The author presents knowledge as a valuable strategic resource. The maintenance of competitiveness of an organization requires a focused intelligent resource management.The article reveals the role of implicit knowledge in the realization of cognitive capacities of management strategies. The paper shows that the channels of replenishment and distribution of implicit knowledge are social relationships and interpersonal interactions. The author defines the role of social capital in strengthening of intellectual capital. The article reveals the role of technical and organizational initiatives in provision of a comprehensive infrastructure used in knowledge management processes. The paper accentuates the role of initiatives on knowledge management which enhances the competitive position of an organization that uses knowledge technologies and strategies in management processes. The author shows the main issues of the SWOT analysis. This analysis promotes the increase of effectiveness of current infrastructure, coordination of knowledge and business strategy of a company; its adaptation on the market. The author highly estimates the significance of the SWOT analysis for the market evaluation and market position of a company. The SWOT-analysis is interpreted as a business-strategy based on knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of an organization, its opportunities and threats. The strategy is considered as a balancing on the edge of external environment (potential and risks) and internal capacity of an organization. The inner capacity of an organization, which is characterized as a resource-based approach, is based on resources and capabilities of competitive organization.The article shows the duration and sustainability of resource strategy, discloses its advantages and specificity of the phenomenon of increasing returns. It is shown that knowledge provides increasing returns only when it is used, as demonstrated by a self-reinforcing cycle.
The paper undertakes a précising consideration of the skeptical “dialectical strategy” in Sextus Empiricus’ variation of Pyrrhonism that nowadays enjoys a high acceptance among the scholars. (In doing this the author is much indebted to R. La Sala’s interpretation of dialectical strategy). The key principles of the strategy consist in borrowing presuppositions of dogmatists and using them against the dogmatists themselves for the argument’s sake, without an endorsement of those presuppositions by Sextus. Thus, the author takes these dialectical principles into a scrutiny in respect of 1) normative premises borrowed from the dogmatists as well as 2) how they were utilized by Sextus in his argumentative practice. Normative presuppositions used by Sextus can be divided into logic rules, rules of justification and the notion of things “by nature”, i. e. how they exist independent from cognizing agents. Sextus takes advantage of logic in order to construct valid arguments in accordance to dogmatists’ theories. Particularly, he applies a method of diaeresis for division of genus into parts as well as the implication rules articulated in Stoic logic. Further, premises as to the things “by nature” are considered. Theywere thought to be self-identical, unchangeable and devoid of any inherent contradiction. Taking this premise for granted, Sextus manages to demonstrate all diversity and disagreement on any question (modes of Aenesidemus) and come to conclusion that knowledge has not yet been attained since there is a huge disagreement. As to the rules of justification, Sextus uses the Agrippa’s Trilemma and states that according to the dogmatists’ rules any proof has not been the case since the principles of justification are not met. Finally, the skeptical methods of exposition and argumentation come to the fore. Sextus uses the sumperigra>fein rule (La Sala) and undermines the most general concepts of dogmatists coming to the particular ones.
One of the main questions of philosophy of science in XX – beginning of XXI centuries is the problem of demarcation – how to distinguish between science and metaphysics. To solve the problem the philosophers of logical positivism suggested the verifiability criterion: scientific theory must be empirically verifiable. Philosophers of postpositivism criticized the verifiability criterion and suggested the falsifiability criterion: there must be possibility for the scientific theory of showing empirically to be false. We suggest a thought technical experiment and examples from the history of natural sciences which do not satisfy the falsifiability criterion and that is why must be declared as metaphysical but are not so. For example the ideas of atom, electron, “electrical matter” in physics and chemistry, infection and gene in biology were metaphysical, but now they are considered to be real and scientific. Such cases happened when the phenomenon is caused by something which can not be discovered at least by modern science, but it really exists. And even if the reason is real and can be discovered and become scientific in future, now it has status of metaphysical idea. So we conclude that neither verifiability criterion no falsifiability criterion can clearly solve the demarcation problem and separate science and metaphysics. Whereas the verifiability criterion can increase the quantity of scientific theories because of naming non-scientific theories as scientific (for example, the theory “All swans are white”, or “it storms because Neptune is angry”), the falsifiability criterion on the contrary decreases the quantity of scientific theories because of naming scientific theories as non-scientific. We conclude that neither verifiability criterion no falsifiability criterion can be the only clear criteria for solving the demarcation problem and distinguish scientific and metaphysic knowledge. The falsifiability criterion makes science constricted, and there are scientific ideas and statements which can not be shown to be false.