Ideas and Ideals

Medieval thought in its philosophical, theological and poetic guise appeared to readers of Modern Times as the thought of the ‘highbrow’, which was facilitated by the scholastic method of research. The Renaissance era contrasted the ‘highbrow’ with a man rediscovering the world, who appeared as multidimensional, open to different traditions, and therefore unable to claim the completeness of knowledge. One of the main principles of thinking was the polylogicality of philosophical logic. And although this meant the coupling of various cognitive systems, taking place in the mainstream of communication (not generalization), the reliance on the Word and its expression of thought remained unchanged for everyone, which initially placed the philosopher in a religious atmosphere: the philosopher worked with something that expressed itself and was ready for its own renewal (philosophy was originally religious). This was realised by Nicholas of Cusa, who understood the original thought as having a willingness to think and the ability to think, which is why the text of the Bible seemed self-speaking. He was the herald of ‘scientifi c ignorance’. He was rather an ignoramus (a layman, a simpleton, a fool) relative to the ‘highbrow’ scholastics. But the introduction of the idea of the simpleton itself meant that the philosophical context included the whole of human life with its faith and hopes, education and upbringing of each person, which was expressed in S. Brant’s “Ship of Fools”, in the “Laudatory Word of Stupidity” by Erasmus of Rotterdam, in the “Letters of dark People” by W. Von Hutten and in the “Book about the Sage” by S. de Beauvel, an informative text, sometimes reminiscent of textbooks, which is the knowledge of a Simpleton.

The article is devoted to the traditional philosophical problem of the essence of man, but an approach to its solution through the reconstruction of the origin of the main distinctive features is chosen. The attention is focused not on the boundary, which somewhere and once hominins from the genus Homo (protosapiens) crossed in their evolution, becoming full-fl edged Homo sapiens. This boundary is called the “Rubicon of sapientation”, and sapientation here is understood as approaching the essential human features associated with “reasonableness”: conscious behavior, speech communication, special sociality, cultural accumulation and openness to subsequent evolution. The thesis that this “Rubicon” was crossed not in the known achievements of the Upper Paleolithic of western Eurasia (c. 50–40 thousand years BP), but several tens of thousands of years earlier in Africa is substantiated. On the basis of generalization of various indirect data the main processes and macroevents of this epoch are reconstructed. The reasons for the formation of intergroup alliances are shown, as well as the cardinal role of abilities necessary for such fundamentally new interactions and relations. The acquisition of essential human traits in this concept is understood as a consequence of the development of special “magic wands” – fl exible polyfunctional structures with high possibilities of modifi cation and synthesis. These include rituals, syntax and “withdrawal communication”, supersituational thinking, arbitrary normativity and institutionality. All of them, on the one hand, are connected in a special way with the ability to create intergroup alliances, and on the other hand, they constitute necessary and suffi cient ingredients for the essential qualities of “rationality”.

The author of the article identifi es the initial context for the assumption of the connection between the ideal and the real, which is the basis of classical epistemology of the XVII century. The author shows that initially such a connection presupposed deep ontological transformations of the real through unity with the ideal. The tradition of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation was formed in archaic times and continued until Modern Times. Classical epistemology arose in the XVII century as a titanic attempt to translate the theurgic act of transformation into the sphere of the possibilities of cognition, to replace the ideal principle (or higher reality) with the possibilities of the human mind. So, on the one hand, classical epistemology retains its connection with the universal tradition of the search for truth as a transformation, and therefore it is highly appreciated by many modern epistemologists. But on the other hand, due to the unjustifi ability of its claims to transformation, it (classical epistemology) breaks with the entire history of the search for truth as a transformation that preceded it. From the need to expose the unjustifi ed assumptions of classical epistemology, the inevitability of non-classics arises. The identifi cation of such a ‘genealogy’ of modern epistemology allows us to conclude, fi rstly, that all the ‘diseases’ of the classical theory of knowledge, which have worsened to date, are ‘genetically’ conditioned and, beyond the idea of transformation, all attempts by defenders of the classics to somehow neutralize them will, by and large, miss the mark. Secondly, the aspirations of non-classics to expose the abuses of the classics, which lead the modern theory of knowledge to dead ends, can, on the contrary, become guidelines for further searches as references to the context of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation, which is original for classical epistemology, where the initial motives of unjustifi ed abuses of the classics become clear.

