From the Principle of Objectivity of Scientific Knowledge to the Reconstruction of Different Situations of Knowledge Production
Vadim Rozin
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2022-14.3.1-75-92

The article proposes to move from the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge to the reconstruction of different situations of knowledge production. To do this, it is first shown that this principle does not work in the humanities and social sciences and has partially ceased to work in natural science (in the field of micro and macro phenomena). A scheme of the genesis of the principle of objectivity is outlined (the need to substantiate knowledge in the natural sciences, the proposals of Kant and Hume). As an alternative to the principle of objectivity, a reconstruction of different situations of knowledge production is proposed, containing two plans: including an external position, on the assumption that we know how everything really happened, and a borrowed one, in which the concept of cognition of those subjects that are subject to analysis is characterized. To demonstrate the logic of this reconstruction, several situations of the production of new knowledge are considered: using schemes (Plato’s work), ideas about thinking (Aristotle), mathematics and experiment (Galileo), interpretations of the researcher (Z. Bauman). Criteria for the truth and effectiveness of new knowledge, which differ significantly in the natural and human sciences, are discussed. For the natural sciences, it is a mathematical description of the processes and mechanisms of a certain natural phenomenon, as well as an experiment that makes it possible to calculate and predict, and create engineering structures. For the humanities, it is an interpretation of a phenomenon that ensures its understanding and use in certain audiences. Since the social sciences are focused on solving two problems at once (the ability to calculate and predict social processes and to comprehend (understand) the social actors who initiated these processes and act in them), insofar as the criteria of authenticity and effectiveness in the social sciences partially coincide with the criteria of the natural sciences indicated here, partly humanitarian.

Phenomenology of the Life -World and Naturalistic Epistemology
Aleksander Frolov
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.1.1-197-209

This paper aims to reveal parallels between the phenomenological concept of the life-world in Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the naturalistic epistemology of Gerhard Vollmer, in which a central concept is the mesocosmos (“world of medium size”). Such a comparison is necessary because the concepts of life-world and mesocosmos are quite similar in content, since they both refer to the human dimension of our world experience, to our natural position in the world. However, these concepts are far from identical. In Husserl’s case, the world of life is the world of pre-scientific experience taking place before scientific idealizations. According to Merleau-Ponty, the world of life is primarily a world of perceptual experience, in which I participate not as a subject of culture, but as an anonymous subject of perception, as a living perceptive body. Both philosophers call for a return to the life-world as a ground of scientific idealizations in order to overcome a crisis brought about by an excessive trust in scientific knowledge and “objectifying thinking”. In turn, Vollmer interprets the mesocosmos as a “world of medium size” that we can successfully explore due to the evolutionary adaptation of our cognitive abilities. This is our “ecological niche”, but while Husserl and Merleau-Ponty encourage us to return to this “cradle of humankind” to take root in it, Vollmer emphasizes that we are not bound to our ecological niche and can expand our knowledge both in the direction of the microworld and in the direction of the “world of mega scales”. He calls this process the objectification and deanthropomorphization of our picture of the world, and this is, in his view, the main trend of the development of scientific knowledge in its history, which is supported by the views of some prominent scientists of the 20th century.

To the Prerequisites for the Formation of an Egocentric Picture of the World: at the Intersection of Physics and Metaphysics
Sergey Myakinnikov
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2021-13.1.1-210-232

The article considers the most general prerequisites for creating a new model of the ecological picture of the world, which is characterized by the comprehensiveness and completeness of coverage of various aspects of the study of the relationships between man and nature. For its formation, it is proposed to use an ecological version of the worldview-methodological platform, called ‘postholism’ by the author, which is able to coordinate the one, whole, many and singular, unique in (among others) the environmental relations of man, society and nature. This allows us to eliminate the methodological shortcomings of the reduction to the individual (merism), to the whole (holism), to the one (onecentrism) of human worldview orientations in the nature of naturcentrism, anthropo(socio)centrism, technocentrism, theocentrism. Such categories of philosophy as ‘reality’, ‘being’, ‘otherness’, ‘non-existence’, ‘being’, ‘nature’, ‘matter’, ‘physical’, ‘metaphysical’, and ‘spiritual’ were important tools for constructing a picture of the world of ecocentrism. They were refined and correlated with the latest achievements in quantum physics, astrophysics, cosmology, as well as reflexed based on extra-scientific representations of ancient cultures and religions. Physical, as well as metaphysical features of nature and man are briefly discussed. Nature is represented at various levels of physical organization (micro-world, macro-world and mega-world) and outside of physical dimensions. These dimensions presumably contain the ‘metaphysical’ content of nature. In them, the objective ‘spiritual’ of the universe, deified by man, is allowed. This does not exclude the pantheistic presence of metaphysical transcendence, estimated as ‘nonexistence’, ‘nothing’ for the reality of man within nature. Man himself is positioned as one whole of physical and spiritual existence, serving as a semblance of a Single Whole of nature. In conclusion, a list of the main environmental invariants of the world picture is given in comparison with the proposed picture of the world of ecologized postholism ecocentrism, the advantages of which are emphasized. The Universe and quantum-field reality, along with the Earth, become components of the All-unified Whole authentic home of the ‘ecos’ of man. Further conditions and prospects for the direct development of this model are discussed.

