Ideas and Ideals

This article introduces and analyzes the “thanatological argument” in order to reveal and analyze the mechanisms that make it possible for a person to justify
his or her own fi nitude. The thanatological argument is understood as a philosophical justifi cation of the conditions under which a person is able to come to the conclusion about his or her own mortality. The author seeks to identify
how knowledge of death is included in the structure of human experience and to demonstrate that the introduction of this argument serves as a heuristically signifi cant conceptual optics that allows us to determine the various bases for
the formation of knowledge about death, both in the intersubjective dimension (through the experience of another, loss, empathy) and at the level of a priori structures of individual consciousness. The purpose of this article is the introduction and philosophical development of the “thanatological argument” within the framework of the analysis of epistemological and ontological ways of justifying
human fi nitude. Methodologically, the article combines philosophical interpretation with elements of conceptual analysis, which allows us to reconstruct the logic of how various authors justify the fi nitude of human existence.
The research is based on two mutually exclusive trajectories: the a priori and the inductive. Proponents of the a priori approach (M. Scheler, G. Simmel, M. Heidegger, M. Conche, E. Fink) identify knowledge of death as intrinsically
inherent to human existence, not requiring external experience of the death of another. Advocates of the inductive approach (J. Derrida, G. Marcel, J.-P. Sartre,
P.-L. Landsberg) argue that a clear recognition of one’s own fi nitude arises only through the perception of the death of the other, where the “gift of death” of the other becomes a necessary condition for the justifi cation of one’s own
fi nite existence. As a result of the conducted study, the author concludes that the introduction of the “thanatological argument” highlights its heuristic value as a
concept potentially useful not only for the development of philosophical thanatology, but also for interdisciplinary research in the fi elds of anthropology, psychoanalysis,
cultural studies, and other disciplines in which the theme of death occupies a central place.tology, but also for interdisciplinary research in the fi elds of anthropology, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, and other disciplines in which the theme of death occupies a central place. 

Frame analysis, which examines the biased nature of our ways of using signs in communicative processes and which is relevant to the modern synergetic picture
of the world, continues the long-standing traditions of hermeneutics and medieval exegesis. In acts of communication, frames of perception and presentation
are permanently converted: response presentations are formed on the basis of received and understood messages. Conversion processes generate an abundance of connotations with which the original meanings are overgrown. Sometimes they are destructive, often banal. But it is the competition of connotations that serves as a source of development. Perceptual frames are always
based on hidden premises (prejudices). The cultural and personal codes of thi bias are invisible to its bearers. In the lexicon of frame analysis, these initial dispositions
of perceptions can be presented as expectation frames. The clash of expectation frames with reality awakens emotions, with which the comprehension of the world begins. The possible cultural shocks in this connection constitute
the empirical material for identifying and criticizing the hidden prerequisites of perception, the features of its “optics”.
After Wittgenstein, researchers prefer the concept of a “door” to the frame of a dispassionate “mirror” as a generally accepted metaphor of cognitive relations in the New Age. It is set in motion by acts of doubt, but the lower door hinge, with its immobility, symbolizes bias as the absence of any doubts regarding preconceived contents, that is, frames of expectations. Now the world behind the looking glass is of interest, the door to which still needs to be discovered.
In connection with the modern emphasis on pragmatic aspirations, presentation frames have been better studied. Brands are of particular interest: they noisily claim the generally signifi cant value of presentations and are effective for manipulative purposes. Meanwhile, the lexicon of frame analysis should be introduced with a whisper of expectation frames. Lively games of frames of perceptions
and presentations constitute the main communicative body, while brands only close the lexicon from the side opposite to the original preconceived expectations.

The relationship between the unconscious and narrative identity remains unresolved within Russian philosophy. This study seeks to rectify this situation. The work’s scientifi c novelty is also determined by its interdisciplinary approach,
which integrates the traditions of phenomenology (E. Husserl), psychoanalysis (S. Freud), and philosophical hermeneutics (P. Ricoeur). This article conceptualizes
the unconscious as a noumenal source of subjectivity, inaccessible to direct signifi cation but manifesting itself through symptoms and affects. As a noumenon, the unconscious is inaccessible to direct reference, precedes symbolization, and serves as a space for the accumulation of “pre-refl ective” experience A hypothesis is advanced and substantiated regarding the dual function of the
unconscious in the structure of narrative identity: on the one hand, it serves as a “reservoir” for the formation of counternarratives that challenge established
self-narratives, while on the other, it constitutes the foundation of pre-reflective experience, ensuring the continuity of the pre-refl ective and the affective content
of implicit memory. It is demonstrated that the process of constructing narrative identity is linked not only to the symbolic horizon but also to affective experience
rooted in pre-refl ective experience, opening new perspectives for understanding the dynamics of personal identity construction.