The article is devoted to the problem of fundamentalism arising within the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, as if contrary to his main position. This approach proclaims the freedom of the method, plurality, the purpose of which is the liberation of research activities, the rejection of the dictate of the method. However, these principles, reduced to the slogan “everything will do”, lead to a serious contradiction: if everything will work, then the dictate of the method will do. Epistemological anarchism is quite capable of pandering to the fundamentalism with which it is called to fi ght. This problem is the subject of the study of this work. In this regard, the method of critical analysis was applied to this research principle, designed to identify its internal contradictions and limitations. With the help of the method of hermeneutics, epistemological anarchism is associated with the broader context of the deontologization of European philosophy, and the corresponding issues. This makes it possible to interpret some ways of understanding P. Feyerabend’s theory as a transition of science from a claim to objectivity to ‘social constructivism’. But such a transition is just a reversal of the classical subject-object opposition. Using the theories of B. Latour, a different interpretation is given to the works of P. Feyerabend, an interpretation that indicates the hybridization of the research strategy, the constant interweaving of things, researchers and forms of expression of research programs and subjects of research. The consequence of such an interpretation of epistemological anarchism is an indication that scientifi c methods are not eliminated in their aspect of the regulation of research activity, but acquire a new property – they are understood aesthetically. Thus, as an addition to the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, there is the concept of aesthetic experience, where the method of science is a “guide”, freely chosen for the purposes of clarity of presentation, the way of expressing scientifi c ideas. An important feature of this approach is a specifi c relationship to empiricism, namely the concept of aesthetic experience. The latter presupposes not the verifi cation of the truth of theories by empiricism, but the use of empirical data as an array of expressions, as a condition for the problematization of any theory. In this regard, aesthetic experience and the corresponding empiricism inverts the principle ‘everything will do’ to ‘nothing will do’.

The paper offers an understanding of the trends and prospects for the development of modern fl at ontology on the example of object-oriented philosophy. The main attention is paid to the concepts developed within the framework of the object-oriented ontology project in the works of G. Harman, L. R. Bryant and T. Morton. The phrase ‘weird realism’, proposed by object-oriented ontology, claims to describe both the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world and current trends in modern philosophy. The work reconstructs the key provisions of object-oriented ontology, fi xes the contradictory consequences of ontological egalitarianism, object-centrism, and criticism of correlationism. The philosophy of object-oriented ontology offers an immaterialistic model of reality, defi ned by an irreducible variety of a multitude of equivalent, but ‘withdrawn’ objects from direct human access. Object-oriented ontology denies the ideas of holism, proclaims ontological egalitarianism, and fi xes the identity of human and ‘non-human’ beings.  The paper notes that the philosophy of objectoriented ontology balances between schematism (through the ‘fl attening’ of being) and metaphorization, objectivity and subjectivism, holism and mereology, the statics of identical and incoherent objects and the dynamism of their internal activity. The criticism of correlationism in the works of representatives of object-oriented ontology takes the form of a rethinking of anthropocentrism. The incorporation of non-human beings as full-fl edged actors expands the possibilities for the co-evolution of man and nature, the fi eld of human moral responsibility. The author discovers that the object-centricity of object-oriented ontology contains signs of ecocentrism and panpsychism, and the ‘democracy of objects’ takes the form of conceptual animism. The recognition of the selfworth of ‘non-human collectives’, the statement of their intertwining with humans expand the possibilities for mapping natural and socio-cultural objects, but raise issues that require comprehensive discussion. The author comes to the conclusion that despite the contradictions, the philosophy of object-oriented ontology encourages a rethinking of classical philosophical issues, contributes to understanding the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

This article is devoted to the study of the history of translations of Aristotle’s heritage into Russian. For a complete picture, the article examines in general terms the degree of familiarity of the Old Russian reader with the corpus of his texts (in particular, with treatises on animals, “Categories”, “Politics”, “Physics”, “Topics”, etc.). However, key attention is paid to supplementing the general “List” of pre-Soviet translations of Aristotle with texts, a signifi cant part of which had not previously appeared in the scientifi c literature. The most valuable among the discovered works are the translations of the “Hymn to Virtue”, the inscription to the statue of Hermias in Delphi and Aristotle’s “Testament”, as well as the lost translations of “Poetics” made by A. F. Merzlyakov. Conclusions are made that the described translations for the most part do not have scientifi c value, since they are unprofessional and are often made using secondary literature. However, this does not exclude their historical signifi cance. Bibliographic information about the translations themselves, their volume and translators, as well as the texts of the translations of the “Hymn” and the inscription on the statue of Hermias, for convenience, are presented in the form of appendices and are given at the end of the article.

