Ideas and Ideals

The author of the article reveals the theological context of the origin of the concept of actual infinity and clarifies the problem of actual infinity. The author shows that this problem is not a paradoxical category of thinking, but a problem of the unity of two realities (eternal, unchanging and infinite, and temporary, changeable and finite), which has been misunderstood. The author raises the question of the relevance of the problem of actual infinity brought by Christianity for modern secularized science and philosophy. The author shows that the problem of the unity of the two realities was declared much earlier than Christianity. This problem was already dealt with by the ancient Eleans. They initiated the one-sided view and incorrect understanding of this problem, which opened the main path of development of the entire Western European philosophy. With the advent of Christianity, all the dangers identified by the Eleans (and above all by Zeno) and then still unclear on this path received a new sharpness and now real force. The author of the article shows that the regularity of the relation of the finite, the actually infinite, and the potentially infinite, revealed by Zeno, was the basis for changing the classical rationality to the non-classical one. In turn, the fact of the collapse of the classics has become evidence of modernity that the problem of actual infinity is not a mental paradox, but contains the real possibility of changing the finite nature. But this change is not carried out in the direction suggested by the recognition of actual infinity itself, but in another direction, opposite to it, but closely connected with it. The disclosure of the essence of this connection will be the disclosure of the problem of actual infinity.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the theory of social action in the context of criticism of the theory of action by analytical philosophy. Firstly, the article describes the basic concepts of social action by M. Weber, E. Durkheim, and T. Parsons. Despite some disagreements between these sociologists, they agree that social action is purposeful and intentional, as well as focused on other people, due to which it receives a social characteristic. Then the author turns to analytical philosophy, in which the concept of "intention" was subjected to skeptical analysis. For example, in the philosophy of late Wittgenstein, action receives its meaning not from the intentions of the actor, but from the context of its implementation, just as words get their meaning from the conditions in which they are used. His ideas were developed by E. Anscombe, who rejected introspection as a method of comprehending the intentions of the subject of action. An obvious consequence of the refusal of psychologizing intent was an appeal to the context of the action being performed and to its social conditions as well. Having considered examples of the application of the theories of social action, the author concludes that sociologists in most of their studies use the model of a rational subject of action, the distinguishing feature of which is awareness of one’s own intentions and goals. Although some researchers have attempted to make this model weaker in order to approximate it to real participants of social interaction, these changes did not affect the awareness of the subject of action of his own goals and intentions. Therefore, the author of the article concludes that one of the urgent tasks of sociology is to develop a new model of the subject of action, which will organically combine the subject’s orientation to the external context and limited awareness of the grounds for his own actions.

This article considers the genesis and development of Buddhism in Japan from the age of Nara to the Tokugawa period. Revealing the problems of the first six philosophical and religious schools of academic Buddhism, namely Kusha, Sanron, Jōjitsu, Hosso, Risshu and Kegon, the authors of the article sought to fully explore the basic foundations of the philosophy of each of them, delve into the linguistic nuances of Japanese and Sanskrit terms, touching on such aspects like dharma, dukha, anatmavada, shunyata or emptiness, the "two truths" of the Buddha's teachings, etc.

The text focuses on the role of Buddhism in the Nara period, it explores the main purpose of monks and the system of "local" temples which was not only an intellectual support of that era, but also played the role of an important military force. Drawing an analogy with the philosophy of the Rinzai-shu and Soto-shu schools, the authors analyze the expansion of the line of succession in Zen by monitoring the formation of groups of thinkers, their development and emergence of cultural capital through long-term discussions and continuous reflection over several generations. The work pays special attention to significant figures in Japanese Buddhism, it outlines the role of philosophical creativity, examines the social and religious transformations that occur over different eras and periods. The question of redistribution of power and basic economic resources, suppression of Buddhism, emergence of anti-Buddhist positions and formation of new doctrines are touched upon. As a result of the study, the genesis of Buddhism was described through the prism of Japanese culture, the trajectory of its development from inception to transformation processes in new trends as well as social phenomena that sometimes gave rise to a creative or destructive tendency and influenced the course of history. The authors note that Japanese society that tends to a greater extent towards abstraction and aesthetic pleasure managed to assimilate to the new realities of life and new teachings with pinpoint accuracy, transforming Buddhism into its culture and polishing and refining it in the Japanese style.

