Ideas and Ideals

Transformations in public life and the rapid development of biotechnology have led to a redefinition of the boundaries between life and death. On the one hand, humanity has achieved unprecedented growth in biotechnological intervention in processes related to the beginning and end of human life. On the other hand, the metamorphoses of modern biomedicine face the need to understand the limits of tolerance in ethical, religious and legal discourses. Religious institutions traditionally conduct expertise and assess the new technological reality, including medical manipulations. Medicine has always been associated with religion, religion with healing. And this is not accidental, since both religion and medicine are at the origin of life and death. Christianity, in particular, the Orthodox tradition, throughout history has formed a confessional view of death and the processes associated with dying. Today, Christian churches continue to respond to social trends and the development of medicine both in official statements and at the level of individual representatives of religious organizations.

The purpose of the article is to consider a set of issues related to death and dying in the optics of the Orthodox faith, combining the analysis of the texts of Holy Scripture and tradition with the experience of modern church practice. The objectives of this study are to describe the Orthodox view of death, identify doctrinal justifications, and identify official positions on palliative care, euthanasia, postmortem donation, and cremation. The scientific novelty consists in an attempt to derive a definition of the bioethical problem of death and dying, as well as an expanded overview of related topics in the context of Christian ethics. The work presents both ethical and theological positions and practical experience in resolving practical situations related to the subject of the study. This article may be useful for physicians, specialists in the fi eld of applied ethics and theology, as well as anyone interested in bioethical issues.

Not only in the world of physics-mechanics, and even not only in sports competitions, there are collisions-bounces-ricochets. The author found it useful to examine a generalized situation in which a moving object (which may be the subject itself) encounters a solid surface (or, more broadly, specific obstacles) and changes direction. Each of the components of a typical situation is briefly described: the SUBJECT (the author of the movement), the OBJECT (what is moving), the CONTEXT (the environment in which the events are taking place), the SURFACE (against which the Object is colliding), the CHANGED DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT, the RESULT, and the ATTITUDE (of the Subject and other participants in the situation) towards the Result. An ethical analysis and brief conclusions are presented in the proposed article.Not only in the world of physics-mechanics, and even not only in sports competitions, there are collisions-bounces-ricochets. The author found it useful to examine a generalized situation in which a moving object (which may be the subject itself) encounters a solid surface (or, more broadly, specific obstacles) and changes direction. Each of the components of a typical situation is briefly described: the SUBJECT (the author of the movement), the OBJECT (what is moving), the CONTEXT (the environment in which the events are taking place), the SURFACE (against which the Object is colliding), the CHANGED DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT, the RESULT, and the ATTITUDE (of the Subject and other participants in the situation) towards the Result. An ethical analysis and brief conclusions are presented in the proposed article.

This publication continues a tradition within the scholarly community of producing analytical and reflective reviews of past events. Its primary aims are to examine the issues of human reproduction through the lens of the modern anthropological crisis and to reveal the epistemological potential of transdisciplinary methodology in researching procreative processes. The article is based on ideas presented at the roundtable “Socio-Cultural and Philosophical Aspects of Research on the Macro-Shift in Contemporary Demographic Processes”, held as part of the conference “Revolution and Evolution: Models of Development in Science, Culture, and Society” (Nizhny Novgorod). The presented materials are analyzed from the perspective of a transition from interdisciplinarity to a transdisciplinary dialogue on procreation. Researchers from various fi elds were united by common objectives: to advance the methodology of demographic studies and to identify the factors and mechanisms behind crisis phenomena in childbearing, including those that contribute to the spread of anti-natalist ideas. The article highlights the following regulatory principles of transdisciplinarity: linking the universal with the specific through social acceptance; combining the concrete with the evaluative function of a meta-position in relation to the whole; the complex configuration of the natural and the artificial in the diversity and paradox of its expressions; integrating the individual and authorial with the narrativity of thematization. This approach allows for overcoming disciplinary boundaries in the study of natalism and anti-natalism, using the value of human life and the humanistic meaning of human reproduction as key benchmarks. Contemporary demographic phenomena are characterized by ambivalence and rhizomatic complexity, yet their interpretation in science is often reduced to methodological reductionism. As an alternative, it is proposed to develop the language of procreative discourse as a form of linguistic creativity that allows for an adequate description of this complexity. The transdisciplinary meta-position aims to generate new meanings and concepts through collective co-creation, offering not final solutions, but variable models applicable to each unique case.