The article discusses the views of the ‘Tsargrad’ website participants and some methodologists on the revival of Russia and the salvation of the world. The peculiarities of their thinking and discourses are noted: a refl ection of the aspirations and values of these participants themselves, utopianism and lack of evidence. A history of ideological infl uences on these views is outlined, which stretches from the works of P. Ya. Chaadaev, F. M. Dostoevsky, Konstantin Leontiev. V. Zenkovsky shows that, for example, Chaadaev’s thoughts on world history went through two stages. At the fi rst, he comes to the idea that it was in Europe that the ideas and plans of Christianity were embodied, and Russia remained on the sidelines, dropped out of the world historical process. But such a conclusion about Russia contradicted the very idea of the providence of the Creator. Therefore, at the second stage, Chaadaev comes up with ideas that form the essence of the tradition under consideration. Namely, Russia has its own purpose, it will come into play later, Russia will determine the historical development of Europe and the whole world, the main content of this future stage of history will be the revelation in the form of the ideas and practice of Orthodoxy. The central methodological fi gures of the reconstruction are Georgy Shchedrovitsky and Yuri Gromyko. It is suggested that the infl uence of methodologists is partly explained by the peculiarities of the consciousness of their followers. Here is a simplifi ed understanding of reality, a circumstance that still appeals to many today, because it becomes clear what is happening and where to go. This understanding was inspired by the Marxist worldview (partly scientifi c, partly utopian, extremely social engineering), as well as a simplifi ed understanding of history and sociality. If models and ideal constructions of methodology (activity and mental activity) are understood as heuristics and schemes that guide the methodologists’ own work of thinking, then everything is fi ne, there are no objections, but if – as an adequate description of the world and reality, then these models and ideal constructions are currently can be assessed either as a very poor and simplifi ed representation of a complex reality, or as generally incorrect knowledge. The last part of the article discusses the civilizational transition from modernity to “future culture”, showing the impossibility of simple solutions and a simplifi ed understanding of reality.

At the turn of the 20^th-21^st centuries there was a rapid growth of popularity of the concept of diaspora and the term itself in scientifi c and socio-political sphere. It was accompanied by increasing criticism and even denial of its usage as a tool of scientifi c analysis. This is a sign of the crisis, which may lead either to drastic transformation of the concept or to rejection of it. Within the global science, including Russia as a part of it, the concept is being criticized from two sides. Some scientists refer the word ‘diaspora’ only to the Jewish history and deny its extensive usage. On the other hand, key provisions of traditional interpretation of the concept are being under constructivist criticism. Among these key points are: the idea of diaspora as a primordial group affi liation by birth; grouping as a mandatory interaction between migrants and their descendants in the host country; diaspora-forming role of the source countries and host countries and political boundaries in the context of transnationalism. Apparently, the radically changing nature of the object under study requires concept transformation or rejection of it.

In the post-Soviet space, especially in Russia, the term diaspora as the ideology of compatriots became the instrument of interstate relations. It was widely spread in socio-political practice to justify state regulation of public relations. In full accordance with R. Kozellek’s scheme, in addition to temporalization of the term (fi lling old words with new meanings), its democratization took place (going beyond the scope of academic fi eld, usage by the lowest and wide stratums of society), ideologization and politicization. In this case diaspora appears as an organized community with joint responsibility of its members, offi cially registered organization with mutual obligations and set membership. The use of the word diaspora to name completely different understandings in scientifi c discourse and in socio-political rhetoric makes it diffi cult to apply it as a scientifi c term and calls the possibility of instrumental usage of the concept into question.

At the turn of the 20^th-21^st centuries there was a rapid growth of popularity of the concept of diaspora and the term itself in scientifi c and socio-political sphere. It was accompanied by increasing criticism and even denial of its usage as a tool of scientifi c analysis. This is a sign of the crisis, which may lead either to drastic transformation of the concept or to rejection of it. Within the global science, including Russia as a part of it, the concept is being criticized from two sides. Some scientists refer the word ‘diaspora’ only to the Jewish history and deny its extensive usage. On the other hand, key provisions of traditional interpretation of the concept are being under constructivist criticism. Among these key points are: the idea of diaspora as a primordial group affi liation by birth; grouping as a mandatory interaction between migrants and their descendants in the host country; diaspora-forming role of the source countries and host countries and political boundaries in the context of transnationalism. Apparently, the radically changing nature of the object under study requires concept transformation or rejection of it.