The article is devoted to one of the most relevant problems of modern philosophy, the philosophy of consciousness in light of the latest discoveries of neurobiology. The most poorly studied aspects; the problem of free will, the problem of consciousness of the animal world and the problem of psychophysical parallelism are considered in this article. Some ethical and ideological issues related to the problems are also considered.

The classic dispute about the nature of consciousness by E.V. Ilyenkov and D.I. Dubrovsky, which ended essentially in a stalemate precisely because of the ignorance of the importance of the above issues, is considered as an example of why these questions are relevant. The article also views the paradox of free will and responsibility for one's actions, which inevitably arises with a materialistic understanding of the nature of consciousness.

The article briefly analyzes the key ideas for this topic by a number of prominent neuroscientists (Wilder Penfield, John Eccles, Oleg Kryshtal (Krishtal), Christoph Koch), devoted to the problem of the nature of consciousness in the time from the 1970s to the present, as well as the philosophical foundations of ideas about consciousness, formed in the European philosophy of modern times. The concept of dualism and its possible foundations, which are relevant at the present time, are examined separately, but the dualistic concept of consciousness proposed by Descartes is criticized as incompatible with the modern conclusions of neurobiology. Also, the evidence of world-renowned neuroscientists destroying the "human monopoly" on the possession of consciousness and indicating the presence of consciousness in the animal kingdom is presented.

Ultimately, the philosophy of Buddhism is considered as one of the possible and most promising topics for studying in this direction. The strengths of the Buddhist concept of consciousness, which are hardly noticeable in this time, are summarized, thus giving an advantage over the ontological foundations of the concept of consciousness that prevailed in Europe in the modern era. In general, the convergence of traditional Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness with the latest achievements of neurobiology is noted.

The paper attempts to expand the authentic understanding of the imperatives of the scientific ethos given by R.K. Merton in 1942. In the original interpretation, Merton’s Code referred only to the European science of the New Age and subsequent centuries. As Merton himself and his followers have seen, the applicability of this code to other societies is not relevant. However, the author of the paper believes that the original four maxims of Merton in one way or another work effectively outside the specified space-time frame and, in particular, work in medieval Arab-Muslim science. The philosophical allegorical parable "The Message of Birds" written by Ibn Sina in the XI century is used as a text in which the imperatives that semantically coincide with Merton's maxims are found. The analysis shows that the text of the medieval scientist is transparently articulated: 1) Mertonian "communism" which assumes the collective ownership of epistemological discourse participants of the products received in its process (new empirical facts, theoretical and methodological innovations); 2) "universalism" that excludes any discrimination of discourse subjects on external, non-scientific criteria; 3) "disinterestedness", according to which the scientist builds his activities as if he had no other interests but to understand the truth; 4) "organized skepticism" according to which there is no presumption of innocence in science, and whoever comes forward with epistemological innovation must calmly and patiently prove his rightness to those who are standing in defence of the existing body of knowledge. Since the author of "The Message of Birds", despite his chosen artistic and mystical form for this work, is one of the largest figures of medieval Arab-Muslim science, his parable should be interpreted, first of all, as a text, which reflects the very process of cognitive search in pre-classical science. A closer familiarity with the nature and content of epistemological discourse in ancient and medieval traditional societies provides a good reason here to see one of the attempts to systematize the ethical rules that have actually been in force among scientists for many centuries.

One can often read about the religious revival that came about in Russia after the collapse of Soviet power, both in the media and in scientific literature. According to opinion polls, the majority of Russians are believers, mostly orthodox Christians. The Russian state clearly patronizes religion, at least some specific ("traditional") religions. In socio-political discourse, the prevailing view is that religion is a good thing, and if sometimes religion is a source of problems, it is associated with some deviations from the norm, a perversion of the very essence of religion. This point of view can easily be found in Russian scientific periodicals. However, a critical attitude towards the growing role of religion in Russia is also often expressed in Russian science. The article highlights the main reasons for the dissatisfaction of scholars with the current state of affairs. It is also shown that such works have no influence on the religious situation in Russia. Although anti-clerical sentiments are quite clearly expressed in Russian science, they do not fall into the socio-political discourse, since there is simply no such force in Russia that could consistently promote the principle of secularism. In search of an additional electoral resource and a replacement for the Soviet ideology, the authorities did everything to enhance the importance of religion and strengthen the authority of religious leaders. As a result, today, despite the fact that the real level of religiosity of the population is apparently much lower than is commonly believed, politicians (even opposition ones) are not ready to openly doubt the positive role of religion, fearing PR problems.

