Ideas and Ideals

Today’s energy transition is a paradigmatic change from fossil fuel-based systems to those centered on renewable energy sources. This transformation spans technological, economic, social, and ethical dimensions and is deeply rooted in the philosophical principles of sustainable development.  Ethical considerations are gaining prominence, particularly through the emerging frameworks of energy ethics and energy justice. These approaches emphasize the moral responsibilities of governments, corporations, and individuals toward both the environment and future generations. Historically, concepts such as ecological modernization and intergenerational justice have shaped the discourse, reinforcing the need for equitable and responsible energy governance. However, despite these guiding ideals, many dominant actors such as international oil companies within the global energy sector do not consistently prioritize the principles of the common good. In practice, the energy transition is often hindered by entrenched interests, stakeholder confl icts, and the prioritization of short-term corporate gains over longterm societal benefi ts. This paper analyzes the fundamental theoretical foundations underlying the energy transition and the integration of renewable energy sources into existing energy systems, with particular attention to the role of international oil and gas companies. It argues that ensuring a just and effective transition requires a rethinking of corporate strategies through the lens of justice, sustainable development, and ethical responsibility toward future generations. Based on theoretical analysis, the author demonstrates that a successful energy transformation entails not merely a technological shift, but institutional change, reassessment of values, and a long-term commitment to sustainability. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of reconciling economic and environmental priorities through innovation, stakeholder engagement, and ethical governance. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for scholars and practitioners seeking to navigate the complexities of energy transition in the 21st century. demonstrates that a successful energy transformation entails not merely a technological shift, but institutional change, reassessment of values, and a long-term commitment to sustainability. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of reconciling economic and environmental priorities through innovation, stakeholder engagement, and ethical governance. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for scholars and practitioners seeking to navigate the complexities of energy transition in the 21st century.

The article is devoted to determining the sociocultural position assigned to normative ethics by modern philosophy. For this purpose, the arguments put forward by postmodern philosophy against the classical idea of normativity in culture are analyzed, and the models proposed by its representatives as alternative concepts of ethical development are described. A comparative analysis of new ethical concepts is carried out: antinormativism, normative relativism, moral neo-universalism, normativity of the “Other”. It is argued that along with the concepts that deny the idea of normativity (antinormativism, normative relativism), within the framework of postmodern philosophy there are ideas that create a foundation for reinterpreting the ideas of classical normativity in their correlation with contemporary socio-cultural experience (moral neo-universalism, normativity of the “Other”).

It is concluded that the communicative organization of modern social reality and the ontological changes that have occurred in it allow us to talk about the emergence of a communicative ontology of ethical codifi cation as one of the important tools of sociocultural self-organization. The social system changes its former rigid hierarchical nature to a network nature, devoid of a semantic center and prone to further modifi cations. In addition, transformations lead to the gradual transformation of society from a subordinate object into a subject of normative-value self-organization.

The article deals with a preliminary analysis of the philosophical system of Russian cosmism and an assessment of the potential applicability of its ideas to modern bioethical problems. The relevance of the study is due to the need to search for axiological guidelines in the context of constantly growing capabilities of science and medicine. The article uses the term “Russian cosmism” to describe a movement in Russian philosophy that combines elements of religious and scientifi c worldviews with the aim of improving the human being. The most important representative of this movement was Nikolai Fyodorov, although in addition to him, a number of other Russian thinkers are also considered part. The study compares the philosophical system of Russian cosmism with the philosophical system of transhumanism. The article demonstrates that Russian cosmism and transhumanism are similar in that both of these systems are based on the idea of  “active evolution”, according to which the evolution of humanity as a biological species should be subordinated to the human mind. At the same time, Russian cosmism differs signifi cantly from transhumanism, the differences are such that they do not allow us to consider these schools of thought to be of the same nature. Nevertheless, the article shows that the similarities between them are suffi cient to conclude that both of these philosophical systems can be productively applied in modern bioethical discourse. At the same time, the article shows, using the example of Nikolai Fyodorov’s project of universal resurrection and immortality, that Russian cosmism, even in isolation from its utopian projects, compared to transhumanism, has a greater potential to bring a strong ethical value system to bioethics, based on the highest value of human life and personhood. Moreover, the article shows that this value system is deeply hostile to any inhumane eugenic ideas, which makes it especially relevant in modern conditions. In the end, the article concludes that the ideas of Russian cosmism, especially their ethical component, can be of great benefi t in the search for new approaches to bioethical problems and overcoming the tendency to desacralize life in modern biomedicine.

