Ideas and Ideals

The article analyzes the development of the ideas of Ludwig Binswanger in the early works of Michel Foucault. The transformation of the basic concepts of Dasein-analysis by M. Foucault leads him to the idea of ​​a human as a dreamer being, and a dream as a way of understanding the ontological foundations of human existence. The article reveals M. Foucault’s idea of ​​the predominance of dreaming activity over conscious, rational and reasonable human activity. The article analyzes ​​M. Foucault’s idea about the essence of madness, presented in his early phenomenological works. He notes the inadequacy of interpreting the meaning of dream images, as psychoanalysis does, it is necessary to consider a dream as a pure potentiality of being, which is constructed into normal or pathological worlds. The article considers the influence of the works of L. Binswanger and S. Freud on the ideas of M. Foucault. Z. Freud was one of the first to open a dialogue with madness. He drew attention to the fact that dreams have meaning and reflect an unconscious part of a person’s mental life. Following him, the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger proposed the Dasein-analysis method for understanding the pathological world of the mentally ill, based on the ideas of M. Heidegger’s ontology, E. Husserl’s phenomenology and Z. Freud’s psychoanalysis. From this moment, madness becomes the subject of research in existential psychology, phenomenological psychiatry and philosophical anthropology. In modern philosophy, madness is often viewed as a trait that distinguishes humans from animals, the problem of madness is compared with the problem of reality. The article notes the inadequacy of a positivist psychiatric approach for understanding madness. The article also highlights the importance of studying the problem of madness for a more holistic understanding of the human phenomenon, socio-cultural processes, where it often becomes difficult to draw a line of demarcation between norm and pathology. The article shows how L. Binswanger’s ideas about dreams developed by M. Foucault are continued in the works of modern Russian philosophers who study the phenomenon of madness.

 Rationality is one of the key and most controversial topics of modern philosophy that gave rise to many different approaches. In this article I explore two original approaches to rationality, which are based on the connection between rationality and openness. I analyze key differences and similarities between two theories. The approach taken by Vladimir Shvyrev in his work “Rationality as a Cultural Value” differentiates between open and closed rationality. Open rationality is able to reconsider and to creatively develop its own presuppositions, while closed rationality always works within a fixed predefined scheme. But only in the case of openness rationality is exercised to its full extent, while closedness in its absolute form leads to the destruction of rationality. This approach is contrasted to Adin Steinsaltz’s theory of open and closed knowledge, presented in his work “Sociology of Ignorance”. According to this approach, rational or open knowledge is also based upon continuous examination of its own criteria. Both authors understand ‘open’ and ‘closed’ as ideal types that do not exist in reality in their pure form. They both agree that rationality or openness was first developed in ancient Greek culture, but blossomed only in the Enlightenment; openness is also connected to the development of trade. However Steinsaltz argues that the ideal of open knowledge was also developed in the ancient Hebrew culture in parallel to ancient Greek. The key difference between the two approaches is that they conceive openness very differently: according to Shvyrev, openness is a continuous change and development of knowledge, while Steinsaltz understands openness as open access to knowledge for every person. Despite such a stark difference, the two approaches are very similar in other respects. Theories of open rationality today are especially relevant because of the development of open science.

The author of the article reveals the theological context of the origin of the concept of actual infinity and clarifies the problem of actual infinity. The author shows that this problem is not a paradoxical category of thinking, but a problem of the unity of two realities (eternal, unchanging and infinite, and temporary, changeable and finite), which has been misunderstood. The author raises the question of the relevance of the problem of actual infinity brought by Christianity for modern secularized science and philosophy. The author shows that the problem of the unity of the two realities was declared much earlier than Christianity. This problem was already dealt with by the ancient Eleans. They initiated the one-sided view and incorrect understanding of this problem, which opened the main path of development of the entire Western European philosophy. With the advent of Christianity, all the dangers identified by the Eleans (and above all by Zeno) and then still unclear on this path received a new sharpness and now real force. The author of the article shows that the regularity of the relation of the finite, the actually infinite, and the potentially infinite, revealed by Zeno, was the basis for changing the classical rationality to the non-classical one. In turn, the fact of the collapse of the classics has become evidence of modernity that the problem of actual infinity is not a mental paradox, but contains the real possibility of changing the finite nature. But this change is not carried out in the direction suggested by the recognition of actual infinity itself, but in another direction, opposite to it, but closely connected with it. The disclosure of the essence of this connection will be the disclosure of the problem of actual infinity.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.

This article considers the genesis and development of Buddhism in Japan from the age of Nara to the Tokugawa period. Revealing the problems of the first six philosophical and religious schools of academic Buddhism, namely Kusha, Sanron, Jōjitsu, Hosso, Risshu and Kegon, the authors of the article sought to fully explore the basic foundations of the philosophy of each of them, delve into the linguistic nuances of Japanese and Sanskrit terms, touching on such aspects like dharma, dukha, anatmavada, shunyata or emptiness, the "two truths" of the Buddha's teachings, etc.

