Ideas and Ideals

The author of the article identifi es the initial context for the assumption of the connection between the ideal and the real, which is the basis of classical epistemology of the XVII century. The author shows that initially such a connection presupposed deep ontological transformations of the real through unity with the ideal. The tradition of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation was formed in archaic times and continued until Modern Times. Classical epistemology arose in the XVII century as a titanic attempt to translate the theurgic act of transformation into the sphere of the possibilities of cognition, to replace the ideal principle (or higher reality) with the possibilities of the human mind. So, on the one hand, classical epistemology retains its connection with the universal tradition of the search for truth as a transformation, and therefore it is highly appreciated by many modern epistemologists. But on the other hand, due to the unjustifi ability of its claims to transformation, it (classical epistemology) breaks with the entire history of the search for truth as a transformation that preceded it. From the need to expose the unjustifi ed assumptions of classical epistemology, the inevitability of non-classics arises. The identifi cation of such a ‘genealogy’ of modern epistemology allows us to conclude, fi rstly, that all the ‘diseases’ of the classical theory of knowledge, which have worsened to date, are ‘genetically’ conditioned and, beyond the idea of transformation, all attempts by defenders of the classics to somehow neutralize them will, by and large, miss the mark. Secondly, the aspirations of non-classics to expose the abuses of the classics, which lead the modern theory of knowledge to dead ends, can, on the contrary, become guidelines for further searches as references to the context of the ontological understanding of truth as transformation, which is original for classical epistemology, where the initial motives of unjustifi ed abuses of the classics become clear.

The article is devoted to the problem of fundamentalism arising within the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, as if contrary to his main position. This approach proclaims the freedom of the method, plurality, the purpose of which is the liberation of research activities, the rejection of the dictate of the method. However, these principles, reduced to the slogan “everything will do”, lead to a serious contradiction: if everything will work, then the dictate of the method will do. Epistemological anarchism is quite capable of pandering to the fundamentalism with which it is called to fi ght. This problem is the subject of the study of this work. In this regard, the method of critical analysis was applied to this research principle, designed to identify its internal contradictions and limitations. With the help of the method of hermeneutics, epistemological anarchism is associated with the broader context of the deontologization of European philosophy, and the corresponding issues. This makes it possible to interpret some ways of understanding P. Feyerabend’s theory as a transition of science from a claim to objectivity to ‘social constructivism’. But such a transition is just a reversal of the classical subject-object opposition. Using the theories of B. Latour, a different interpretation is given to the works of P. Feyerabend, an interpretation that indicates the hybridization of the research strategy, the constant interweaving of things, researchers and forms of expression of research programs and subjects of research. The consequence of such an interpretation of epistemological anarchism is an indication that scientifi c methods are not eliminated in their aspect of the regulation of research activity, but acquire a new property – they are understood aesthetically. Thus, as an addition to the epistemological anarchism of P. Feyerabend, there is the concept of aesthetic experience, where the method of science is a “guide”, freely chosen for the purposes of clarity of presentation, the way of expressing scientifi c ideas. An important feature of this approach is a specifi c relationship to empiricism, namely the concept of aesthetic experience. The latter presupposes not the verifi cation of the truth of theories by empiricism, but the use of empirical data as an array of expressions, as a condition for the problematization of any theory. In this regard, aesthetic experience and the corresponding empiricism inverts the principle ‘everything will do’ to ‘nothing will do’.

The paper offers an understanding of the trends and prospects for the development of modern fl at ontology on the example of object-oriented philosophy. The main attention is paid to the concepts developed within the framework of the object-oriented ontology project in the works of G. Harman, L. R. Bryant and T. Morton. The phrase ‘weird realism’, proposed by object-oriented ontology, claims to describe both the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world and current trends in modern philosophy. The work reconstructs the key provisions of object-oriented ontology, fi xes the contradictory consequences of ontological egalitarianism, object-centrism, and criticism of correlationism. The philosophy of object-oriented ontology offers an immaterialistic model of reality, defi ned by an irreducible variety of a multitude of equivalent, but ‘withdrawn’ objects from direct human access. Object-oriented ontology denies the ideas of holism, proclaims ontological egalitarianism, and fi xes the identity of human and ‘non-human’ beings.  The paper notes that the philosophy of objectoriented ontology balances between schematism (through the ‘fl attening’ of being) and metaphorization, objectivity and subjectivism, holism and mereology, the statics of identical and incoherent objects and the dynamism of their internal activity. The criticism of correlationism in the works of representatives of object-oriented ontology takes the form of a rethinking of anthropocentrism. The incorporation of non-human beings as full-fl edged actors expands the possibilities for the co-evolution of man and nature, the fi eld of human moral responsibility. The author discovers that the object-centricity of object-oriented ontology contains signs of ecocentrism and panpsychism, and the ‘democracy of objects’ takes the form of conceptual animism. The recognition of the selfworth of ‘non-human collectives’, the statement of their intertwining with humans expand the possibilities for mapping natural and socio-cultural objects, but raise issues that require comprehensive discussion. The author comes to the conclusion that despite the contradictions, the philosophy of object-oriented ontology encourages a rethinking of classical philosophical issues, contributes to understanding the socio-cultural transformations of the modern world.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

The article is devoted to the methodology for studying the “human – animal” interaction. The subject of the study is a comparison of the actor network theory and dialectical methodology from the position of their applicability to the study of subject-object relations in the system of interactions “society – nature”. The problem is the contradictory position of animals in the “society-nature” system, since animals can be both part of nature and part of modern society. The article uses comparative analysis as a research method. The problem of researching the “human – animal” interaction is, fi rst of all, a problem of research methodology, the choice of research methodology.