The phrase ‘new ethics’ has long gone beyond philosophy, and has been actively introduced into fi elds such as political science and sociology over the past decade. The article presents the author’s opinion and an attempt to give a comparative analysis of the ‘new ethics’ and the traditional ‘old’ ethics. The article examines the following historical periods characteristic of ethics in the framework of the study of this fi eld in philosophy: ancient ethics, Christian ethics, Enlightenment ethics, ethics of awareness, proposed in the XX century by thinkers such as K. Jung and E. Neumann, and finally, a ‘new ethics’ that came to the fore in the XXI century. In this work, the author has made an attempt to analyze the above-mentioned ethical trends, revealing the main content and differences in relation to the fundamental issues of ethics: the problem of criteria for evaluating actions, namely, about good and evil, about responsibility and free will, and finally, about the existence of absolute moral truth. In addition, the author analyzed the concept of new ethics as a stage in the development of normative regulation of established norms using the example of changes in some areas influenced by the new ethics. First of all, this applies to the social sphere of human interaction, namely, on the issue of understanding consent, equality, inclusivity. The author compared the new ethics with the ethical trends that preceded the ethics of the XXI century, considered the concept of human happiness and self-realization in the context of understanding ethics.

Today’s energy transition is a paradigmatic change from fossil fuel-based systems to those centered on renewable energy sources. This transformation spans technological, economic, social, and ethical dimensions and is deeply rooted in the philosophical principles of sustainable development.  Ethical considerations are gaining prominence, particularly through the emerging frameworks of energy ethics and energy justice. These approaches emphasize the moral responsibilities of governments, corporations, and individuals toward both the environment and future generations. Historically, concepts such as ecological modernization and intergenerational justice have shaped the discourse, reinforcing the need for equitable and responsible energy governance. However, despite these guiding ideals, many dominant actors such as international oil companies within the global energy sector do not consistently prioritize the principles of the common good. In practice, the energy transition is often hindered by entrenched interests, stakeholder confl icts, and the prioritization of short-term corporate gains over longterm societal benefi ts. This paper analyzes the fundamental theoretical foundations underlying the energy transition and the integration of renewable energy sources into existing energy systems, with particular attention to the role of international oil and gas companies. It argues that ensuring a just and effective transition requires a rethinking of corporate strategies through the lens of justice, sustainable development, and ethical responsibility toward future generations. Based on theoretical analysis, the author demonstrates that a successful energy transformation entails not merely a technological shift, but institutional change, reassessment of values, and a long-term commitment to sustainability. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of reconciling economic and environmental priorities through innovation, stakeholder engagement, and ethical governance. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for scholars and practitioners seeking to navigate the complexities of energy transition in the 21st century. demonstrates that a successful energy transformation entails not merely a technological shift, but institutional change, reassessment of values, and a long-term commitment to sustainability. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of reconciling economic and environmental priorities through innovation, stakeholder engagement, and ethical governance. In doing so, it offers a comprehensive theoretical framework for scholars and practitioners seeking to navigate the complexities of energy transition in the 21st century.

The article is devoted to determining the sociocultural position assigned to normative ethics by modern philosophy. For this purpose, the arguments put forward by postmodern philosophy against the classical idea of normativity in culture are analyzed, and the models proposed by its representatives as alternative concepts of ethical development are described. A comparative analysis of new ethical concepts is carried out: antinormativism, normative relativism, moral neo-universalism, normativity of the “Other”. It is argued that along with the concepts that deny the idea of normativity (antinormativism, normative relativism), within the framework of postmodern philosophy there are ideas that create a foundation for reinterpreting the ideas of classical normativity in their correlation with contemporary socio-cultural experience (moral neo-universalism, normativity of the “Other”).

It is concluded that the communicative organization of modern social reality and the ontological changes that have occurred in it allow us to talk about the emergence of a communicative ontology of ethical codifi cation as one of the important tools of sociocultural self-organization. The social system changes its former rigid hierarchical nature to a network nature, devoid of a semantic center and prone to further modifi cations. In addition, transformations lead to the gradual transformation of society from a subordinate object into a subject of normative-value self-organization.

The article deals with a preliminary analysis of the philosophical system of Russian cosmism and an assessment of the potential applicability of its ideas to modern bioethical problems. The relevance of the study is due to the need to search for axiological guidelines in the context of constantly growing capabilities of science and medicine. The article uses the term “Russian cosmism” to describe a movement in Russian philosophy that combines elements of religious and scientifi c worldviews with the aim of improving the human being. The most important representative of this movement was Nikolai Fyodorov, although in addition to him, a number of other Russian thinkers are also considered part. The study compares the philosophical system of Russian cosmism with the philosophical system of transhumanism. The article demonstrates that Russian cosmism and transhumanism are similar in that both of these systems are based on the idea of  “active evolution”, according to which the evolution of humanity as a biological species should be subordinated to the human mind. At the same time, Russian cosmism differs signifi cantly from transhumanism, the differences are such that they do not allow us to consider these schools of thought to be of the same nature. Nevertheless, the article shows that the similarities between them are suffi cient to conclude that both of these philosophical systems can be productively applied in modern bioethical discourse. At the same time, the article shows, using the example of Nikolai Fyodorov’s project of universal resurrection and immortality, that Russian cosmism, even in isolation from its utopian projects, compared to transhumanism, has a greater potential to bring a strong ethical value system to bioethics, based on the highest value of human life and personhood. Moreover, the article shows that this value system is deeply hostile to any inhumane eugenic ideas, which makes it especially relevant in modern conditions. In the end, the article concludes that the ideas of Russian cosmism, especially their ethical component, can be of great benefi t in the search for new approaches to bioethical problems and overcoming the tendency to desacralize life in modern biomedicine.