The article deals with the problems and principles of reconstruction of certain concepts of philosophy and cultural narratives. The reason was the discussion of N. Kanaeva's report at the Institute of Philosophy, read at a seminar on the geography of rationality. Analyzing V. Bibikhin's work "Wittgenstein: Change of Aspect", the author poses the problem of correctly (to avoid contradictions and reach an understandable logic of text interpretation) reading the narratives of a foreign culture or even the narratives of one's own culture, but belonging to a different direction of thought. Such a reading, he claims, presupposes special optics, a hermeneutic concept and a cultural-historical reconstruction. To introduce and clarify what can be understood by such concepts (optics, concept and reconstruction), an analysis of two cases is proposed: semiotic schemes and G. Oldenberg's study of the Buddha's teachings. The schemes are discussed on the basis of the works of Plato ("Feast" and "Timaeus"). The author shows that Plato in "The Feast" constructs schemes for solving problem situations and specifying ideal objects, and in "Timaeus" he discusses the nature of schemes. In turn, Oldenberg reconstructs the prehistory of Buddhism and the basic ideas proposed by the Buddha. A feature of its reconstruction is an appeal to the culture of Ancient India, an analysis of the ancient Hindu consciousness and mentality, a discussion of the features of Buddhist discourse. The author concludes that if the ideas about Buddhism outlined by Oldenberg are used for the purpose of understanding Buddhist narratives, then these ideas as optics can be summed up under the notion of a hermeneutic concept. This concept is structured in such a way that it clearly takes into account the peculiarities of the Hindu culture and mentality, as different from the European ones.

Ability of knowledge and thinking operations, such as abstraction, comparison syllogisms and so on, are of course common to all peoples. Nevertheless,
when referring to this or that specifi c cultural material, the problem of the existence of separate epistemic cultures arises. Contemporary research on epistemological diversity relies primarily on methods of analytic epistemology and focuses on identifying examples of ‘cross-linguistic divergence’ at the semantic level. The concepts of ‘know’ and ‘knowledge’ often become the object of research. However, there are suffi cient grounds for identifying and studying epistemic cultures also in terms of other parameters. This article is focused upon highlighting these parameters by referring to examples of the history of the Japanese spiritual tradition associated with Buddhist and Confucian teachings. In particular, the author
examines the Buddhist doctrines of two truths and the identity of absolute being and the phenomenal world, as well as the neo-Confucian principle of the
unity of knowledge and action from the point of view of their infl uence on the epistemological attitudes of Japanese culture. The undertaken analytic excursion allows, using the example of Japan, to show that each culture has its own set of assumptions underlying the cognitive strategy, certain preferences, more or less trust in relation to one or another form of acquiring knowledge, e.g., sensoryempirical, rational, intuitive forms, as well as ideas about the goals of cognition, differently perceived in diverse cultural and historical contexts. 