As a result of the study, certain shortcomings of the actor network theory were identifi ed, which do not allow it to become a universal methodology for studying both social interactions and “man – nature” interaction. It is also shown that the dialectical-materialistic approach has not lost its relevance as a universal methodology for studying social and natural processes.

As a conclusion, it is believed that the analysis of the interaction of actors through the scheme “Actors – problems-obstacles – goals of actors” has some methodological signifi cance, when moving away from the concept of equality of actors, but in general the actor-network approach has a fundamental drawback, which consists in leveling out the differences between actors. Therefore, the actor network theory can only be used as an additional method, making the main reliance on a more classical methodology, including the dialectical method.

This article is devoted to the study of the history of translations of Aristotle’s heritage into Russian. For a complete picture, the article examines in general terms the degree of familiarity of the Old Russian reader with the corpus of his texts (in particular, with treatises on animals, “Categories”, “Politics”, “Physics”, “Topics”, etc.). However, key attention is paid to supplementing the general “List” of pre-Soviet translations of Aristotle with texts, a signifi cant part of which had not previously appeared in the scientifi c literature. The most valuable among the discovered works are the translations of the “Hymn to Virtue”, the inscription to the statue of Hermias in Delphi and Aristotle’s “Testament”, as well as the lost translations of “Poetics” made by A. F. Merzlyakov. Conclusions are made that the described translations for the most part do not have scientifi c value, since they are unprofessional and are often made using secondary literature. However, this does not exclude their historical signifi cance. Bibliographic information about the translations themselves, their volume and translators, as well as the texts of the translations of the “Hymn” and the inscription on the statue of Hermias, for convenience, are presented in the form of appendices and are given at the end of the article.

Medieval thought in its philosophical, theological and poetic guise appeared to readers of Modern Times as the thought of the ‘highbrow’, which was facilitated by the scholastic method of research. The Renaissance era contrasted the ‘highbrow’ with a man rediscovering the world, who appeared as multidimensional, open to different traditions, and therefore unable to claim the completeness of knowledge. One of the main principles of thinking was the polylogicality of philosophical logic. And although this meant the coupling of various cognitive systems, taking place in the mainstream of communication (not generalization), the reliance on the Word and its expression of thought remained unchanged for everyone, which initially placed the philosopher in a religious atmosphere: the philosopher worked with something that expressed itself and was ready for its own renewal (philosophy was originally religious). This was realised by Nicholas of Cusa, who understood the original thought as having a willingness to think and the ability to think, which is why the text of the Bible seemed self-speaking. He was the herald of ‘scientifi c ignorance’. He was rather an ignoramus (a layman, a simpleton, a fool) relative to the ‘highbrow’ scholastics. But the introduction of the idea of the simpleton itself meant that the philosophical context included the whole of human life with its faith and hopes, education and upbringing of each person, which was expressed in S. Brant’s “Ship of Fools”, in the “Laudatory Word of Stupidity” by Erasmus of Rotterdam, in the “Letters of dark People” by W. Von Hutten and in the “Book about the Sage” by S. de Beauvel, an informative text, sometimes reminiscent of textbooks, which is the knowledge of a Simpleton.

The article distinguishes and analyzes two planes of discourses about death, as well as understanding of the cosmos: natural, independent of man, on the contrary, determining his life, and private, so to speak artificial, oriented towards man. Already in the works of Plato and further throughout history, these planes can be reconstructed. For example, they are demonstrated in the novel by Alexander Bogdanov “Engineer Manny”. The author shows that the private plane was initially independent; it was formed in the Ancient World on the basis of semiotic schemes that were invented as means of resolving problematic situations. The understanding of death and space is no exception. The corresponding schemes were understandable to man, as if they were created for his benefit, which is easy to explain, because it was man who invented the schemes that allowed him to understand what was happening and act effectively. Another matter is modern scientific explanations of the Universe and human death. They often describe (model) natural processes independent of man, which with iron necessity force him to follow these processes, but which man cannot understand. The isolation of the private plan, the author argues, did not benefit man. When the latter ignored the natural plan, realizing only his desires in the cognition of reality, the resulting reality became similar to the content of his consciousness without any correction from experience. The author illustrates this position by analyzing one of Carl Jung’s youthful memories. Based on the difference between these two plans, a brief understanding of the natural, humanitarian and social sciences, as well as death and the Universe, is offered. Although the Universe is a physical object, it is also an object of the humanities and social sciences. The latter can be understood in the sense that the Universe is a highly complex text and message that we have yet to understand, as well as a certain form of life, naturally, not biological, the nature of which, again, needs to be understood and explored. In conclusion, the article discusses the crisis of our civilization and a possible scenario for its resolution.