In the 20th century, philosophy saw a number of rediscoveries of the idea of culture and, accordingly, the formation of approaches to its study. Given the extremely “confused and ambiguous social history” (T. Eagleton) of this idea, the article reveals its presence in the thoughts of different generations of Russian philosophers. The article is based on the materials of the book “Philosophical Generations” (Moscow, 2022), which contains a collection of autobiographical narratives of Russian philosophers of the mid-20th – early 21st centuries. Based on the memoirs and thoughts of philosophers about their time, the development of the concept of “culture”, its semantic emphases and fl uctuations in the second half of the 20th century are studied. The rich material presented in this “chronicle of the Moscow philosophical community” allows us to trace the specifi cs of philosophical solutions to the “problem of culture” and the reverse impact of structural transformations of culture, art, and aesthetics on philosophy. The search for a relevant philosophical language to describe cultural dynamics in an era of constant and multiple crises deserves special attention. The author of the article suggests looking for ways to place the problem of culture in a philosophical context associated with tradition, modernity and new methodologies in the humanities.

In search of the specifi cs of the domestic approach to the phenomenon of culture, the author turns to the analysis of discussions around the ‘philosophy of culture’, ‘cultural studies’, ‘cultural research’, ‘dialogue of cultures’. Particular attention is paid to the humanitarian discussions of the 1980-1990s, in particular, the discussion around the relevance of the Silver Age, the ‘cult’ of which fell precisely on these years, is reconstructed. The conducted research made it possible to identify, on the one hand, the generational specifi city of the theoretical positions and formulations of the issue of culture presented in the book (fi xing points of misunderstanding and breaks), and on the other, to catch traces of their interactions.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the problem of the relationship between M. Heidegger’s ‘anti-metaphysical’ project and the so-called ‘indictment’, which, with the assistance of a signifi cant part of representatives of modern Western philosophy, seeks to present his philosophy as a metapolitical project of affi rming the priority signifi cance of German ‘soil’, ‘blood’, ‘destiny’, ‘spirit’ for the world history. Appeals to the meaning of M. Heidegger’s philosophy of the event as a refl ection on the historicity of the accomplishment of the truth of Being itself, which has nothing in common with the will to power, which is the apogee of the metaphysical style of thinking, are rejected by these representatives as false and bewitching concepts designed to obscure and hide the ‘true’ intentions of the philosopher. The author of the article presents the thesis that the ‘anti-metaphysical’ project is a marker of the fact that accusations of the national-socialist character of M. Heidegger’s philosophical thinking are groundless and may relate only to his personal views, which had a more or less longterm nature. The development of this thesis is based on the consideration of the criticism of the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger by the French phenomenologists J. -L. Marion and M. Henry. In analyzing the views of the abovementioned authors, the fi rst part of the article presents a historical-philosophical view of M. Heidegger’s ontology of intentionality as an ecstatic sphere of the being of the beings, or ‘Logos’, which acts as a main element in the structure of the fundamental ontology and metaphysics of fi nitude “Being-Logos-Beings”.

The article attempts to determine the specifi cs of the semiotic hierarchy of neo-Protestantism and to identify its structure. The object of the research is the dogmatic and praxeological complexes of neo–Protestantism, and the subject is the structure of their semiotic hierarchy. Semiotic methodology is used as a basic methodology in the study. The terminology used in the hierarchy is defi ned and explained.  The concept of hierophany is studied as the basic one in religious semiosis. The author gives its confessional concepts (Orthodoxy, Catholicism). The historical biblical facts of hierophany are considered. Their semiotic structure is investigated. There is a genetic similarity between the facts of the biblical science of hierophany and the concept of hierophany in neo-Protestantism. The consistency and complementarity of all three semiotic concepts are emphasized. The work also lays the prerequisites for the study of semiotic transformation – semiotic drift. The result of the study was the identifi cation of specifi c features of the semiotics of neo-Protestantism, which allows it to go beyond value judgments from the standpoint of religious semiotics and overcome its theological and social marginalization.

The article discusses the position expressed by Peter Engelmeyer, the fi rst Russian philosopher of technology, that signs, language and thinking can be subsumed under the concept of technology. The author shows that there is indeed a problem here, to solve the problem it is necessary to understand and distinguish between the concept of technology and non-technology, represented by signs, language and thinking. Based on his studies of the nature and genesis of technology, he characterizes the latter as a cultural and historical formation, a solution to unsolvable problems and tasks, as an artifact that allows solving such problems and creating new natural processes that were previously unobservable and even non-existent, and fi nally, as a conceptualization of technology. Characterizing signs, the author shows that the meaning and the sign as a whole, as a concept, in contrast to the artifact, as a product of activity, relate to the inner, to the life world of a man. For a better understanding of this thesis, a case is considered – a story told by K. Jung in his last book, on the material of which the concept of the life world and the scheme explaining Jung’s act are introduced. Regarding language and thinking, two cases are distinguished: in one they are not technology, in the other, if rules and methodology are used, they can be considered as intellectual technology. The last part of the article discusses hybrid types of technology, specifi cally neural computers. The author shows that in a neurocomputer, due to technical imitation of the neural network and training, a model is created that allows, at the request of a person, to take information from the Internet, construct written speech according to the rules of language and reason according to the rules of logic. At the same time, this model does not replace natural intelligence, which lives and unfolds in people and in social communications. Since people are constantly improving computer technology and trying to replace natural intelligence with artifi cial intelligence, the neurocomputer as a model becomes more and more perfect in terms of the product (the results of linguistic communication and thinking).