The article continues the polemics on the problems of interaction of philosophical cultures in the era of globalization, which was started at the meetings of the Round Table "Geography of Rationality". The author gives answers to critical questions, explains the methodology and principles of her work with Indian philosophical texts. A short research of the meta-term "cognitive subject" is an example of her methods. The analysis of cognitive subject aimed to justify the absence of the concepts of reason and rationality in Indian epistemic culture, the cornerstones of Western epistemic culture, since Modern times. The justification was carried out by comparing the generalized model of the cognitive subject, abstracted from the writings of empiricists and rationalists of the XVII–XVIII centuries, with the generalized models of the cognitive subject, reconstructed on the basis of authoritative writings of three variants of Indian epistemological teachings: Advaita Vedānta, Jainism and Buddhism. From the author's point of view, the absence of the concepts of reason and rationality in India leads to the non-classical problem of pluralism of epistemic cultures, and the exploration of the meta-term "cognitive subject" allows us to find, on the one hand, intersections in the contents of epistemologies in Indian philosophy and Western metaphysics of Modern times, and on the other, their incompatible contents, which are specific manifestations of pluralism of epistemic cultures. For her reconstruction of the cognitive subject models the author takes the principle of "double perspective" in combination with the methods of hermeneutical and logical analysis of philosophical terms. The principle determinates the consideration of the theoretical object from two sides: European and Indian. Having appeared in the Western epistemic culture, these methods effectively work to objectify the results of socio-humanitarian research, thanks to which they are becoming increasingly widespread among non-Western cross-cultural philosophers. When the author applies the method of logical analysis to justify the absence of the concepts of reason and rationality in India, she is guided by the rules of logical semantics and the principles of semiotics.  The compared terms, Western and Indian, are considered as signs with their own meanings and senses. The senses are understood as sets of predicates important for solving the author’s task. The author of the article, taking into account the experience of famous philosophers, negatively assesses the possibility of solving the problem of unambiguously correct translation.

This article is devoted to solving the problem of epistemological and ontological insufficiency of traditional scientific approaches applied to the comprehension of social phenomena presented in their disordered, chaotic multidisciplinary theoretical images (interpretations). A comprehensive and in-depth analysis of disciplinary strategies / programs for comprehending social phenomena that serve as the object of scientific views of a number of scientific fields has shown that they demonstrate a pronounced methodological approach, lack of clarity of which description language describes / is able to fully describe their object of scientific knowledge.

The key specificity of the problematization of the article is determined by the fact that the focus is on the process / result of reconstructing / constructing theoretical interpretations of a social phenomenon taken in the coordinates of space and time. It is proposed to correlate the following processes with the process of understanding the theoretical interpretations of the studied social phenomenon: reconstruction (past, present) and scenario construction (present, future). The author's analytical position is determined by the fact that theoretical interpretations of the perceived social phenomenon will always belong exclusively to the past and future of its plans, but not to the present. This implicit, but very important facet, unfortunately, escapes in the dominant and well-established theoretical reflection of social phenomena today.

The main purpose of this publication is to overcome the above-mentioned difficulties, relying on the proposed universal concept of comprehension of multidisciplinary social phenomena. The author's approach proposed in the publication, based on the idea of understanding the theoretical interpretations of the social phenomenon under study belonging to the world of the past (reconstruction - for understanding the theorizations of its past events) and the future (scenario construction - for reflection on the theoretical pictures of its future events), is designed to overcome the discovered problem. Summarizing, the paper formulated the principles for determining the optimal way to comprehend social phenomena and the key prohibitions dictated by the author's concept of comprehending social phenomena revealed to the researcher in their multidisciplinary interpretations /theorizations.

The article is devoted to the analysis of imagination as a philosophical and sociological concept that played a significant role in the development of social theory in the middle of the 20th century. Exploring the premises of the contradictory relationship between science and society, it is easy to find a connection between the development of science and social change. Currently, it is generally accepted that scientific, including social theories, through the transfer of ideas, transform the social order and, on the contrary, social practices transform knowledge about the world. The article proves that imagination plays a key role in this process. An excursion into the theory of ideas reveals the connection between imagination and irrational and experiential knowledge. The author of the article refers to the works of P. Berger and T. Luckmann, C. Castoriadis and C. Taylor, who showed a direct connection between theoretical ideas and the world of "social imaginary", collective imaginary and social changes. For the first time in the history of mankind, thanks to imagination, society does not see the social order as something immutable. Methodological cases are presented that illustrate the specific role of the concept of imagination as a source of the formation of new research strategies that allow for a new look at the problem of nationalism (social constructivism) and the study of public expectations from the implementation of technological innovations (STS). For decades, Benedict Anderson's work “Imagined Communities” predetermined the interest of researchers of nationalism in social imagination and the collective ideas based on it about the national identity of modern societies, their history and geography. The research of Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim has formed a new track for the study of science as a collective product of public expectations of an imaginary social order, embodied in technological projects. The conclusion is made about the contradictory nature of social expectations based on collective imagination: on the one hand, they strengthen the authority of science in society, on the other hand, they provoke the growth of negative expectations from the introduction of scientific discoveries. The article substantiates the opinion that imagination is an effective tool for assessing the risks of introducing innovations.