The felicitous turn of European civilization forms a critical industry – a set of ideas about what happiness should be and how to feel it correctly. In these conceptual ideas, the concepts of “success” and “happiness” are mixed or replaced, and the value experience of experiencing failure is not considered. Experiences of happiness are replaced by ambiguous emotional states associated with the practices of achievement and demonstrative strategies. The doctrine of social success is modal and deprives a person of the freedom to choose alternative lifestyles. The felicitous doctrine is based on the mechanism of social pressure, forcing a person to choose “happy objects”. Happiness in its social sense is imposed, a person is deprived of his free individual happiness.

We consider the concept of “happiness” in relation to its oppositions: success, failure. Success requires constant confirmation and carries risks of failure. Failure is seen as a form of happiness, filled with valuable experience necessary for building a future trajectory in life. This allows us to come to the definition of happiness, its socio-philosophical and sociocultural content, and to form a scientific understanding of the culture of happiness. The conclusions are based on the methods of systemic, sociocultural approaches.

The culture of happiness characterizes the felicitous experience of humanity. Happiness is a subsystem of the cultural system; it embraces eternal values with a single semantic content, dictates the norms of virtue, performs stabilizing and regulating functions, and manifests itself in symbolic design. The semantic content of happiness connects the terminal (noological) and instrumental (everyday) aspects of a person’s spiritual life and his social practices. Behavioral patterns and symbolism are distributed in accordance with the dual content of the concept of “happiness”.

When the orderly and ordered systemic character of classical scientifi c theories or philosophical concepts reproduces the supposed order of nature, the obvious and unproblematic nature of such correspondence does not require further refl ection. On the way to solving actual problems of conceptualisation of chaos, paradoxes arise: the stronger the ordering means and the more developed concepts, the less chaos remains in it, and vice versa, the more chaos, the less conceptual said concept will be. This paradox turns out to be a specifi c version of a bigger paradox – how do we conceptualise what ultimately escapes conceptualisation? How do we grasp something intangible by defi nition? This is ultimately maintained by the rigidity of classical binary oppositions, the removal of which allows one to avoid its most radical forms. Typical examples would be the problem of the Other or the attempts at consistent thinking of contradictions. The same thing happens with the conceptualisation of the non-systemic and the unstable. We need to systematise the non-systemic one way or another just to incorporate knowledge about it into the broader body of knowledge about complex systems. As for the unstable, it has to be stabilised to end up forming a concept. Even though ontology of the unstable has to correspond to what is being conceptualised, it cannot afford to be too unstable, or else it risks failing to be recognised by the academic community altogether. The paradox can be overcome if we use the means provided to us by post-non-classical approaches in philosophy, which reject classical interpretations of chaos, in turn allowing us to construct concepts fl exible and mouldable enough to actually approach chaos on a level that matches state-of-the-art epistemologies. This outlines a way to think about chaos chaotically, but also to avoid the self-destructive catastrophe of chaotic thinking. Some of the aforementioned concepts are: chaosmos, hyperchaos, magma, plasma and plasmagma. In the light of above considered ways and methods of overcoming the paradox of conceptualization of chaos or perhaps the possibility of avoiding the paradox entirely, it is clear that it is necessary to transform the very mode of our thinking, it is therefore necessary to rethink thinking itself in order to build suffi ciently fl exible and plastic post-non-classical concepts which stand a chance of making the comprehension of chaos accessible to begin with.

The purpose of the article is to reflect on the concept of Intelligent Design, the connection between the development of this theory and the development of scientific ideas about the world, as well as about free will and predestination.

As a basis in the methodological aspect, the authors applied the five Proofs of the Being of God, which were developed by Thomas Aquinas, namely, the proofs: 1) from motion, 2) from the producing cause, 3) from necessity, 4) from the degree of perfection, 5) from the purposeful cause.  After characterizing each proof, the authors of the paper refute or prove each of the proofs in terms of the concept of predestination and the Being of God. We believe that Thomas Aquinas’ proofs are based in part on Aristotle’s logic and hence on commonplace conceptions of the world. Aristotle, indeed, is the founder of a number of modern sciences that are key today. In addition, the authors refer to one of the greatest philosophers of the enlightenment era in relation to his views in the doctrines of expediency and aesthetics as a category of the beautiful and reasonable.

The relationship between ontological randomness, quantum physics, and issues of freedom of choice and predestination is analyzed. The authors then draw on the aforementioned philosopher’s writings on free will and Genesis to reflect on the theses of causality, and conclude that freedom is God, and God is where there is choice.