The criticism of epistemology undertaken by R. Rorty in the book “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” is based on the concept of knowledge by J. Dewey of ‘research’ as an evolutionary change of beliefs. Rorty identifies two components of this process: the description of the transition from the old belief system to the new, and the development of a new system. The first is closely related to the problems of Kuhn’s paradigm shift, and the second to Gadamer’s hermeneutic tools. Both of these are intertwined in Rorty’s subsequent philosophy, undergoing changes under the influence of a pragmatic critique of the dualisms of Western philosophy. But since hermeneutics is only one of the means of mastering new beliefs, Rorty introduces a more general concept of ‘recontextualization’. This step requires a revision of the place of Kuhn and Gadamer in late Rorty’s philosophy. In relation to Kuhn, this was expressed in the rejection of Kuhn’s privilege of the natural sciences, while the role of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as an interpretation has suffered more damage. Rorty denies the universality of hermeneutics, addressing a rebuke to those philosophers whose interpretation comes to the fore, or in Rorty’s words, ‘is inscribed on the banners of the philosophical movement’ - Dilthey, Gadamer and Taylor. Recontextualization instead of hermeneutics is implemented by Rorty in the form of a translation concept. Rorty does not accept Quine’s concept of radical translation as an expression of extreme skepticism in understanding someone else’s linguistic framework, and accepts Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which emphasizes interpretation with the achievement of ‘maximizing’ meaning and ‘optimizing’ communication. As a consequence, Rorty uses the possibility of completely abandoning ontology as a tool for describing the world and teeters on the verge of adopting a purely ‘linguistic’ vision of reality.

Two widely discussed books on violence by Steven Pinker offer a grand metanarrative about the movement of humanity towards reason, progress, and humanism. The article briefly generalizes the main author’s methodological predispositions. The article also deals with the conceptual analysis of the theory. The scholar’s theory is based on several key ideas: the state, gentle commerce, the taming of manners, and the Enlightenment. The main point is that society, passing successively through such stages-ideas, moves in the direction of greater progress and limitation of violence. As for the criticisms, we illustrate the limitations of the method chosen and the inadequacy of its objectives. First, the author uses the criminological method of counting the number of murders per hundred thousand in a population, which can only characterize one segment of violence. Secondly, the measured violence does not always correlate with other violent crimes. We also point out objective difficulties in working with the available statistics. In particular, we are confronted with fragmented data and incomparable methodology of data collection from predecessors. In addition, we reveal many mistakes, inaccuracies, and in many cases even deliberate discrepancies within representative data. Steven Pinker often resorts to overly sweeping generalizations and comparisons of difficult-to-compare cases. Many scholars have also noted the author’s use of unprofessional literature. In terms of conceptual ideas, critics note the author’s ignorance of contemporary debates and disregard for differences in the works of those classics used in the work. We should also note the rather unfriendly tone of the discussion on the part of all the participants, since the dispute is about big ideas, which often leads to direct insults and labeling. In conclusion, we praise the communicative gesture of challenging the scientific community, but it seems clear that the main goal to give proof towards violence decline is inconclusive.

The article raises the question of the relationship between the practice of artificial intelligence and universal ethics. The topic is fundamentally important, since a person and society that have lost their ethical foundations are deprived of their humanity. The ethics of scientists, designers, high-level managers play a decisive role in modern processes of development and application of artificial intelligence. In their activities, an ethic of responsibility develops, originating from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, published in 1955 in the conditions of a nuclear standoff during the Cold War. The article shows the modern indescribably rapid growth and development of artificial intelligence applications in the practical life of people. Attention is drawn to the fact of the presence of uncertainty in situations of practical application of artificial intelligence, the presence of unforeseen consequences in addition to the expected consequences, who is responsible for those consequences (individuals, corporations, governments). The responsibility lies with the one who decides on the action: the actor. The actor is in a situation of ethical risk. It is shown that the risk increases due to a number of circumstances: 1) a variety of applications; 2) uncontrolled rampant growth; 3) difficulties in tracking the empirical situation of application; 4) difficulties in theoretical analysis of the situation of action. The article focuses on the risks of the practice of peaceful use of remotely piloted aircraft, as well as their military use and automated weapons without operator confirmation. The sharp, apparently exponential growth of information technology, the practical implementation of artificial intelligence, puts people in a difficult situation, an ethical situation: what to choose ‘to have or to be’.  Or is there a third choice?

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought digital ethics to the public’s attention and are the driving force behind many discussions on ethical issues related to digital technologies. This article analyzes the arguments of supporters and opponents of artificial intelligence, various approaches to the development of AI systems, ethical issues associated with the use of AI technologies, including the problem of managing artificial intelligence and the idea of active responsibility for the development of AI technologies, general principles for the development of AI systems formulated in the founding documents. The methodological basis of this work was the dialectical method; in the process of research the author used the comparative method and the method of document analysis. The sources were the studies by domestic and foreign authors on various ethical issues of artificial intelligence, the European “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI” and the Russian “AI Ethics Code”. The author demonstrates the importance of the moralization of artificial intelligence technologies, that is, the conscious development of technologies for the formation of moral actions and decision-making. One of the clear problems is finding a democratic way to moralize technology, since technology differs from laws in that it can restrict human freedom without being the result of a democratic process. It is argued that it is necessary to create an independent international scientific organization to develop a clear scientific view of artificial intelligence, as well as an independent international body for the regulation of artificial intelligence, which would unite approaches to understanding this phenomenon from different points of view (states, private companies and academia).