In the post-Soviet space, especially in Russia, the term diaspora as the ideology of compatriots became the instrument of interstate relations. It was widely spread in socio-political practice to justify state regulation of public relations. In full accordance with R. Kozellek’s scheme, in addition to temporalization of the term (fi lling old words with new meanings), its democratization took place (going beyond the scope of academic fi eld, usage by the lowest and wide stratums of society), ideologization and politicization. In this case diaspora appears as an organized community with joint responsibility of its members, offi cially registered organization with mutual obligations and set membership. The use of the word diaspora to name completely different understandings in scientifi c discourse and in socio-political rhetoric makes it diffi cult to apply it as a scientifi c term and calls the possibility of instrumental usage of the concept into question.

The article examines the phenomenon of social practices and their signifi cance in the context of modern social development and substantiates the importance of their research at different levels of scientifi c knowledge. Through a theoretical and methodological analysis of the concept of ‘social practices’ and the mechanism of their formation and impact on social development in the concepts of social constructivism and structuralist constructivism, as well as in the theory of structuration, their importance in maintaining the structure of society, historical continuity and the formation of habitus is revealed. The dual nature of social practices is revealed, which consists in the fact that, on the one hand, they underlie the emergence of social processes, and on the other, individual social processes determine new social practices. Through the theoretical refl ection of the most important social processes of our time – globalization, migration, urbanization, and rurbanization (rural area), their interdependence with social practices is revealed.

The mechanism of determination of new social practices in the translocal living space is considered and their infl uence on the formation of trends in the development of social interaction and lifestyle is revealed. The pendulum migration has led to the emergence of both translocal living space and corresponding social practices. The localization of pendulum migration in the agglomeration determined the emergence of the process of urbanization based on translocal practices, which results in the transformation of both the lifestyle of the villagers and the habitus.

The interregional pendulum migration that has gone beyond the region has identifi ed new social challenges that have led to the formation of appropriate social practices in the context of the deterritorialization of family groups. Social practices are historically determined, refl ect the accumulated generational experience in each culture, and are a tool for maintaining intergenerational communication. The high rates of social dynamics have objectively led to the transformation of social practices and the formation of new ones in modern society. This process has manifestations at the level of their reproduction and at the same time affects the deep mechanisms of functioning of society, of which habitus and its transformation are a part.

The article examines the phenomenon of social practices and their signifi cance in the context of modern social development and substantiates the importance of their research at different levels of scientifi c knowledge. Through a theoretical and methodological analysis of the concept of ‘social practices’ and the mechanism of their formation and impact on social development in the concepts of social constructivism and structuralist constructivism, as well as in the theory of structuration, their importance in maintaining the structure of society, historical continuity and the formation of habitus is revealed. The dual nature of social practices is revealed, which consists in the fact that, on the one hand, they underlie the emergence of social processes, and on the other, individual social processes determine new social practices. Through the theoretical refl ection of the most important social processes of our time – globalization, migration, urbanization, and rurbanization (rural area), their interdependence with social practices is revealed.

The mechanism of determination of new social practices in the translocal living space is considered and their infl uence on the formation of trends in the development of social interaction and lifestyle is revealed. The pendulum migration has led to the emergence of both translocal living space and corresponding social practices. The localization of pendulum migration in the agglomeration determined the emergence of the process of urbanization based on translocal practices, which results in the transformation of both the lifestyle of the villagers and the habitus.

The interregional pendulum migration that has gone beyond the region has identifi ed new social challenges that have led to the formation of appropriate social practices in the context of the deterritorialization of family groups. Social practices are historically determined, refl ect the accumulated generational experience in each culture, and are a tool for maintaining intergenerational communication. The high rates of social dynamics have objectively led to the transformation of social practices and the formation of new ones in modern society. This process has manifestations at the level of their reproduction and at the same time affects the deep mechanisms of functioning of society, of which habitus and its transformation are a part.

