article is to explicate the ontological risks of digitalization, which at the same time are harbingers of the strengthening of the transhumanist paradigm. The author distinguishes between the concepts of digitization and digitalization, further considering the latter as a factor in the transformation of a person’s way of thinking and life. The thesis is put forward that digitalization is the main tool for the initial stage of society’s transition to transhumanistic rails, being one of the anthropotechnics designed to infi nitely improve a person. The research focuses on the formation of a transhumanist worldview and the role digitalization plays in this process. The author of the article has established the cyclical nature of the digitalization process. The following stages of digitalization are distinguished as the ‘turns’ of the cycle: the emergence and spread of the Internet (the World Wide Web provided the necessary breeding ground for further processes); the spread of social networks and online services; the development and spread of neural networks. The author notes that digitalization was consolidated in public practice mainly through the dissemination of social networks and online services. It is determined that it is at this stage that there is a risk of cutting off human contact with reality. The author suggests considering the explosive development and proliferation of neural networks as the next phase of the digitalization cycle. It is clarifi ed that in the phase of dissemination and improvement of training programs, due to the peculiarities of their functioning, there are risks associated with neglecting reality by belittling the importance of data sources. In addition, there are risks to common sense and deductive thinking throughout the life cycle of digitalization. It is also possible to observe varying degrees of truncation of access to reality, threatening to ‘uproot’ a person from his life world. Based on this, the author explicated the ontological traps of digitalization, in fact, pushing people to practice transhumanist ideology. Proceeding from the thesis that the source of data, common sense and the ability to form general concepts are the ‘three pillars’ of the connection of human consciousness with reality and self– identifi cation, the author comes to the conclusion that it is precisely in these sensitive aspects that the ontological traps of digitalization are hidden – factors that imperceptibly ‘disconnect’ a person from his life world. The researcher cites the uncertainty of data sources, the discreteness of common sense, and a violation of the ability to form general concepts as such factors. The methods of ontological and structural analysis were used in the study.The article is devoted to an attempt at a philosophical analysis of the genesis of the transhumanist worldview in the context of the explosive development of science and technology and the active use of convergent technologies that change the nature of interaction not only between humans and the environment, but also humans and the environment themselves.  The purpose of the article is to explicate the ontological risks of digitalization, which at the same time are harbingers of the strengthening of the transhumanist paradigm. The author distinguishes between the concepts of digitization and digitalization, further considering the latter as a factor in the transformation of a person’s way of thinking and life. The thesis is put forward that digitalization is the main tool for the initial stage of society’s transition to transhumanistic rails, being one of the anthropotechnics designed to infi nitely improve a person. The research focuses on the formation of a transhumanist worldview and the role digitalization plays in this process. The author of the article has established the cyclical nature of the digitalization process. The following stages of digitalization are distinguished as the ‘turns’ of the cycle: the emergence and spread of the Internet (the World Wide Web provided the necessary breeding ground for further processes); the spread of social networks and online services; the development and spread of neural networks. The author notes that digitalization was consolidated in public practice mainly through the dissemination of social networks and online services. It is determined that it is at this stage that there is a risk of cutting off human contact with reality. The author suggests considering the explosive development and proliferation of neural networks as the next phase of the digitalization cycle. It is clarifi ed that in the phase of dissemination and improvement of training programs, due to the peculiarities of their functioning, there are risks associated with neglecting reality by belittling the importance of data sources. In addition, there are risks to common sense and deductive thinking throughout the life cycle of digitalization. It is also possible to observe varying degrees of truncation of access to reality, threatening to ‘uproot’ a person from his life world. Based on this, the author explicated the ontological traps of digitalization, in fact, pushing people to practice transhumanist ideology. Proceeding from the thesis that the source of data, common sense and the ability to form general concepts are the ‘three pillars’ of the connection of human consciousness with reality and self– identifi cation, the author comes to the conclusion that it is precisely in these sensitive aspects that the ontological traps of digitalization are hidden – factors that imperceptibly ‘disconnect’ a person from his life world. The researcher cites the uncertainty of data sources, the discreteness of common sense, and a violation of the ability to form general concepts as such factors. The methods of ontological and structural analysis were used in the study.

Debates on the use and regulation of artifi cial intelligence tend to highlight the ambiguity of its impact on the democratic political process in terms of risks and opportunities. The spread of artifi cial intelligence technologies may affect individual and collective autonomy, either by changing the social and political practices that shape individual choices in different ways or by directly affecting fundamental rights. The danger lies not in short-term manipulations but in the long-term erosion of the infrastructural conditions of the public sphere. A detailed study of the interplay of artifi cial intelligence technologies and democratic development, taking into account specifi c aspects of the political life of society, is necessary to better understand the reconfi guration of the changing options for individuals, corporations and states. This article analyzes the terminological ambiguity of the concept of artifi cial intelligence in the context of its impact on politics and the democratic process and notes that artifi cial intelligence research addresses this issue through various forms of discursive critique, where attention is focused not on defi nitions but on modes of interpretation and their consequences. In analyzing the relationship between artifi cial intelligence and politics and democracy, the article pays special attention to such aspects as political self-determination, political participation and democratic governance. It emphasizes the importance of effective oversight by government and civil society over companies developing and using artifi cial intelligence technologies, which implies, in particular, the creation of effective institutions capable of defending public interests and civil and democratic rights, including in spite of technical capabilities and economic incentives. It is concluded that the infl uence of artifi cial intelligence on the political process and democracy will increase, which leads to the need to professionalize and develop its systematic interdisciplinary research.

The problem of rationality at the border of expressiveness and possibilities of human thinking is discussed when comparing natural and artifi cial intelligence (AI). A distinction is made between the concepts of intelligence and thinking. At the same time, intelligence is defi ned as rationality, always working within the limits of expressibility, and thinking includes inexpressibility in its structure. It is possible to better differentiate intelligence and thinking through an appeal to AI by formulating groups of restrictions for it, which together with this are the limits of expressiveness.

Four groups of AI limitations are considered: 1) the material support of big data storage, where we come to the resource limitation of AI; 2) the computational capabilities of the program code, where we come to the fundamental incalculability of the human brain; 3) a group of spatio-temporal conditions of the computational procedure, which is decompressed by 6 types of restrictions of this type. 3.1) AI as a time-closed system with a degraded future. 3.2) AI as a time-closed system with a degraded not only future, but also past. 3.3) Heterogeneity of G. B. Minkovsky’s space-time. 3.4) Biological space-time of V. I. Vernadsky. 3.5) Kairos. 3.6) Real time. 4) Civilizational conditions for the development of society, where the limit of AI is determined by the Noosphere according to V. I. Vernadsky.

When transferring this scheme of limitations for artifi cial intelligence to human consciousness, it is possible to more accurately defi ne the ‘boundary’ between natural intelligence and thinking. Thinking is defi ned as a part of consciousness that is outside the intellect and determines the development of both the person himself and artifi cial intelligence. From this defi nition, a natural scheme of human interaction with artifi cial intelligence is derived.