The text focuses on the role of Buddhism in the Nara period, it explores the main purpose of monks and the system of "local" temples which was not only an intellectual support of that era, but also played the role of an important military force. Drawing an analogy with the philosophy of the Rinzai-shu and Soto-shu schools, the authors analyze the expansion of the line of succession in Zen by monitoring the formation of groups of thinkers, their development and emergence of cultural capital through long-term discussions and continuous reflection over several generations. The work pays special attention to significant figures in Japanese Buddhism, it outlines the role of philosophical creativity, examines the social and religious transformations that occur over different eras and periods. The question of redistribution of power and basic economic resources, suppression of Buddhism, emergence of anti-Buddhist positions and formation of new doctrines are touched upon. As a result of the study, the genesis of Buddhism was described through the prism of Japanese culture, the trajectory of its development from inception to transformation processes in new trends as well as social phenomena that sometimes gave rise to a creative or destructive tendency and influenced the course of history. The authors note that Japanese society that tends to a greater extent towards abstraction and aesthetic pleasure managed to assimilate to the new realities of life and new teachings with pinpoint accuracy, transforming Buddhism into its culture and polishing and refining it in the Japanese style.

The article is devoted to one of the most relevant problems of modern philosophy, the philosophy of consciousness in light of the latest discoveries of neurobiology. The most poorly studied aspects; the problem of free will, the problem of consciousness of the animal world and the problem of psychophysical parallelism are considered in this article. Some ethical and ideological issues related to the problems are also considered.

The classic dispute about the nature of consciousness by E.V. Ilyenkov and D.I. Dubrovsky, which ended essentially in a stalemate precisely because of the ignorance of the importance of the above issues, is considered as an example of why these questions are relevant. The article also views the paradox of free will and responsibility for one's actions, which inevitably arises with a materialistic understanding of the nature of consciousness.

The article briefly analyzes the key ideas for this topic by a number of prominent neuroscientists (Wilder Penfield, John Eccles, Oleg Kryshtal (Krishtal), Christoph Koch), devoted to the problem of the nature of consciousness in the time from the 1970s to the present, as well as the philosophical foundations of ideas about consciousness, formed in the European philosophy of modern times. The concept of dualism and its possible foundations, which are relevant at the present time, are examined separately, but the dualistic concept of consciousness proposed by Descartes is criticized as incompatible with the modern conclusions of neurobiology. Also, the evidence of world-renowned neuroscientists destroying the "human monopoly" on the possession of consciousness and indicating the presence of consciousness in the animal kingdom is presented.

Ultimately, the philosophy of Buddhism is considered as one of the possible and most promising topics for studying in this direction. The strengths of the Buddhist concept of consciousness, which are hardly noticeable in this time, are summarized, thus giving an advantage over the ontological foundations of the concept of consciousness that prevailed in Europe in the modern era. In general, the convergence of traditional Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness with the latest achievements of neurobiology is noted.

The paper attempts to expand the authentic understanding of the imperatives of the scientific ethos given by R.K. Merton in 1942. In the original interpretation, Merton’s Code referred only to the European science of the New Age and subsequent centuries. As Merton himself and his followers have seen, the applicability of this code to other societies is not relevant. However, the author of the paper believes that the original four maxims of Merton in one way or another work effectively outside the specified space-time frame and, in particular, work in medieval Arab-Muslim science. The philosophical allegorical parable "The Message of Birds" written by Ibn Sina in the XI century is used as a text in which the imperatives that semantically coincide with Merton's maxims are found. The analysis shows that the text of the medieval scientist is transparently articulated: 1) Mertonian "communism" which assumes the collective ownership of epistemological discourse participants of the products received in its process (new empirical facts, theoretical and methodological innovations); 2) "universalism" that excludes any discrimination of discourse subjects on external, non-scientific criteria; 3) "disinterestedness", according to which the scientist builds his activities as if he had no other interests but to understand the truth; 4) "organized skepticism" according to which there is no presumption of innocence in science, and whoever comes forward with epistemological innovation must calmly and patiently prove his rightness to those who are standing in defence of the existing body of knowledge. Since the author of "The Message of Birds", despite his chosen artistic and mystical form for this work, is one of the largest figures of medieval Arab-Muslim science, his parable should be interpreted, first of all, as a text, which reflects the very process of cognitive search in pre-classical science. A closer familiarity with the nature and content of epistemological discourse in ancient and medieval traditional societies provides a good reason here to see one of the attempts to systematize the ethical rules that have actually been in force among scientists for many centuries.