Medieval thought in its philosophical, theological and poetic guise appeared to readers of Modern Times as the thought of the ‘highbrow’, which was facilitated by the scholastic method of research. The Renaissance era contrasted the ‘highbrow’ with a man rediscovering the world, who appeared as multidimensional, open to different traditions, and therefore unable to claim the completeness of knowledge. One of the main principles of thinking was the polylogicality of philosophical logic. And although this meant the coupling of various cognitive systems, taking place in the mainstream of communication (not generalization), the reliance on the Word and its expression of thought remained unchanged for everyone, which initially placed the philosopher in a religious atmosphere: the philosopher worked with something that expressed itself and was ready for its own renewal (philosophy was originally religious). This was realised by Nicholas of Cusa, who understood the original thought as having a willingness to think and the ability to think, which is why the text of the Bible seemed self-speaking. He was the herald of ‘scientifi c ignorance’. He was rather an ignoramus (a layman, a simpleton, a fool) relative to the ‘highbrow’ scholastics. But the introduction of the idea of the simpleton itself meant that the philosophical context included the whole of human life with its faith and hopes, education and upbringing of each person, which was expressed in S. Brant’s “Ship of Fools”, in the “Laudatory Word of Stupidity” by Erasmus of Rotterdam, in the “Letters of dark People” by W. Von Hutten and in the “Book about the Sage” by S. de Beauvel, an informative text, sometimes reminiscent of textbooks, which is the knowledge of a Simpleton.

The article is devoted to the traditional philosophical problem of the essence of man, but an approach to its solution through the reconstruction of the origin of the main distinctive features is chosen. The attention is focused not on the boundary, which somewhere and once hominins from the genus Homo (protosapiens) crossed in their evolution, becoming full-fl edged Homo sapiens. This boundary is called the “Rubicon of sapientation”, and sapientation here is understood as approaching the essential human features associated with “reasonableness”: conscious behavior, speech communication, special sociality, cultural accumulation and openness to subsequent evolution. The thesis that this “Rubicon” was crossed not in the known achievements of the Upper Paleolithic of western Eurasia (c. 50–40 thousand years BP), but several tens of thousands of years earlier in Africa is substantiated. On the basis of generalization of various indirect data the main processes and macroevents of this epoch are reconstructed. The reasons for the formation of intergroup alliances are shown, as well as the cardinal role of abilities necessary for such fundamentally new interactions and relations. The acquisition of essential human traits in this concept is understood as a consequence of the development of special “magic wands” – fl exible polyfunctional structures with high possibilities of modifi cation and synthesis. These include rituals, syntax and “withdrawal communication”, supersituational thinking, arbitrary normativity and institutionality. All of them, on the one hand, are connected in a special way with the ability to create intergroup alliances, and on the other hand, they constitute necessary and suffi cient ingredients for the essential qualities of “rationality”.

The author of the article identifi es the initial context for the assumption of the connection between the ideal and the real, which is the basis of classical epistemology of the XVII century. The author shows that initially such a connection presupposed deep ontological transformations of the real through unity with the ideal. The tradition of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation was formed in archaic times and continued until Modern Times. Classical epistemology arose in the XVII century as a titanic attempt to translate the theurgic act of transformation into the sphere of the possibilities of cognition, to replace the ideal principle (or higher reality) with the possibilities of the human mind. So, on the one hand, classical epistemology retains its connection with the universal tradition of the search for truth as a transformation, and therefore it is highly appreciated by many modern epistemologists. But on the other hand, due to the unjustifi ability of its claims to transformation, it (classical epistemology) breaks with the entire history of the search for truth as a transformation that preceded it. From the need to expose the unjustifi ed assumptions of classical epistemology, the inevitability of non-classics arises. The identifi cation of such a ‘genealogy’ of modern epistemology allows us to conclude, fi rstly, that all the ‘diseases’ of the classical theory of knowledge, which have worsened to date, are ‘genetically’ conditioned and, beyond the idea of transformation, all attempts by defenders of the classics to somehow neutralize them will, by and large, miss the mark. Secondly, the aspirations of non-classics to expose the abuses of the classics, which lead the modern theory of knowledge to dead ends, can, on the contrary, become guidelines for further searches as references to the context of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation, which is original for classical epistemology, where the initial motives of unjustifi ed abuses of the classics become clear.