The criticism of epistemology undertaken by R. Rorty in the book “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” is based on the concept of knowledge by J. Dewey of ‘research’ as an evolutionary change of beliefs. Rorty identifies two components of this process: the description of the transition from the old belief system to the new, and the development of a new system. The first is closely related to the problems of Kuhn’s paradigm shift, and the second to Gadamer’s hermeneutic tools. Both of these are intertwined in Rorty’s subsequent philosophy, undergoing changes under the influence of a pragmatic critique of the dualisms of Western philosophy. But since hermeneutics is only one of the means of mastering new beliefs, Rorty introduces a more general concept of ‘recontextualization’. This step requires a revision of the place of Kuhn and Gadamer in late Rorty’s philosophy. In relation to Kuhn, this was expressed in the rejection of Kuhn’s privilege of the natural sciences, while the role of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as an interpretation has suffered more damage. Rorty denies the universality of hermeneutics, addressing a rebuke to those philosophers whose interpretation comes to the fore, or in Rorty’s words, ‘is inscribed on the banners of the philosophical movement’ - Dilthey, Gadamer and Taylor. Recontextualization instead of hermeneutics is implemented by Rorty in the form of a translation concept. Rorty does not accept Quine’s concept of radical translation as an expression of extreme skepticism in understanding someone else’s linguistic framework, and accepts Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which emphasizes interpretation with the achievement of ‘maximizing’ meaning and ‘optimizing’ communication. As a consequence, Rorty uses the possibility of completely abandoning ontology as a tool for describing the world and teeters on the verge of adopting a purely ‘linguistic’ vision of reality.

Two widely discussed books on violence by Steven Pinker offer a grand metanarrative about the movement of humanity towards reason, progress, and humanism. The article briefly generalizes the main author’s methodological predispositions. The article also deals with the conceptual analysis of the theory. The scholar’s theory is based on several key ideas: the state, gentle commerce, the taming of manners, and the Enlightenment. The main point is that society, passing successively through such stages-ideas, moves in the direction of greater progress and limitation of violence. As for the criticisms, we illustrate the limitations of the method chosen and the inadequacy of its objectives. First, the author uses the criminological method of counting the number of murders per hundred thousand in a population, which can only characterize one segment of violence. Secondly, the measured violence does not always correlate with other violent crimes. We also point out objective difficulties in working with the available statistics. In particular, we are confronted with fragmented data and incomparable methodology of data collection from predecessors. In addition, we reveal many mistakes, inaccuracies, and in many cases even deliberate discrepancies within representative data. Steven Pinker often resorts to overly sweeping generalizations and comparisons of difficult-to-compare cases. Many scholars have also noted the author’s use of unprofessional literature. In terms of conceptual ideas, critics note the author’s ignorance of contemporary debates and disregard for differences in the works of those classics used in the work. We should also note the rather unfriendly tone of the discussion on the part of all the participants, since the dispute is about big ideas, which often leads to direct insults and labeling. In conclusion, we praise the communicative gesture of challenging the scientific community, but it seems clear that the main goal to give proof towards violence decline is inconclusive.

The article raises the question of the relationship between the practice of artificial intelligence and universal ethics. The topic is fundamentally important, since a person and society that have lost their ethical foundations are deprived of their humanity. The ethics of scientists, designers, high-level managers play a decisive role in modern processes of development and application of artificial intelligence. In their activities, an ethic of responsibility develops, originating from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto, published in 1955 in the conditions of a nuclear standoff during the Cold War. The article shows the modern indescribably rapid growth and development of artificial intelligence applications in the practical life of people. Attention is drawn to the fact of the presence of uncertainty in situations of practical application of artificial intelligence, the presence of unforeseen consequences in addition to the expected consequences, who is responsible for those consequences (individuals, corporations, governments). The responsibility lies with the one who decides on the action: the actor. The actor is in a situation of ethical risk. It is shown that the risk increases due to a number of circumstances: 1) a variety of applications; 2) uncontrolled rampant growth; 3) difficulties in tracking the empirical situation of application; 4) difficulties in theoretical analysis of the situation of action. The article focuses on the risks of the practice of peaceful use of remotely piloted aircraft, as well as their military use and automated weapons without operator confirmation. The sharp, apparently exponential growth of information technology, the practical implementation of artificial intelligence, puts people in a difficult situation, an ethical situation: what to choose ‘to have or to be’.  Or is there a third choice?