Digital technologies, ubiquitous in our daily life, have radically changed the way we work, communicate, and consume in a short period of time. They affect all components of quality of life: well-being, work, health, education, social connections, environmental quality, the ability to participate and govern civil society, and so on.

Digital transformation creates both opportunities and serious risks to the well-being of people. Researchers and statistical agencies around the world are facing a major challenge to develop new tools to analyze the impact of digital transformation on the well-being of the population.

The risks are very diverse in nature and it is very difficult to identify the key factor. All researchers conclude that secure digital technologies significantly improve the lives of those who have the skills to use them and pose a serious risk of inequality for society, as they introduce a digital divide between those who have the skills to use them and those who do not.

In the article, the author examines the risks created by digital technologies for some components of the quality of life (digital component of the quality of life), which are six main components: the digital quality of the population, providing the population with digital benefits, the labor market in the digital economy, the impact of digitalization on the social sphere, state electronic services for the population and the security of information activities. The study was carried out on the basis of the available statistical base and the results of research by scientists from different countries of the world.

The risks of the digital economy cannot be ignored when pursuing state social policy. Attention is paid to government regulation aimed at reducing the negative consequences of digitalization through the prism of national, federal projects and other events.

The collective monograph, along with the classical themes of V.A. Kutyrev, contains new themes of his co-authors V.V. Slyusarev and T.M. Khusyainov: transformation of social structures, problems of interaction with virtual assistants, personal self-identification in the information society, labor resources in the context of globalization, opposition to humanism and efficiency in the market. The second theme is the increasing complexity of the information society through speed, data volumes, convergence, and dialogue. Religious differences that have fundamentally differentiated ethnic groups for so many centuries are a thing of the past. Differentiation of consumption styles, the ecological load on the biosphere and the capacity of the habitat; these are the current antinomies of man and technology. The paper deals with the effects of current social dynamics, in particular, the increasing processes of precarization, the accelerating pace of life and population growth. Stable employment, sustainable development, wisdom, conservative values; all of this is offered as a sacrifice to civilization, gamification, informatization and together constitutes a society of risk. Can we talk about human consumption by Technos? Isn't this black slug on the cover of the monograph yet another philosophical hypostatized metaphor? It would be correct to say that in conditions of overproduction of people, we need equipment for more efficient production. Without it, we cannot remain human. Technology helped us to leave a purely biological state and become sapient, civilized. Artificial intelligence, neural networks, robotics, blockchain (data processing distribution), 5G standard, big data, internet of things, cloud computing, 3D printing, augmented reality; these are not monster technologies, transhumanist actors, but something that can provide promising employment to millions of people. The problem of unemployment in post-industrial society is already becoming global, because humanity has reached the limits of development. The rapid precarization of the population is proof of this. The mass of people on the planet cannot find normal employment with social guarantees. So maybe we need to thank tech? The review ends with such an ambiguous conclusion.

Abstract

The article analyzes the dynamics of the development of medical models of treatment of deviations from the health norm, discusses the issue of changing ideas about the human health in medicine.  It is shown that as a result of changes in the conceptual understanding of health and the process of its restoration, the principle of achieving a commercially profitable, fast and controlled result is introduced into modern medicine, as a result of that the process of medical treatment is standardized and regulated. But the preservation of object optics of views in the medical industry, as shown in the article, becomes ineffective, moreover, risky in a situation of moving boundaries of the human health norm. To overcome the existing risks, new institutes and practices of ethical examination of health standards are being introduced into medicine. It is shown that the accepted deliberative practices of ethical expertise only introduce a procedure for taking into account the patient’s position regarding the boundaries of their health standards and the limits of medical intervention. At the same time, the patient’s position is considered as something ready, initially given, in other words, the classic “human project” continues to be defended in medicine.