The article examines the paradoxical nature of G. W. F. Hegel’s biography and philosophical ideology. The essence of paradoxicality is substantiated by several factors – biographical, historical-philosophical, hermeneutical, and concrete-historical. The purpose of the work is to identify insufficiently known aspects of the personality and philosophical ideology of the thinker. Methodologically, the study is constructed using dialectical and historical-logical methods. The results of the study are to reveal the voluminous inconsistency of Hegel’s biography and thought; to clarify both the positive and negative aspects of his philosophical ideology.

The author shows a number of paradoxes of Hegel’s philosophy: first, the understanding of development as a ‘hard’ war against itself and inattention to the multifactorial and non-linear nature of many processes; secondly, focusing on a logical idea belittles or denies the value of everything else, including living and human beings; thirdly, the desire to raise a person to ‘the highest’ position and at the same time enslave him as a universal creature and a state citizen; fourth, Hegel’s essentialism is frankly anti-existential and merciless to everything private and subjective; fifth, Hegel’s seemingly flawless scientific system suffers from inattention to the complexity and unpredictability of reality; sixth, the Lutheran religiosity of the philosopher turns out to be almost anti-Christian – with the non-recognition of the Most Holy Trinity, without the desire to become a ‘servant’ of another, etc.; seventh, Hegel’s decency and philistine ‘kindness’ are radically different from his pejorative attitude towards the female sex, other peoples, races, and civilizations. Colonialism is justified. Hence, it was quite natural for the German Nazis to turn to Hegel’s ideas. Eighth, the great dialectic has too much belittled the reality of static things, unambiguity and invariance.

The novelty of the research lies in the recognition of the true causes and tasks of the thinker’s life and work; in the explanation of his main values, including his understanding of Christianity; in the clarification of the Hegel-German and Hegel-citizen positions.

The conclusions of the study are related to the antithetical comparison of the ideology and philosophy of Hegel and Hesse, Hegel and Shestov. The author highlights anti-existential and racial-nationalist motives of the philosopher’s work.

The purpose of this paper is to show how the thought and speech of people holding and defending directly opposite positions affect the change in the thought and speech of people of their own and subsequent generations, with different life orientations, and to find ways of this influence. The author describes the situation that arose at the end of the sixties of the twentieth century, known as the ideological dispersal of philosophical, historical and sociological trends that ran counter to the policy of the CPSU, which became especially fierce in the fight against opponents after the USSR’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. One of the results of such an ideological battle was the defeat of the sector of the methodology of history of the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by M. Ya. Gefter, who published a series of books in which the so-called laws of historical development (formational approach) were questioned and the fundamental provisions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism were criticized.  The subject of analysis is Gefter’s article “A Page from the History of Marxism in the Early 20th Century”, published in the book “Historical Science and Some Problems of the Modernity”, dedicated to the analysis of Lenin’s tactics and strategy development which changed the views of many, especially young, historians on the historical process, and most importantly - on the methods of seeking and expressing the truth. The differences were expressed primarily in the fact that the proponents and defenders of the Soviet regime, which was based on their own established norms of Marxism-Leninism, fearlessly used all means of pressure on unwanted opponents. Professionals, however, who tried to understand the true sense of the historical process, the sense of judgments about it, especially the sense of the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy, unfolding at the beginning of the twentieth century, were forced to use the Aesopian language, which also provoked a distortion of this sense in many ways: due to the nebulous and veiled expressions, which give the impression of theoretical blackmail, causing such consequences as speech irresponsibility.

This paper is devoted to the analysis and to the comparison of concepts on theodicy and on the nature of evil that was developed by two medieval Jewish philosophers. They are Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides or Ralbag, 1288-1344) and Hasdai Crescas (1340-1410/12). The sources of the analysis are the third chapter of the fourth book of the “Wars of the Lord” (1329) by Gersonides and the second chapter of the second book of the “Light of the Lord” (1410) by Crescas. Both philosophers assert that evil essentially cannot come from God. The causes of evil are the sinfulness of human beings, or the celestial bodies, or the breaking of the connection between human and God. The problem of evil and injustice in this world are closely related for Gersonides and Crescas to other problems, such as divine knowledge of future events, free will, reasons for reward and punishment. Gersonides and Crescas differ considerably on these issues. Gersonides demonstrates that God is not an essential source of evil. He proceeded to build on this statement with the fallacy of the opinion that divine providence extends to individuals. After all, said Gersonides, retribution would make God a source of evil. And in this case, righteous men would always be rewarded, and sinners would always be punished for their sins. But obviously this is not the case. Crescas, in contrast to Gersonides, claims that God knows individuals. This does not prevent him from agreeing with Ralbagh that God is not the source of evil. According to Сresсas, any punishment or suffering (even for the righteous) always leads to good. It is obvious therefore that Crescas adheres to a more traditional position, trying, inter alia, to bring his thoughts as close as possible to the ideas expressed in the Torah. Gersonides adheres to a position close to the ideas of Maimonides. Gersonides, in the author’s opinion, created a philosophical concept that is more consistent in comparison with Crescas’ conception, however more distant from the Jewish teaching.