The article is devoted to an attempt at a philosophical analysis of the genesis of the transhumanist worldview in the context of the explosive development of science and technology and the active use of convergent technologies that change the nature of interaction not only between humans and the environment, but also humans and the environment themselves.  The purpose of the article is to explicate the ontological risks of digitalization, which at the same time are harbingers of the strengthening of the transhumanist paradigm. The author distinguishes between the concepts of digitization and digitalization, further considering the latter as a factor in the transformation of a person’s way of thinking and life. The thesis is put forward that digitalization is the main tool for the initial stage of society’s transition to transhumanistic rails, being one of the anthropotechnics designed to infi nitely improve a person. The research focuses on the formation of a transhumanist worldview and the role digitalization plays in this process. The author of the article has established the cyclical nature of the digitalization process. The following stages of digitalization are distinguished as the ‘turns’ of the cycle: the emergence and spread of the Internet (the World Wide Web provided the necessary breeding ground for further processes); the spread of social networks and online services; the development and spread of neural networks. The author notes that digitalization was consolidated in public practice mainly through the dissemination of social networks and online services. It is determined that it is at this stage that there is a risk of cutting off human contact with reality. The author suggests considering the explosive development and proliferation of neural networks as the next phase of the digitalization cycle. It is clarifi ed that in the phase of dissemination and improvement of training programs, due to the peculiarities of their functioning, there are risks associated with neglecting reality by belittling the importance of data sources. In addition, there are risks to common sense and deductive thinking throughout the life cycle of digitalization. It is also possible to observe varying degrees of truncation of access to reality, threatening to ‘uproot’ a person from his life world. Based on this, the author explicated the ontological traps of digitalization, in fact, pushing people to practice transhumanist ideology. Proceeding from the thesis that the source of data, common sense and the ability to form general concepts are the ‘three pillars’ of the connection of human consciousness with reality and self– identifi cation, the author comes to the conclusion that it is precisely in these sensitive aspects that the ontological traps of digitalization are hidden – factors that imperceptibly ‘disconnect’ a person from his life world. The researcher cites the uncertainty of data sources, the discreteness of common sense, and a violation of the ability to form general concepts as such factors. The methods of ontological and structural analysis were used in the study.The article is devoted to an attempt at a philosophical analysis of the genesis of the transhumanist worldview in the context of the explosive development of science and technology and the active use of convergent technologies that change the nature of interaction not only between humans and the environment, but also humans and the environment themselves.  The purpose of the article is to explicate the ontological risks of digitalization, which at the same time are harbingers of the strengthening of the transhumanist paradigm. The author distinguishes between the concepts of digitization and digitalization, further considering the latter as a factor in the transformation of a person’s way of thinking and life. The thesis is put forward that digitalization is the main tool for the initial stage of society’s transition to transhumanistic rails, being one of the anthropotechnics designed to infi nitely improve a person. The research focuses on the formation of a transhumanist worldview and the role digitalization plays in this process. The author of the article has established the cyclical nature of the digitalization process. The following stages of digitalization are distinguished as the ‘turns’ of the cycle: the emergence and spread of the Internet (the World Wide Web provided the necessary breeding ground for further processes); the spread of social networks and online services; the development and spread of neural networks. The author notes that digitalization was consolidated in public practice mainly through the dissemination of social networks and online services. It is determined that it is at this stage that there is a risk of cutting off human contact with reality. The author suggests considering the explosive development and proliferation of neural networks as the next phase of the digitalization cycle. It is clarifi ed that in the phase of dissemination and improvement of training programs, due to the peculiarities of their functioning, there are risks associated with neglecting reality by belittling the importance of data sources. In addition, there are risks to common sense and deductive thinking throughout the life cycle of digitalization. It is also possible to observe varying degrees of truncation of access to reality, threatening to ‘uproot’ a person from his life world. Based on this, the author explicated the ontological traps of digitalization, in fact, pushing people to practice transhumanist ideology. Proceeding from the thesis that the source of data, common sense and the ability to form general concepts are the ‘three pillars’ of the connection of human consciousness with reality and self– identifi cation, the author comes to the conclusion that it is precisely in these sensitive aspects that the ontological traps of digitalization are hidden – factors that imperceptibly ‘disconnect’ a person from his life world. The researcher cites the uncertainty of data sources, the discreteness of common sense, and a violation of the ability to form general concepts as such factors. The methods of ontological and structural analysis were used in the study.