The Potential of the SWOT Analysis in the Formation of Knowledge Strategy Models
Irina Brylina
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2019-11.1.1-162-174

The author presents knowledge as a valuable strategic resource. The maintenance of competitiveness of an organization requires a focused intelligent resource management.The article reveals the role of implicit knowledge in the realization of cognitive capacities of management strategies. The paper shows that the channels of replenishment and distribution of implicit knowledge are social relationships and interpersonal interactions. The author defines the role of social capital in strengthening of intellectual capital. The article reveals the role of technical and organizational initiatives in provision of a comprehensive infrastructure used in knowledge management processes. The paper accentuates the role of initiatives on knowledge management which enhances the competitive position of an organization that uses knowledge technologies and strategies in management processes. The author shows the main issues of the SWOT analysis. This analysis promotes the increase of effectiveness of current infrastructure, coordination of knowledge and business strategy of a company; its adaptation on the market. The author highly estimates the significance of the SWOT analysis for the market evaluation and market position of a company. The SWOT-analysis is interpreted as a business-strategy based on knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of an organization, its opportunities and threats. The strategy is considered as a balancing on the edge of external environment (potential and risks) and internal capacity of an organization. The inner capacity of an organization, which is characterized as a resource-based approach, is based on resources and capabilities of competitive organization.The article shows the duration and sustainability of resource strategy, discloses its advantages and specificity of the phenomenon of increasing returns. It is shown that knowledge provides increasing returns only when it is used, as demonstrated by a self-reinforcing cycle.

Dialectical strategy in pyrrhonism
D.K. Maslov
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2018-3.1-125-143

The paper undertakes a précising consideration of the skeptical “dialectical strategy” in Sextus Empiricus’ variation of Pyrrhonism that nowadays enjoys a high acceptance among the scholars. (In doing this the author is much indebted to R. La Sala’s interpretation of dialectical strategy). The key principles of the strategy consist in borrowing presuppositions of dogmatists and using them against the dogmatists themselves for the argument’s sake, without an endorsement of those presuppositions by Sextus. Thus, the author takes these dialectical principles into a scrutiny in respect of 1) normative premises borrowed from the dogmatists as well as 2) how they were utilized by Sextus in his argumentative practice. Normative presuppositions used by Sextus can be divided into logic rules, rules of justification and the notion of things “by nature”, i. e. how they exist independent from cognizing agents. Sextus takes advantage of logic in order to construct valid arguments in accordance to dogmatists’ theories. Particularly, he applies a method of diaeresis for division of genus into parts as well as the implication rules articulated in Stoic logic. Further, premises as to the things “by nature” are considered. Theywere thought to be self-identical, unchangeable and devoid of any inherent contradiction. Taking this premise for granted, Sextus manages to demonstrate all diversity and disagreement on any question (modes of Aenesidemus) and come to conclusion that knowledge has not yet been attained since there is a huge disagreement. As to the rules of justification, Sextus uses the Agrippa’s Trilemma and states that according to the dogmatists’ rules any proof has not been the case since the principles of justification are not met. Finally, the skeptical methods of exposition and argumentation come to the fore. Sextus uses the sumperigra>fein rule (La Sala) and undermines the most general concepts of dogmatists coming to the particular ones.

About Unfalsifiable Scientific Statements and Ideas
S.Yu. Kolomiytsev
DOI: 10.17212/2075-0862-2018-3.1-112-124

One of the main questions of philosophy of science in XX – beginning of XXI centuries is the problem of demarcation – how to distinguish between science and metaphysics. To solve the problem the philosophers of logical positivism suggested the verifiability criterion: scientific theory must be empirically verifiable. Philosophers of postpositivism criticized the verifiability criterion and suggested the falsifiability criterion: there must be possibility for the scientific theory of showing empirically to be false. We suggest a thought technical experiment and examples from the history of natural sciences which do not satisfy the falsifiability criterion and that is why must be declared as metaphysical but are not so. For example the ideas of atom, electron, “electrical matter” in physics and chemistry, infection and gene in biology were metaphysical, but now they are considered to be real and scientific. Such cases happened when the phenomenon is caused by something which can not be discovered at least by modern science, but it really exists. And even if the reason is real and can be discovered and become scientific in future, now it has status of metaphysical idea. So we conclude that neither verifiability criterion no falsifiability criterion can clearly solve the demarcation problem and separate science and metaphysics. Whereas the verifiability criterion can increase the quantity of scientific theories because of naming non-scientific theories as scientific (for example, the theory “All swans are white”, or “it storms because Neptune is angry”), the falsifiability criterion on the contrary decreases the quantity of scientific theories because of naming scientific theories as non-scientific. We conclude that neither verifiability criterion no falsifiability criterion can be the only clear criteria for solving the demarcation problem and distinguish scientific and metaphysic knowledge. The falsifiability criterion makes science constricted, and there are scientific ideas and statements which can not be shown to be false.