Modernity has presented a new challenge to capitalism, the answer to which may be the emergence of ‘moral capital’. Since the end of the 20th century, corporations have become convinced of the importance of a strong ideology and the need for developed meaningful corporate ethics based on values understood and accepted by all members of the company. The exaggerated importance of personal gain in Western philosophy since the time of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham has led to the formation of an ‘economic man’ who views the world around him through the prism of individual material interest. The life credo of such a person is “I feel good, so everyone feels good.” has become a real threat to society, making it impossible for adequate forms of collectives to exist. In this article we study large corporations as they are the most visible as representatives of modern capitalist society. An analysis of the activities of corporations and their reactions to crises has shown that companies that have managed to survive a critical situation, as a rule, make changes to corporate ethics 2-3 years later, having undergone some reflection. The competitive environment, the requirements of society, the state and international organizations contribute to the manifestation of greater social responsibility to comprehend and fix these changes. All types of capitalism, as Max Weber saw them: ‘predatory’, ‘adventurous’ and ‘rational’ simultaneously coexist in the present time. Time will tell whether capitalism is able to transform into its more moral form or whether we observe the emergence of a new social order. If multinational corporations manage to overcome their natural thirst for profit and transform it into a desire to ‘bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people’, expanding this ‘greatest number’ to a planetary scale, the answer will be positive. The way some of these companies are overcoming their own crises is encouraging. The time of change is wonderful because everyone can contribute to the current changes by acting in accordance with human standards of morality.

The interview discusses a number of critical issues related to those social and technological transformations that are radically changing the way people think about their place within the state and amongst other people, and that have created the need for such a line of thought and action as bioethics. The discussion begins with the problem of just access to medical care, which turns out to be tied to the position that the individual occupied during the Soviet era, when in fact his physical body belonged to the State, when his subjectivity also belonged to the State, and his values and interests were represented by the doctor. The moral formula for the patient's actions was medical paternalism, represented by the doctrine of medical deontology. The task of the present time is the formation of autonomy of personality, the ability to realize oneself, where subjectivity is formed as a response to the demands imposed by various biomedical and bioethical practices. The core of this subjectivity is encapsulated in the concept of autonomy, and the rule of free and informed consent is its practical implementation. These questions are rooted in the problem of dignity, which, in turn, is deeply connected to the familiar model of the “other,” in which the doctor, when prescribing treatment, prescribes it not to this particular person, but to a generalized person. The task of philosophical criticism is discussed, which consists in diagnosing the zones of the most glaring discrepancy between our knowledge, skills, moral and legal norms, and philosophical understandings of the new reality. This diagnosis influences the formation of philosophical anthropology of B.G. Yudin, which interprets the borders of the human in human being’ consciousness as “zones of phase transitions”. The idea of transition from a dialogue to a conversation is discussed. Unlike dialogue, conversation is originally multipolar, intermittent and nonlinear, and problemocentric. Ultimately, this leads to the question of the meaningfulness of life in general, which, according to Aristotle, is the highest form of human existence.

The article is devoted to the analysis of ethical theories that were formulated in a neo-pragmatic discourse, in particular to the study of preconditions for an imaginative transition.  Since forming a new image of ethics is done by supporters of pragmatism by criticizing the rationalistic tradition, the categories that have traditionally been associated with the sphere of irrational come first, related to sensuality and aesthetics. Therefore, the effectiveness of solving moral issues in pragmatic ethics directly depends on the extent to which the resources of imagination are actively used. The author of the article offers to use the new term “imaginative transition” to fix the specifics of those ethical theories. There is a historical and comparative review in order to trace the transformation of the idea of the imagination. The author indicates the conceptual foundations of universalist ethical theory, where imagination belonged to the sphere of sensuality and had no privileged status. In formulating ethical concepts, the rationalistic tradition, which dates back to early Greek philosophy, was primarily based on gnoseology, and the main virtue was wisdom that was associated with an enlightened mind. Followers of Plato’s fundamentalism and Descartes’ objectivism treated the imagination as a derivative of blind feelings. The article has shown that the main actor in the transition from the rationalistic tradition to the romantic one, in which imagination will be interpreted as the highest form of spirit activity, was Immanuel Kant.  Based on the hermeneutic analysis of the philosopher’s texts, it has been discovered that the ability to imagine is crucial to the thinking process for Kant, and knowledge is interpreted as a synthesis of sensuality and reasoning in the activities of the imagination. The author shows that Kant’s aesthetics is the result of the problem of coordinating the pure and practical mind. The author comes to the conclusion, that the adherents of pragmatism, considering the ability of imagination as having moral force, develop an idea which was first clearly formulated by Kant.