Debates on the use and regulation of artifi cial intelligence tend to highlight the ambiguity of its impact on the democratic political process in terms of risks and opportunities. The spread of artifi cial intelligence technologies may affect individual and collective autonomy, either by changing the social and political practices that shape individual choices in different ways or by directly affecting fundamental rights. The danger lies not in short-term manipulations but in the long-term erosion of the infrastructural conditions of the public sphere. A detailed study of the interplay of artifi cial intelligence technologies and democratic development, taking into account specifi c aspects of the political life of society, is necessary to better understand the reconfi guration of the changing options for individuals, corporations and states. This article analyzes the terminological ambiguity of the concept of artifi cial intelligence in the context of its impact on politics and the democratic process and notes that artifi cial intelligence research addresses this issue through various forms of discursive critique, where attention is focused not on defi nitions but on modes of interpretation and their consequences. In analyzing the relationship between artifi cial intelligence and politics and democracy, the article pays special attention to such aspects as political self-determination, political participation and democratic governance. It emphasizes the importance of effective oversight by government and civil society over companies developing and using artifi cial intelligence technologies, which implies, in particular, the creation of effective institutions capable of defending public interests and civil and democratic rights, including in spite of technical capabilities and economic incentives. It is concluded that the infl uence of artifi cial intelligence on the political process and democracy will increase, which leads to the need to professionalize and develop its systematic interdisciplinary research.

The problem of rationality at the border of expressiveness and possibilities of human thinking is discussed when comparing natural and artifi cial intelligence (AI). A distinction is made between the concepts of intelligence and thinking. At the same time, intelligence is defi ned as rationality, always working within the limits of expressibility, and thinking includes inexpressibility in its structure. It is possible to better differentiate intelligence and thinking through an appeal to AI by formulating groups of restrictions for it, which together with this are the limits of expressiveness.

Four groups of AI limitations are considered: 1) the material support of big data storage, where we come to the resource limitation of AI; 2) the computational capabilities of the program code, where we come to the fundamental incalculability of the human brain; 3) a group of spatio-temporal conditions of the computational procedure, which is decompressed by 6 types of restrictions of this type. 3.1) AI as a time-closed system with a degraded future. 3.2) AI as a time-closed system with a degraded not only future, but also past. 3.3) Heterogeneity of G. B. Minkovsky’s space-time. 3.4) Biological space-time of V. I. Vernadsky. 3.5) Kairos. 3.6) Real time. 4) Civilizational conditions for the development of society, where the limit of AI is determined by the Noosphere according to V. I. Vernadsky.

When transferring this scheme of limitations for artifi cial intelligence to human consciousness, it is possible to more accurately defi ne the ‘boundary’ between natural intelligence and thinking. Thinking is defi ned as a part of consciousness that is outside the intellect and determines the development of both the person himself and artifi cial intelligence. From this defi nition, a natural scheme of human interaction with artifi cial intelligence is derived.

Since the invention of printing, mankind has not experienced such a revolutionary situation in relation to the preservation and reproduction of information as it is experiencing now. We live in an environment where new technologies and social media have become an integral part of everyday life. The application and use of such technologies have made a person addicted to them. A distinctive feature of this environment is the visualization of space saturated with visual images and signs. What had previously been presented as a full-fl edged text was transformed, the visual component began to prevail over the verbal one. In connection with this phenomenon, communication is changing qualitatively: if previously written speech consisted mainly of verbal text, now it is increasingly presented in the form of a creolized text, the texture of which consists of two inhomogeneous parts: verbal and non-verbal, and sometimes it is completely replaced by the language of ideograms and emojis. This phenomenon transforms our perception, speech, and language in general, as well as forms new habits and ways of communication in the modern world. In the long term, given the current rate of text replacement by visualization, this may lead to degradation of language communication and the mental level of the future person as a whole. After all, if in the 20th century scientists recorded the so-called Flynn effect. An article was published in 1984 which stated that the average IQ of US residents increased by 15 points in 1932-1978 – by about 3 points for each decade. Studies conducted after 2000 have shown what is now called the “reverse Flynn effect”: IQ growth slows down, stops, or even gives way to a recession. So, the accelerated overlay of visualization which replaces the dominance of verbality, negatively affects the intellectual level of new generations. Therefore, there are serious reasons to believe that among other things this is due to the growth of visualization of communication tools.